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Since the last major article on estoppel and preclusion doctrines in 
bankruptcy law was released in 2005,1 courts have issued a number of 
decisions affecting the operation of estoppel and preclusion principles in 
consumer bankruptcy cases. It is imperative that practitioners keep abreast 
of these developments. If they do not, they run the risk that unclear 
language in court filings or inadvertent (or advertent) omissions at the 
beginning of a bankruptcy case will subsequently return to haunt both them 
and their clients. This danger is especially acute in the bankruptcy context 
because estoppel and preclusion are partially uncodified common law 
doctrines that are easy for bankruptcy practitioners, who are understandably 
accustomed to working within a closed statutory code, to overlook.2 
It is not enough, however, to know of the existence of these doctrines; 
the practitioner must also understand the nuances of each and the 
differences between them.3 Each has distinct elements, and different 
policies and theories underlie them. The failure to distinguish between 
varieties of estoppel or preclusion in court filings may result in the court 
applying a doctrine the litigant did not intend to plead.4 
This Article, presented in two volumes, canvasses post-2005 consumer 
bankruptcy5 decisions on the subjects of judicial estoppel, equitable 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Honorable Christopher Klein et al., Principles of Preclusion and Estoppel in 
Bankruptcy Cases, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 839, 839-40 (2005); see also Theresa M. Beiner & 
Robert B. Chapman, Take What You Can, Give Nothing Back: Judicial Estoppel, 
Employment Discrimination, Bankruptcy, and Piracy in the Courts, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 
(2005); David Gray Carlson, The Res Judicata Worth of Illegal Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Plans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 351 (2009); Robert F. Dugas, Note, Honing a Blunt Instrument: 
Refining the Use of Judicial Estoppel in Bankruptcy Nondisclosure Cases, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
205 (2006); Eric Hilmo, Note, Bankrupt Estoppel: The Case for a Uniform Doctrine of 
Judicial Estoppel As Applied Against Former Bankruptcy Debtors, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1353 (2012); Steven Jackson, Comment, Heavy Backpacks: Res Judicata and Appropriate 
Notice to Creditors During a Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
235 (2009); Honorable James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Judicial Estoppel and the 
Eleventh Circuit Consumer Bankruptcy Debtor, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1115 (2005). 
 2. See Klein et al., supra note 1, at 839-40. 
 3. “Incantations such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, or equitable 
estoppel, often lead courts into summary resolution of actions without being precise about 
the niceties of the doctrines being invoked. Imprecision, while expedient, tends to produce 
unfortunate consequences in the case at hand and future actions.” Id. at 839. 
 4. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. (In re Sharpe), 391 B.R. 117, 164 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2008) (“The plaintiffs do not identify the type of estoppel the Court 
should apply. There are many. Based on the complaint, the Court presumes it is one of the 
two most frequently raised. Those are ‘judicial estoppel’ and ‘equitable estoppel.’”). 
 5. For recent developments on these topics in the field of corporate bankruptcy, see, 
for example, Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137 (2009); Jones v. Estate of Cole, 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
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estoppel, claim preclusion (also known as res judicata),6 and issue 
preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel).7 We have discussed the 
former two doctrines in an earlier volume;8 the latter two will be discussed 
in this volume. Each preclusive doctrine will be treated in a separate 
section, which will begin by defining the doctrine and distinguishing it from 
similar but distinct doctrines. Brief summaries of cases of interest will 
follow, including important takeaways. These takeaways will benefit not 
only attorneys who practice in the field of consumer bankruptcy, but also 
nonbankruptcy attorneys who represent consumers who have gone through 
bankruptcy, are currently in bankruptcy, or who may declare bankruptcy in 
the future. 
I. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata) 
A. Definition 
Before defining the term “claim preclusion,” also known as “res 
judicata,” it is important to note a crucial distinction oft-neglected by 
courts, commentators, and practitioners alike: 
“Res judicata” has been used . . . as a general term referring to 
all the ways in which one judgment will have a binding effect on 
another. That usage is and doubtless will continue to be 
common, but it lumps under a single name two quite different 
effects of judgments. The first is the effect of foreclosing any 
litigation of matters that have never been litigated, because of the 
determination that they should have been advanced in an earlier 
suit. The second is the effect of foreclosing relitigation of 
matters that have once been litigated and decided. The first of 
these, preclusion of matters that were never litigated, has gone 
                                                                                                                 
483 F. App’x 468 (10th Cir. 2012); Adelphia Recovery Trust v. HSBC Bank USA (In re 
Adelphia Recovery Trust), 634 F.3d 678 (2d Cir. 2011); Logan Med. Found., Inc. v. 
Hayflich & Steinberg (In re Logan Med. Found., Inc.), 346 B.R. 184 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 
2006). 
 6. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 722-73 (5th ed. 1994) 
(citing Allan D. Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29 (1964)). 
 7. Id. Some jurisdictions refer to issue preclusion by names other than collateral 
estoppel, such as “estoppel by judgment.” See In re Barrett, 377 B.R. 667, 671 n.3 (Bankr. 
D. Colo. 2007). 
 8. K.M. Lewis & Paul M. Lopez, Recent Developments in Estoppel and Preclusion 
Doctrines in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases; Volume I of II: Estoppel, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 459 
(2014). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/2
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under the name, “true res judicata,” or the names, “merger” and 
“bar.” The second doctrine, preclusion of matters that have once 
been decided, has usually been called “collateral estoppel.” 
Professor Allan Vestal has long argued for the use of the names 
“claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion[,]” [respectively,] for 
these two doctrines, and this usage is increasingly employed by 
the courts . . . .9 
Accordingly, this Article will use the term “claim preclusion” to the 
exclusion of “res judicata,” with few exceptions.10  
Claim preclusion means essentially this: when a court has finally 
adjudicated a claim, a litigant will generally not be allowed to relitigate that 
claim in the same or another court.11 Thus, as a general matter, even where 
the court has committed error in adjudicating the claim in question, the 
losing party is forbidden from relitigating the claim if “the loser had the 
opportunity to test the final judgment on appeal.”12 
As one widely-cited case establishes,13 claim preclusion generally 
requires the following elements: 
1) the prior suit must have ended with a judgment on the merits;14  
                                                                                                                 
 9. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 722-23 (emphasis added); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 
U.S. 880, 892 (2008). 
 10. When referring to principles of finality generally, we may use the term “res judicata 
principles.” Also, when quoting courts and commentators who use the general term “res 
judicata,” we will preserve that usage. 
 11. Carlson, supra note 1, at 353 (citing Universal Am. Mortg. Co. v. Bateman (In re 
Bateman), 331 F.3d 821, 830 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 12. E.g., Sanders v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. (In re Sanders), No. AZ-06-1382-
PaBMo, 2007 WL 7540961, at *3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2007) (citing Paine v. Griffin (In 
re Paine), 283 B.R. 33, 39 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)). 
 13. Jackson, supra note 1, at 241-42 (citing Nwosun v. Gen. Mills Rests., Inc., 124 F.3d 
1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
 14. For example, a consent decree constitutes a final judgment on the merits for the 
purposes of claim preclusion unless the decree includes an express reservation of rights. 
Munoz v. Sovereign Bank, 323 F. App’x 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. 
Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 n.5 (3d Cir. 1984)).  
By contrast, an interlocutory order, such as a temporary restraining order, has no claim 
preclusive effect. In re Schwartz, Bankruptcy No. 07-30508, 2007 WL 3051865, at *4 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007). 
In some courts, a judgment remains final for the purposes of claim preclusion even where 
an appeal is pending. See Rainey v. Davenport (In re Davenport), 353 B.R. 150, 192 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2006) (citing Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 
1986)). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
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2) the parties must be identical or in privity;  
3) the suit must be based on the same cause of action;15 and  
4) the plaintiff must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the claim in the prior suit.16 
Some courts consider additional elements, such as whether the prior 
judgment was “rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction”17 or whether 
“the issues in the prior action [were] decided adversely to the plaintiff’s 
contentions in the instant case.”18 Some courts deemphasize or remove 
                                                                                                                 
By contrast, in some courts, claim preclusion is not applicable to a dismissal on statute of 
limitations grounds. See Smyth v. City of Oakland (In re Brooks-Hamilton), 271 F. App’x 
654, 657-58 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying California law). 
Claim preclusion is also inapplicable to a “no change” letter issued by a state's Franchise 
Tax Board, because such letters are “not the same as a final judgment issued by a court.” 
Franchise Tax Board of the State of Cal. v. Kipperman (In re Adams), Nos. SC–07–1283–
KMkDo, SC–07–1394–KMkDo, 2008 WL 8444788, at *9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008). 
Some courts have noted that the finality element for claim preclusion is more stringent 
than the finality requirement for issue preclusion. Allen v. Loughery (In re Loughery), No. 
09-69033-PWB, 2010 WL 4642131, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 12, 2010) (quoting Christo 
v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
 15. To determine whether the suit was based on the same cause of action, many courts 
utilize the “transactional approach.” See, e.g., Dye v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 289 F. App'x 
941, 944 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Wisconsin law); Humphreys v. EMC Mortg. Corp. (In re 
Mack), Nos. CC-06-1123-MoDK, CC-06-1242-MoDK, 2007 WL 7545163, at *8 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982)); Rose v. 
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 835 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1018 (D. Or. 2011) (citing Mpoyo v. 
Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005)) (applying federal law); 
Crowe v. Moran (In re Moran), 413 B.R. 168, 178 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (citing LaPoint v. 
AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 193 (Del. 2009)) (applying Delaware law); 
Monsour v. Monsour (In re Monsour), 372 B.R. 272, 277-78 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007). If two 
claims are derived from a common nucleus of operative fact, they arise from the same 
transaction. In re Moran, 413 B.R. at 178 (citing LaPoint, 970 A.2d at 193). This entails a 
pragmatic consideration of “whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or 
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit 
conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24. For instance, “a contract is [generally] considered to be a 
single ‘transaction’ for the purpose of claim preclusion.” In re Moran, 413 B.R. at 178. 
 16. Jackson, supra note 1, at 241-42 (citing Nwosun, 124 F.3d at 1257). 
 17. See McDonald v. Redstone Fed. Credit Union (In re McDonald), 374 F. App'x 937, 
940 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying Alabama law) (quoting Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 566 
So.2d 723, 725 (Ala. 1990)); see also Dover v. United States, 367 F. App'x 651, 653 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (citing Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877, 880 (6th Cir. 1997)); In 
re Moran, 413 B.R. at 178; Bailey v. City of Wilmington, 766 A.2d 477, 481 (Del. 2001)) 
(applying Delaware law); Calaway v. Cozart (In re Cozart), No. 5:08-bk-73392, 2009 WL 
1955294, at *4-5 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. July 6, 2009) (applying Eighth Circuit federal law). 
 18. See In re Moran, 413 B.R. at 178; Bailey, 766 A.2d at 481. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/2
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some of the elements listed above.19 These differences may have dispositive 
consequences.20 
Courts have also placed some limits on claim preclusion. “Suits on post-
complaint conduct generally are not barred under principles of” claim 
preclusion.21 By logical extension, even “facts representing a continuance 
of the same course of conduct” would not be barred as precluded claims.22 
The burden is on the party asserting claim preclusion to satisfy all 
applicable elements.23 However, in some jurisdictions, even if the parties do 
not formally address the applicability of claim preclusion, a court may 
apply the doctrine sua sponte if all the elements are satisfied.24 
The general purpose of claim preclusion doctrine is to further “such 
fundamental policies as promoting finality, economy, consistency, and 
comity in the judicial process.”25 However, per the U.S. Supreme Court, 
because [claim preclusion] may govern grounds and defenses not 
previously litigated, . . . it blockades unexplored paths that may 
lead to truth. For the sake of repose, [claim preclusion] shields 
                                                                                                                 
 19. For instance, Wisconsin, North Carolina, New Jersey, and other jurisdictions do not 
list the “full and fair opportunity to litigate” element in their formulations of claim 
preclusion. See, e.g., In re Cozart, 2009 WL 1955294, at *4-5; Bennett v. Smith (In re 
Smith), No. 05-10041, 2006 WL 3333801, at *10 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Nov. 16, 2006) (citing 
Green v. Dixon, 528 S.E.2d 51, 53 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)); Cotter v. Skylands Cmty. Bank 
(In re Cotter), No. 08-12504 (NLW), 2011 WL 5900811, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2011) 
(citing In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008)); Dye v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 
289 F. App'x 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶¶ 20-21, 
279 Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879, 885). 
Georgia state law removes the “full and fair opportunity” element and the “judgment on 
the merits” element and replaces them with a “court of competent jurisdiction” element. See, 
e.g., Omega Cotton Co. v. Sutton (In re Sutton), No. 06-60373-JTL, 2008 WL 4527761, at 
*2 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2008) (citing Austin v. Coca-Cola Co., 458 S.E.2d 409 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1995)). 
 20. See In re Barrett, 377 B.R. 667, 671 n.3 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007). 
 21. Era Franchise Sys. L.L.C. v. Kroeber (In re Kroeber), No. 09-32125 (LMW), 2010 
WL 4064026, at *8 (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2010) (citing Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree 
Italiane, S.P.A., 400 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 22. Legnani, 400 F.3d at 141 (citation omitted). 
 23. E.g., Caresource, Inc. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), No. 11-38159-BKC-AJC, 2012 WL 
3781134, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2012) (quoting Kaiser Aerospace Elecs. Corp. v. 
Teledyne Indus., Inc. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 24. See Wendt v. Hanson (In re Hanson), No. 10-19165-MM7, 2011 WL 6148429, at 
*2 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011) (citing Columbia Steel Fabricators v. Ahlstrom 
Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 25. In re Barrett, 377 B.R. at 672. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
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the fraud and the cheat as well as the honest person. It therefore 
is to be invoked only after careful inquiry.26 
Claim preclusion rulings are typically reviewed on appeal de novo as 
mixed questions of law and fact in which legal questions predominate.27 
However, in some (but not all) courts, “[o]nce it is determined that 
preclusion doctrines are available to be applied, the actual decision to apply 
them is left to the trial court's discretion.”28 
Claim preclusion also raises interesting choice of law issues. 
“Frequently, properly applying the law of claim . . . preclusion involves an 
initial step of deciding which jurisdiction’s rules for preclusion apply, a step 
sometimes ignored in reported cases.”29 For example, when a federal court 
must decide whether a prior state court judgment has claim preclusive 
effect, the full faith and credit statute30 requires the federal court to give 
that judgment the same preclusive effect that a court of that state would 
give.31 As a result, the federal court must apply the claim preclusion 
elements of the state in which the judgment was rendered, rather than the 
law of the state in which the federal court sits.32 Likewise, in a federal 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979). 
 27. E.g., Laurance v. Ranger Ins. Co., Inc. (In re Laurance), No. CC-04-1348-KJB, No. 
SA 01-19470-JB, 2006 WL 6810984, at *2 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2006); Alary Corp. v. 
Sims (In re Associated Vintage Grp., Inc.), 283 B.R. 549, 554 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)); cf. 
Wash. Mut. Bank v. Carlson (In re Carlson), 464 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(reviewing a court’s decision whether or not to apply claim preclusion de novo as a purely 
legal question). 
 28. Laurance, 2006 WL 6810984, at *2; George v. City of Morro Bay (In re George), 
318 B.R. 729, 732-33 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 144 F. App’x 636 (9th Cir. 2005)); 
accord Int’l Harvester Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 628 F.2d 982, 
986 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[E]ven where the technical requirements of res judicata have been 
established, a court may nonetheless refuse to apply the doctrine.”); Humphreys v. EMC 
Mortg. Corp. (In re Mack), Nos. CC-06-1123-MoDK, CC-06-1242-MoDK, 2007 WL 
7545163, at *3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2007) (citing Khaligh v. Hadaegh (In re Khaligh), 
338 B.R. 817, 823 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006)); In re Antonie, 432 B.R. 843, 850 (Bankr. D. 
Idaho 2010) (declining to apply claim preclusion solely on the grounds of judicial 
discretion). But see, e.g., Dye v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 289 F. App'x 941, 944 (7th Cir. 
2008) (suggesting that under Wisconsin law, claim preclusion automatically applies when all 
prongs of the test are satisfied). 
 29. In re Barrett, 377 B.R. 667, 671 n.3, 672 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007). 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). 
 31. E.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005). 
 32. See, e.g., Ngo v. Webb (In re Webb), No. 08-bk-743, 2009 WL 1139548, at *3 
(Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2009) (applying the preclusion law of California rather than 
West Virginia). 
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diversity action, the court must apply the forum state’s preclusion rules, 
rather than federal rules of preclusion, unless the state’s rules are 
incompatible with federal interests.33 By contrast, “[i]n a federal-question 
case based on a prior federal judgment, the federal rules of [claim 
preclusion] apply.”34 
When requesting that a court apply claim preclusion, the party should 
provide the court with a copy of the pleadings and the final judgment in the 
prior case and affirmatively explain why the prior judgment should have 
preclusive effect, lest that party run the risk of waiving his or her claim 
preclusion argument.35 
B. Illegal Bankruptcy Plans and Claim Preclusion 
Claim preclusion can come into play in consumer bankruptcy 
proceedings in several respects. “In the mad chaos of the American 
bankruptcy system, courts unwittingly confirm illegal reorganization plans” 
(that is, plans that fail to comply with one or more provisions of the Code), 
“especially in the highly frenetic context of a Chapter 13” consumer debtor 
case.36 Nonetheless, “[e]ach reorganization chapter” of the Code contains a 
finality provision that “includes a sweeping statement to the effect that 
confirmed plans are binding” on the debtor and all creditors.37 These 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Semtek Intern. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001); Munoz v. 
Sovereign Bank, 323 F. App’x 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 
880, 891 n.4 (2008); Houbigant, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 374 F.3d 192, 205 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 34. Sommers v. Vaught (In re Wilson), No. 05-81190, 2007 WL 1040565, at *1 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2007) (citing Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1326 n.10 (5th Cir. 
1981)). 
 35. See, e.g., Neely v. Johnson (In re Knezek), 370 F. App'x 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 36. Carlson, supra note 1, at 352; accord Ralph Brubaker, Supreme Court Upholds 
“Discharge by Declaration” of Student Loan Debts in Chapter 13 (Or Does It?), 30 No. 6 
BANKRUPTCY LAW LETTER 1 (Westlaw) (2010). 
 37. Carlson, supra note 1, at 352 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141, 1327) (2012)). Code § 
1141(a) reads as follows: 
Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, the 
provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any entity issuing securities 
under the plan, any entity acquiring property under the plan, and any creditor, 
equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor, whether or not the claim 
or interest of such creditor, equity security holder, or general partner is 
impaired under the plan and whether or not such creditor, equity security 
holder, or general partner has accepted the plan. 
Id. § 1141(a). Similarly, § 1327(a) reads: “The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the 
debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the 
plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the 
plan.” Id. § 1327(a). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
742 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:733 
 
 
finality sections “'generally codif[y] the doctrine of [claim preclusion] with 
respect to confirmed' reorganization plans.”38 Thus, 
“[c]onfirmation of a Chapter 13 plan by a bankruptcy court of 
competent jurisdiction, in accordance with the procedural 
requirements of notice and hearing of confirmation, is given the 
same [preclusive] effect as any district court's final judgment on 
the merits.” This [preclusive] effect prohibits the collateral attack 
of a confirmed plan, “bar[ring] litigation not only of every matter 
which was actually offered and received to sustain the demand, 
but also of every claim which might have been presented.”39 
“In sum, the principle of res judicata precludes a creditor from waiting until 
a plan is approved to assert its rights.”40 
These finality provisions often operate “even if the confirmed 
bankruptcy plan contains illegal provisions,”41 and necessarily so: “Were 
the rule otherwise, no judgment would ever be conclusive, as a party 
aggrieved by it could endlessly re-litigate errors supposedly committed by 
the trial court.”42 However, as an astute commentator has vividly explained, 
“Common sense requires that exceptions mitigate the absoluteness of [the 
Code’s finality provisions].”43 A confirmed plan giving the debtor the right 
to murder a creditor, for example, is clearly absurd and not enforceable.44 
When, therefore, does an illegal reorganization plan bind the parties, and 
when must the plain language of the Code's finality provisions give way to 
sense and sensibility? 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Carlson, supra note 1, at 353 (quoting Hutchinson v. Del. Sav. Bank FSB, 410 F. 
Supp. 2d 374, 378 (D.N.J. 2006)). 
 39. Clark v. Shapiro & Pickett, L.L.P., 452 F. App'x 890, 894 n.7 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Universal Am. Mortg. Co. v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 331 F.3d 821, 825 n.4, 830 
(11th Cir. 2003)). 
 40. Albert Togut & Lara R. Sheikh, The “Absolute Finality” Rule: Confirmation Orders 
After Travelers v. Bailey and United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 20 NORTON J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 2 (2011) (Westlaw). 
 41. Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, 553 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd, 
559 U.S. 260 (2010) (quoting Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Pardee (In re Pardee), 193 
F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 42. Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1199. 
 43. Carlson, supra note 1, at 353.  
 44. Id. at 353; see also Brubaker, supra note 36 (“Notwithstanding the statutory finality 
attributed to confirmed Chapter 13 plans, the speed with which Chapter 13 plans are filed 
and confirmed and the less-than-fastidious form and process for many confirmed Chapter 13 
plans can test the ultimate binding effect of the plan in many different ways.”). 
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Since the publication of an illuminating and exhaustively-researched 
article canvassing the res judicata worth of illegal bankruptcy plans in 
2009,45 there have been several developments that have radically changed 
the landscape of claim preclusion and illegal plans in the consumer 
bankruptcy context. 
1. Student Loans and Claim Preclusion 
a) Espinosa: The Supreme Court Giveth Its Blessing to Discharge-by-
Declaration of Student Loans, and the Supreme Court Taketh Away46 
Student loans are generally nondischargeable under the Code,47 as your 
authors are painfully aware. However, the Code provides an exception to 
the nondischargeability of student loans when “excepting such debt from 
discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the 
debtor's dependents.”48 “Congress left the courts to define what constitutes 
an undue burden. . . .”49 As it happens, it is generally agreed that courts 
have, on the whole, interpreted the undue hardship standard in a manner 
that makes it quite difficult for student loan debtors to receive a discharge.50 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Carlson, supra note 1. 
 46. For further reading, see generally, Brubaker, supra note 36; Karen Cordry, 
Espinosa: It's Not So Simple: Part 1, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2010, at 12 
[hereinafter Cordry, Part I]; Karen Cordry, Espinosa, It's Not So Simple: Part II, 29 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2010, at 12 [hereinafter Cordry, Part II]; Janet A. Flaccus, Revisiting 
Bankruptcy Discharge of Student Debt by Declaration in a Chapter 13 Plan, 2010 ARK. L. 
NOTES 21; James J. Haller, Creativity Alive in Chapter 13 Plans After Espinosa, 30 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2011, at 40; Gloria J. Liddell & Pearson Liddell, Jr., Errors in 
Judgment or How to Get Debts Discharged in Bankruptcy “(Il)legally:” A Matter of Notice, 
5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 193 (2011); Kerry Brian Melear, The Devil's Undue: Student Loan 
Discharge in Bankruptcy, The Undue Hardship Standard, and the Supreme Court's Decision 
in United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 264 ED. L. REP. 1 (2011); Togut & Sheikh, supra 
note 40. 
 47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8), 1328(a) (2012). 
 48. Id. § 523(a)(8) (emphasis added). 
 49. Jackson, supra note 1, at 239. 
 50. See, e.g., C. Aaron LeMay & Robert C. Cloud, Student Debt and the Future of 
Higher Education, 34 J.C. & U.L. 79, 83-84 (2007); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, 
The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
179, 181 (2009); Richard Fossey, Review of Alan Michael Collinge, the Student Loan Scam: 
The Most Oppressive Debt in U.S. History - And How We Can Fight Back, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 
715, 717 (2009) (book review). But see Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student 
Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 495 (2012) 
(citing empirical data suggesting that the undue hardship standard is not as unduly 
burdensome as is often suggested). 
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Faced with this high hurdle to dischargeability, some consumer debtors 
began to attempt an end run around the undue hardship requirement: 
discharge-by-declaration. A debtor would “include[] a declaratory 
statement in his or her bankruptcy petition that his or her student loan [was] 
an undue burden” and hope that the lender would not object.51 If the lender 
objected, the debtor would be drawn into an adversary proceeding, in which 
she would have to demonstrate affirmatively that she satisfied the 
applicable undue hardship elements as articulated by courts in that 
jurisdiction.52 If the lender did not object, however, and the bankruptcy 
court confirmed the plan, the debtor could discharge his or her student loans 
without having to prove an undue hardship, and claim preclusion principles 
would prevent the lender from challenging the plan for noncompliance with 
the Code's nondischargeability provisions.53 
Prior to 2010, discharge-by-declaration met a chilly reception in the 
courts. Of the circuits that considered the issue, nearly all ultimately54 
concluded “that there must be an adversarial proceeding” pursuant to which 
the debtor affirmatively demonstrates an undue hardship “for res judicata to 
apply. . . . [T]hus, a student loan cannot be discharged by mere 
declaration.”55 Ruling otherwise, reasoned these courts, would be 
tantamount to confirming an illegal plan that violated the 
nondischargeability provisions of the Code.56 Indeed, discharge-by-
declaration was so poorly received by the courts “that use of this tactic had 
largely died out.”57 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Jackson, supra note 1, at 236. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. at 236-43. 
 54. The Tenth Circuit initially concluded that discharge-by-declaration was acceptable, 
but subsequently reversed its position. Id. at 244 (citing Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Mersmann (In re Mersmann), 505 F.3d 1033, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 2007), abrogated by United 
Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010); Andersen v. UNIPAC-NEBHELP 
(In re Andersen), 179 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled by In re Mersmann, 
505 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 55. Id. (citations omitted); accord Carlson, supra note 1, at 412. 
 56. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 244; see also Carlson, supra note 1, at 410-11. 
 57. Cordry, Part I, supra note 46, at *12.  
The first point of note about Espinosa is that it is an anachronism. The tactic of 
“discharge by declaration” began in the early 1990s as a way of avoiding the 
requirements of Rule 7001. . . . [A]s such provisions blossomed, courts began 
to look for them (either on their own, or based on creditors' objections), roundly 
condemned the tactic, ordered broad remedial measures for pending cases, and 
threatened significant sanctions against debtors' counsel who persisted in using 
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By contrast, the Ninth Circuit took the increasingly lonely position that a 
discharge-by-declaration was perfectly acceptable if the creditor did not 
object.58 This result was criticized by a number of commentators,59 and 
when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue,60 many 
confidently predicted that the Court would reverse the Ninth Circuit as a 
poorly-reasoned outlier.61 
That prediction was wrong. In United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. 
Espinosa,62 decided in 2010, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the 
Ninth Circuit, thereby abrogating the case law of numerous other circuits.63 
The Court held that although the bankruptcy court confirmed a Chapter 13 
debtor's bankruptcy plan providing for a discharge of his student loans 
“without . . . an adversary proceeding . . . . or making a finding of undue 
hardship,”64 the confirmation order was nonetheless not void.65 According 
to the Court, a confirmation order is void, and therefore not binding,66 only 
                                                                                                                 
them. The result was that use of this tactic had largely died out by the middle of 
this decade. 
Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 
2008), aff'd, United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010). 
 59. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 410-12; Jackson, supra note 1, at 247-56. 
 60. Espinosa, 557 U.S. 903 (2009). 
 61. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 250-52 (“[T]he Supreme Court is leaning toward the 
requirement of an adversarial proceeding to show undue hardship. . . . [the Ninth Circuit] 
will likely be overturned . . . .”); see also Flaccus, supra note 46, at *21 (“I thought (dumb 
me) there was only a slim chance the Supreme Court would affirm the Ninth Circuit and 
overturn all of the circuits on the opposite side, but that is what the Supreme Court did!”). 
 62. 559 U.S. 260 (2010). 
 63. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mersman (In re Mersmann), 505 F.3d 1033, 1047-
48 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 2005); Ruehle v. Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. (In re Ruehle), 412 F.3d 679, 682-84 (6th Cir. 2005); Whelton v. Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp., 432 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2005); Banks v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re 
Banks), 299 F.3d 296, 302-03 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 64. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 265. 
 65. Id. at 272. 
 66. The Supreme Court did not frame its holding in terms of res judicata principles, and 
the Ninth Circuit expressly denied that res judicata principles were even implicated at all: 
[W]hat we have here is not a question of res judicata—giving the judgment in 
the bankruptcy case preclusive effect in another case. . . . A discharge 
injunction does not operate by way of res judicata; it is, rather, an equitable 
remedy precluding the creditor, on pain of contempt, from taking any actions to 
enforce the discharged debt. . . . There was no second lawsuit in our case . . . . 
Res judicata thus has no application to a case like ours . . . . 
Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, 553 F.3d 1193, 1200 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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in the exceptional circumstances where either (1) “the court that rendered 
judgment lacked even an 'arguable basis' for jurisdiction”67 or (2) “a 
violation of due process . . . deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to 
be heard.”68 Granting a discharge-by-declaration was not a jurisdictional 
defect that would render the confirmation order void. 
First, [Code section] 523(a)(8)'s statutory requirement that a 
bankruptcy court find undue hardship before discharging a 
student loan debt is a precondition to obtaining a discharge 
order, not a limitation on the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. 
Second, the requirement that a bankruptcy court make this 
finding in an adversary proceeding derives from . . . [Rule 
7001(6)], which [is a] “procedural rule[] adopted by the Court 
for the orderly transaction of its business” [and is] “not 
jurisdictional.”69 
Nor was the lender's constitutional right to due process violated by the 
confirmation order; the lender “received actual notice of the filing and 
contents of [the debtor's] plan,” which “more than satisfied [the lender's] 
due process rights” even though the debtor “fail[ed] to serve a summons 
and complaint” as would be required in an adversary proceeding.70 
However, the Supreme Court did not accept the Ninth Circuit's reasoning 
wholesale. The Ninth Circuit stated in its opinion below: 
                                                                                                                 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's silence and the Ninth Circuit's denials, Espinosa 
does indeed implicate res judicata principles insofar as it relates to whether a party can 
attack a plan provision that could have or should have been attacked in a prior proceeding. 
As one commentator explains: 
Extinguishment of a claim pursuant to a plan simply means that the student 
loan creditor has no cause of action once the plan is complete. This would have 
been the case even if a court refused to issue a discharge order pursuant to § 
1328(a). Therefore, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the case turned on 
res judicata of the plan after all. The plan itself does not give rise to the 
discharge injunction. Only a discharge order could do so. 
Carlson, supra note 1, at 409. But see Brubaker, supra note 36 (arguing that res judicata 
principles are not implicated in Espinosa). 
 67. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271 (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 
1986)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 271-72. 
 70. Id. at 272. For further reading on the notice and procedural analysis in Espinosa, see 
generally, Cordry, Part I, supra note 46; Cordry, Part II, supra note 46; Liddell & Liddell, 
supra note 46. 
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[S]tudent loan debts can be discharged by way of a Chapter 13 
plan if the creditor does not object, after receiving notice of the 
proposed plan, and that such notice [sic] is not constitutionally 
inadequate. We find it highly unlikely that a creditor whose 
business it is to administer student loans will be misled by the 
customary bankruptcy procedures or somehow be bamboozled 
into giving up its rights by crafty student debtors. If the creditor 
is notified and fails to object, it is doubtless the result of a 
careful calculation that this course is the one most likely to yield 
repayment of at least a portion of the debt. In such 
circumstances, bankruptcy courts have no business standing in 
the way.71 
To this, the Supreme Court responded: 
This, we think, was a step too far. 
 . . . [C]ontrary to the [Ninth Circuit's] assertion, the Code 
makes plain that bankruptcy courts have the authority—indeed, 
the obligation—to direct a debtor to conform his plan to the 
requirements of [Code sections] 1328(a)(2) and 523(a)(8). . . . 
[T]he bankruptcy court must make an independent determination 
of undue hardship before a plan is confirmed, even if the creditor 
fails to object or appear in the adversary proceeding.72 
Thus, the Supreme Court gave claim preclusive effect to the discharge-by-
declaration before it, notwithstanding “the Bankruptcy Court's failure to 
find undue hardship before confirming Espinosa's plan was a legal error.”73 
The Court immediately followed with the announcement that bankruptcy 
courts would henceforth have the obligation to be vigilant and deny 
confirmation of plans that seek to skirt the undue hardship standard.74 
Ultimately, the takeaway from Espinosa for bankruptcy courts is unclear. 
Espinosa saddles courts with the obligation, but not the incentive, to 
extirpate discharges-by-declaration from proposed Chapter 13 plans. Courts 
may “deny confirmation of [a] posited, uncontested discharge-by-
declaration plan without something more (e.g., some evidentiary showing 
or proffer at confirmation regarding undue hardship).”75 Beyond that, 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1205 (citations omitted). 
 72. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 276-78. 
 73. Id. at 275. 
 74. Id. at 276-77. 
 75. Brubaker, supra note 36. 
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however, given that “Chapter 13 procedure is so accelerated that the 
opportunity for error is much increased,”76 courts are unlikely to comb 
through every Chapter 13 plan in search of offending provisions unless 
guided by a creditor's objection, especially if the plan will be given claim 
preclusive effect under Espinosa even if the debtor sneaks in an illegal 
term.77 Incentives aside, there is also “no clear answer as to whether courts 
have the resources to oversee compliance with the provisions that violate 
the Code.”78 
Instead, courts are increasingly turning to local rules and model plans for 
Chapter 13 debtors that help to curtail some of the more challenging tactics 
debtors employed to work around nondischargeable debts.79 In Colorado, 
for example, debtors are required under the local rules to include provisions 
in their plans that bind the debtors to file a modification to deal with 
priority or secured claims post-confirmation.80 This provision has proven 
controversial, but does achieve the goal of giving creditors more effective 
notice of unusual or unexpected provisions in Chapter 13 plans. 
The takeaway for creditors is that the onus remains on them to vigilantly 
police proposed plans for illegal provisions. “Despite the court's duty, 
creditors should not rely on the bankruptcy courts to police a debtor's plan, 
as there is no clear answer as to whether courts have the resources to” 
police every proposed Chapter 13 plan.81  
Although the debtor's counsel's ethical duties should deter such 
illegal provisions, creditors cannot sleep on their rights or bury 
their heads in the sand. From the creditor's perspective, in light 
of Espinosa, objecting to plan provisions that appear to be 
contrary to the . . . Code is the prudent course of action. The 
alternative could mean malpractice. Creditor's counsel should 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Carlson, supra note 1, at 355. 
 77. See Flaccus, supra note 46, at 24 (“A question remains whether the bankruptcy 
judges will start scrutinizing Chapter 13 plans.”). 
 78. Faiq Mihlar & Heather Giannino, Creativity in Chapter 13 Has Limits After 
Espinosa, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2011, at 41, 95. Mihlar and Giannino suggest that this 
duty could be delegated to the Chapter 13 trustee, but express doubt as to whether trustees 
have the resources to perform the task either. See id. 
 79. Karen Cordry, Claims Bar Dates and Confirmation Orders: Can’t We All Just Get 
Along?, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2012, at 12, 72 [hereinafter Cordry, Claims Bar 
Dates]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Mihlar & Giannino, supra note 78, at 95. 
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not rely on the courts or the trustee to police for or be a caretaker 
of the creditor.82 
Some creditors, particularly taxing authorities, have therefore evinced an 
increased willingness to scour plans for illegal terms and aggressively seek 
sanctions for violations of the Code.83  
One bit of good news for creditors appeared in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in the case In re 
Anderson.84 There, a court refused to confirm a plan containing illegal 
provisions on the objection of a secured creditor.85 The case is notable, 
however, because the decision simultaneously found the creditor to lack 
standing to make the objection.86 Picking up on the Supreme Court’s 
admonition in Espinosa, the bankruptcy court refused to ignore the issues 
raised by the creditor after becoming aware of them and refused to confirm 
the debtors’ plan sua sponte.87 
At the same time, however, “creditor[s'] counsel should also be looking 
out for the practical aspects and cost/benefits to [their] clients.”88 Paying 
associates to read every word of every Chapter 13 plan that comes across a 
creditor's desk would be significantly burdensome, especially on large 
lenders with millions of clients. Thus, 
[g]iven today's environment, the uncertainty as to how courts 
will handle plans containing provisions in contravention of the 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. One commentator explained the development this way:  
[T]he states are politely putting debtors' counsel on notice—the days of 
“anything goes” in a plan are over, as are the days of carving out the loudest 
voices and keeping the provisions in for everyone else. If debtors' counsel 
continue to include such provisions, they can expect the states' response to 
escalate up to and including requests for sanctions under Rule 9011. Thus far, 
the State of Texas has convinced a number of debtors to voluntarily remove 
problematic provisions from their plans entirely; other states are expected to 
follow suit. They trust that soon, like discharge by declaration, improper 
provisions will disappear from plan proposals. If they do not, the Supreme 
Court made clear that bankruptcy courts have means at their disposal to police 
these problems. The states intend to ensure that the courts are apprised of when 
they need to exercise those means. 
Cordry, Part II, supra note 46, at 12. 
 84. 458 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011). 
 85. Id. at 503. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Mihlar & Giannino, supra note 78, at 95. 
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Code, and the ethical considerations surrounding the same, it 
would be advisable to creditor's counsel and its client to stay 
vigilant and practical at the same time. There may not be a 
universal or simple answer; each case will need to be evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis.89 
What is the takeaway for consumer debtors' attorneys? Has it suddenly 
become easier to discharge student loan debts and other nondischargeable 
debts?90 Should debtors with student loans attempt discharge-by-declaration 
after Espinosa? Despite the relative unlikelihood that courts will 
independently sift through Chapter 13 plans looking for illegal provisions, 
we believe attorneys would be well-advised not to attempt discharge-by-
declaration in the future.91 The Supreme Court intimated in Espinosa that 
“[d]ebtors and their attorneys face penalties” for “bad-faith attempts to 
discharge student loan debt without the undue hardship finding Congress 
required.”92 Even if courts are unlikely to catch the illegal provisions, a 
creditor's attorney vigilantly fulfilling his or her duty to zealously represent 
his or her client might,93 which could lead to sanctions against debtor’s 
counsel. Such penalties “should cause debtor[s'] counsel to think twice 
about proposing plan provisions that do not conform to the . . . Code.”94 
That said, the Supreme Court also suggested that other end-runs around the 
undue hardship standard remain viable: “Neither the Code nor the Rules 
prevent the parties from stipulating to the underlying facts of undue 
hardship, and neither prevents the creditor from waiving service of a 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Kurtis K. Wiard, Comment, Brunner’s Folly: The Road to Discharging Student 
Loans Is Paved with Unfounded Optimism, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 357, 389-90 (2013) (arguing 
that Espinosa may “foreshadow[] a ‘return to an era’ when student loans are more easily 
discharged”); Brendan Baker, Comment, Deeper Debt, Denial of Discharge: The Harsh 
Treatment of Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy, Recent Developments, and Proposed 
Reforms, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1213, 1215 (2012) (arguing that Espinosa is a signal of a return 
to an era of more lenient treatment of student loans in bankruptcy). 
 91. Flaccus, supra note 46, at *23. (“[I]t would be foolish to try to discharge student 
debt by declaration in the Chapter 13 plan.”). But see Brubaker, supra note 36 (arguing that 
discharge-by-declaration will retain its vitality post-Espinosa in jurisdictions where the 
“local legal culture” permits it). 
 92. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 278 (2010) (citing FED. 
R. BANKR. P. 9011); see also Haller, supra note 46, at 94 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT 3.1); Liddell & Liddell, supra note 46, at 195 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006); 
Mihlar & Giannino, supra note 78). 
 93. See Mihlar & Giannino, supra note 78, at 95. 
 94. Id. 
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summons and complaint.”95 We therefore advise debtors' attorneys to seek 
stipulations from creditors but avoid clandestine discharges-by-declaration. 
Some practitioners have proposed other ways that debtors' attorneys “can 
be creative” in “proposing new and innovative solutions in [C]hapter 13 
plans” for their clients “while also being ethical,”96 but other attorneys have 
questioned these proposals.97 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 278 (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004; FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)). 
 96. Haller, supra note 46, at *94. Mr. Haller makes the following recommendations 
when attempting to utilize “a non-standard proposal for repayment”: 
 1. Do not include issues in a chapter 13 plan that are listed as adversary 
proceedings under Bankruptcy Rule 7001; 
 2. When filing plans with alternative treatment, make the proposed 
treatment clear and obvious. Identify the language in bold. CAPS and 
underline. Include in the plan the language of the statute or case you are relying 
on for the alternative treatment. This will put the creditor on notice and give the 
court a better understanding of your proposed treatment; 
 3. Ask your local bankruptcy court whether it would insert a paragraph in 
the uniform plan (if applicable) that identifies proposed treatment under 11 
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A); 
 4. Send a letter to the creditor upon filing with a description of your 
proposed treatment in the plan and request a response; 
 5. Contact creditor's counsel, if any, to discuss the treatment before 
confirmation; and 
 6. Keep your client advised of the potential likelihood of success. 
Id. 
 97. See Mihlar & Giannino, supra note 78, at 95. Mihlar and Giannino respond to 
Haller's proposals as follows: 
Debtor's counsel may propose creative solutions including questionable 
provisions in a chapter 13 plan. For instance, debtor's counsel may attempt to 
put the creditor on notice by highlighting the alternative treatment in the plan 
through changes in font—bolding, italicizing, underlining or capitalizing. 
However, this does not solve the fact that debtor's counsel is proposing 
language contrary to the Code. 
 Let's assume that debtor's counsel sends a letter to the creditor with the 
proposed alternative treatment in the plan and requests a response. What, if 
anything, does this do to mitigate liability under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 or 11 
[sic — this should refer to Chapter 28] U.S.C. § 1927? Does making the 
proposed treatment clear and conspicuous provide an answer, or does this still 
fly in the face of debtor's counsel's ethical duties as a [sic] an attorney? As a 
practical matter, it may mitigate the potential Rule 9011 or § 1927 issues, but it 
does not get debtor's counsel “off the hook” in terms of legal and ethical 
obligations. Identifying provisions in bold, sending letters or calling the 
creditor's counsel does not make it OK to propose illegal provisions. This 
presumes that debtor's counsel can propose terms that violate the . . . Code and 
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Ultimately, whether discharge-by-declaration is appropriate, Espinosa 
sends “mixed signals” that some commentators believe “will likely 
perpetuate extreme nonuniformity” in the case law going forward.98 
b) Espinosa in the Trenches: Post-Espinosa Lower Court Decisions 
Many courts have now grappled with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Espinosa. Some have followed the Court’s directive to excise illegal plan 
provisions sua sponte,99 while others have applied the decision’s preclusive 
logic in contexts beyond student loans.100 Enough time has passed since 
Espinosa that many Circuit Courts have now issued opinions in this area.101 
In most cases examined below, a bankruptcy court confirmed a plan that 
discharged a debt not normally subject to discharge, just as in Espinosa. 
Subsequently, a suddenly attentive creditor, dissatisfied with its treatment 
under the plan, made an effort to appeal the confirmed plan on the grounds 
that the plan contained illegal provisions. In some cases, the language has 
been ambiguous or the crucial terms have been absent, leaving the parties to 
squabble over interpretation. As one might expect, debtors and their 
attorneys have been impressively inventive in their efforts to minimize 
debtors’ post-confirmation burdens. Perhaps surprisingly, however, courts 
have not uniformly thrown open the gates to illegal discharges, as the 
following cases will demonstrate. 
(1) Educational Loan Debt 
In re Wright, decided shortly after Espinosa, concerns a case with closely 
analogous facts.102 In In re Wright, the debtor’s confirmed plan contained a 
provision that purported to discharge her student loan debt as a hardship.103 
The trustee made a mistake reviewing the plan and did not object to the 
student loan discharge provision, despite lodging other objections to the 
                                                                                                                 
Ethical Rules as long as he or she puts all parties on notice. Surely, this was not 
the intended result. 
Id. 
 98. Brubaker, supra note 36. 
 99. In re Donson, 434 B.R. 471, 475 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (requiring a debtor to 
raise objections to the dischargeability of a debt not as claim objections but as assertions in 
an adversary proceeding on the same subject previously filed by the creditor, even though 
neither party had requested such an order). 
 100. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Diaz (In re Diaz), 647 F.3d 1073, 1091-93 (11th Cir. 
2011) (denying the discharge of domestic support obligations by declaration). 
 101. See, e.g., id. 
 102. In re Wright, 444 B.R. 883 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2010). 
 103. Id. at 884. 
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plan.104 The debtor’s attorney claimed that the debtor intended to file an 
adversary proceeding to obtain a finding of undue hardship, but had never 
gotten around to actually doing so.105 The court assumed the trustee’s 
motion to set aside the plan was predicated on Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(1), which deals with mistaken judgment, not Rule 60(4) like 
in Espinosa.106 The court decided that the trustee’s oversight was not 
excusable and refused to set aside the plan.107 Like Espinosa before her, 
Wright succeeded in discharging her student loan debts by declaration.108 
In its decision, the Wright court emphasized the language in Espinosa 
urging bankruptcy courts to issue sanctions against attorneys engaging in 
improper conduct.109 The court offered the following thoughts: 
[T]he Court . . . takes an extremely dim view of [the debtor’s 
plan’s] inclusion of the Student Loan Provision. Counsel insisted 
that he included the provision in order to treat “every claim” in 
the plan. If that were true, then the plan presumably could have 
merely stated only that Debtors intended to file an adversary 
proceeding to seek discharge of their student loan obligation as 
an undue hardship. . . . 
 . . . .  
 . . . Debtors' counsel and the consumer bar are well advised to 
take heed of [Rule 9011 sanctions] and to exercise more care in 
how they treat student loans within Chapter 13 plans; otherwise 
they could, and probably should, be looking down the barrel of a 
Rule 9011 motion for sanctions.110 
Of course, not all cases are so straightforward. In Hann v. Educational 
Credit Management Corp. (In re Hann), the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit considered a debtor with student loan debts that she 
claimed she had already paid.111 Although her creditor filed a proof of 
claim, the lender did not appear at the hearing on the debtor’s objection.112 
The court, unsurprisingly, found in the debtor’s favor, allowing the claim 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. at 884-85. 
 105. Id. at 885. 
 106. Id. at 886. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 886-87. 
 111. 711 F.3d 235, 237 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 112. Id.  
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for zero dollars, and the lender never appealed.113 After the debtor’s 
bankruptcy case ended in 2010, her lender continued to try to collect on the 
putative debts under the belief that its claim was not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy and therefore survived it in whole.114 The debtor re-opened her 
bankruptcy case, but the original judge had retired, leaving a lingering 
question: Had the claim been conclusively adjudicated and reduced to zero 
dollars, precluding further collection efforts, or had the bankruptcy court 
meant only to exclude the creditor from recovering against the estate, 
leaving the debt recoverable post-discharge?115 
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Hann held that Espinosa did not 
apply and was not a factor; the court rejected the lender’s argument that the 
claim allowance for zero dollars left its claim intact.116 Instead, the Panel 
found that the claim allowance and objection process did not merely signify 
that the lender would not collect in bankruptcy, but rather that the claim 
was paid in full.117 The Panel concluded that the bankruptcy court’s 
allowance in the amount of zero dollars was “tantamount to 
disallowance.”118 Thus, Hann was able to avoid any arguments about 
discharge before the Panel, because the Panel was convinced that there was 
no existing debt to discharge. 
The First Circuit followed suit, noting “the fact that [the debtor] squarely 
raised the issue of whether she had repaid her loans distinguishe[d] th[e] 
case” from cases involving discharge by declaration.119 The First Circuit 
instead likened Hann’s case to one in which an appellate court must decide 
whether a factual issue is a necessary component of an unexplained 
judgment.120 Because Hann’s argument that she had repaid her loans was 
her “central” argument against her lender, and because the bankruptcy court 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 238. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Hann v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hann), 476 B.R. 344, 357 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 
2012). 
 117. See, e.g., id. (reasoning that Espinosa did not apply because “discharge is not 
currently the issue”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. In re Hann, 711 F.3d at 241 (citing Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Diaz (In re Diaz), 647 F.3d 
1073 (11th Cir. 2011)). 
 120. Id. (citing Hoult v. Hoult, 157 F.3d 29, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1998) and concluding that a 
jury verdict that didn’t expressly state a central contention of a woman’s tort lawsuit against 
her father, who had raped her, nonetheless undeniably rested on the premise that the rapes 
did occur, so as to support the woman’s affirmative defense of truth against her father’s 
subsequent defamation lawsuit; the issue “was resolved by the jury at the first trial”). 
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indisputably had jurisdiction to determine the amount of the claim, the court 
conclusively determined the debt to have been paid in full.121 
Ultimately, the First Circuit decided that this case hinged on the proper 
interpretation of an inartfully drafted order,122 so the narrow lesson for 
debtor’s counsel is simple — offer the judge an order that disallows a 
creditor’s claim, not one that allows it for zero dollars. More broadly, 
Hann’s case makes clear that, if a debtor can show that she has already paid 
the creditor what she owed, the proper place to raise that issue is in the 
claims allowance process. Espinosa does not reach into the claims 
allowance process, and because courts apply Espinosa unevenly, parties 
should resolve disputed claims without relying on it. As such, debtors 
should only make an effort to take refuge under the Espinosa umbrella 
when they lack the evidence and testimony to prove repayment of a debt 
during the claims allowance process. 
To provide some contrast to the Hann decision, Greer v. Healthcare 
Financial Services (In re Greer) involved a debtor whose efforts to 
discharge her student loans without holding an “undue hardship hearing” 
were unsuccessful.123 The debtor included her student loan debts in her 
bankruptcy schedules, but mislabeled them as unsecured medical debts, not 
educational loan debt.124 The student loan debts were listed among the 
debtor’s unsecured debts but were not designated as non-dischargeable 
student loans.125 The confirmation order treated the debtor’s education 
lender simply as an unsecured creditor.126 After plan confirmation, the 
creditor continued to pursue its collection efforts, which led the debtor to 
initiate an adversary proceeding against the student loan creditor for 
allegedly violating the automatic stay.127  
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. (citing In re Hann, 476 B.R. at 357). 
 122. Id. at 240 (“At the outset, we can agree with ECMC that it is far better for 
bankruptcy courts that disallow claims on the ground that the underlying debt is satisfied to 
say so in clear language. We think this case would not be before us if the Claim Order 
simply said ‘ECMC's claim is disallowed because the underlying loans have been repaid.’ 
But the onus of avoiding ambiguity in these situations does not rest solely with bankruptcy 
judges. The Claim Order was submitted by Hann's counsel as a proposed order; had Hann's 
counsel proposed clearer language, this entire second proceeding most likely would have 
been unnecessary.”). 
 123. Greer vs. Healthcare Fin. Servs., LLC (In re Greer), 498 B.R. 98, 111 (Bankr. S.D. 
Miss. 2013). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 111. 
 126. Id. at 101. 
 127. Id. 
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The court assumed that the debtor was attempting to discharge her debts 
by declaration, but ruled that her failure to properly categorize the debts on 
her schedules resulted in insufficient notice to her student loan creditor of 
her intention to discharge the student loan.128 Even under the relaxed 
standards of Espinosa, a debtor cannot discharge a student debt without 
affording her creditor due process, and to do so, the discharge declaration 
must make it specifically clear which debts are subject to discharge.129 
In a similar case, Haney v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re 
Haney), a Chapter 13 debtor listed her student loan as an unsecured, 
nonpriority claim.130 After paying the student loan creditor over the course 
of the administration of her plan, the debtor’s student debt remained 
significantly in arrears.131 Some seven years after the conclusion of plan 
payments, the educational lender’s successor in interest began attempting to 
collect the unpaid portion of the debts.132 The debtor responded by 
reopening her long dormant case in an effort to enforce the stay.133 The 
result in In re Haney, however, was not a discharge, because unlike in 
Espinosa, the debtor’s plan did not contain “an express provision 
purporting to discharge the [d]ebtor’s student loan debt.”134 Taken together, 
In re Haney and In re Greer give clear guidance to student loan debtors 
seeking a discharge: the discharge order must be clear that it discharges the 
student debt. So clear, it seems, that a creditor would have ample 
opportunity to screen the illegal provision out beforehand, otherwise it will 
not be effective. 
Student loan cases are relatively rare, perhaps for a variety of reasons. 
Courts are often able to decide student loan cases on preliminary matters 
and, therefore, rarely reach the preclusion issue.135 Nevertheless, the few 
cases surveyed above make it clear that Espinosa is no open floodgate of 
student loan discharges. Instead, courts have taken a reasoned and narrow 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Id. at 111. 
 129. See id. 
 130. No. 97-70937, 2011 WL 6000886, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 30, 2011). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at *3.  
 135. See, e.g., Smyth v. Edamerica, Inc. (In re Smyth), 470 B.R. 459, 462 (B.A.P. 6th 
Cir. 2012) (holding that Espinosa has no application to bankruptcy cases filed under Chapter 
7); In re McKinnie, 501 B.R. 344, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (same); Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. v. Pulley, Case No. 3:14cv00864-HEH, 2015 WL 2146903 at *11-12 (E.D. Va. 
Apr. 30, 2015) (holding that lender's accidental rejection of trustee's plan payments did not 
estop lender from pursuing debtor for unpaid student loans). 
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approach to apply Espinosa in the realm of nondischargeable student loans. 
Thus, the best practice is to draft a discharge order with the clear aim of 
discharging a student loan, or else even the best laid schemes of mice and 
men may go awry, leaving the debtor naught but grief and pain for 
promised joy.136 
(2) “Whose Child Is This?”: Domestic Support Obligations After 
Espinosa 
The courts have been hesitant to apply the reasoning of Espinosa to 
certain varieties of debt, such as domestic support obligations. For instance, 
in the case of Florida Department of Revenue v. Diaz (In re Diaz) a Chapter 
13 debtor who had completed his plan and received a discharge argued that 
the child-support agencies of various states violated the discharge 
injunction by attempting to collect past-due child support.137 The 
bankruptcy court had granted the debtor’s objection to one of the agency’s 
claims as unopposed and had thereby reduced the claim to cover only 
unpaid principal and not interest.138 The bankruptcy court then confirmed 
the debtor’s plan, which provided for the payment in full of only the 
reduced portion of the agency’s claim.139 The debtor then completed the 
plan and received a discharge order.140 Following the discharge, the 
agencies attempted to collect the full amount of child support owed, 
including the interest the bankruptcy court had disallowed.141 
The Eleventh Circuit, notwithstanding Espinosa’s holding that the 
Code’s plan-finality provisions may result in the discharge of an otherwise 
nondischargeable debt, held that the agencies did not violate the discharge 
injunction by attempting to collect the child support because “the 
bankruptcy court’s discharge order did not discharge [the debtor’s] child-
support obligation.”142 First, the court seized upon language in Espinosa 
that—unlike student loan debt, which is dischargeable if the debtor makes 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See ROBERT BURNS, To a Mouse, on Turning Her Up in Her Nest, with the Plough, 
in POEMS, CHIEFLY IN THE SCOTTISH DIALECT 138, 148 (Kilmarnock ed. 1786). 
 137. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Diaz (In re Diaz), 647 F.3d 1073, 1081 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 138. Id. at 1080. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1081. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1089-93. However, the court also concluded that sovereign immunity did not 
categorically bar the debtor’s claims for violations of the discharge injunction. Id. at 1086-
88. 
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the difficult showing of undue hardship—”child-support debt is ‘not 
dischargeable under any circumstances’ in Chapter 13 proceedings.”143 
Secondly, the court emphasized that a bankruptcy court’s disallowance 
of a debt has no bearing on whether that debt is discharged once the debtor 
completes his or her plan. “Although a creditor whose claim is disallowed 
may not collect from the bankruptcy estate, ‘disallowance of a claim does 
not necessarily discharge [the underlying] debt’ and eliminate the debtor’s 
personal liability outside of bankruptcy.”144 In other words, the debtor 
remained liable to the creditor for the amount of the domestic support 
obligation not settled during the bankruptcy case.145 Thus, the debtor’s 
completion of his plan did not discharge the child-support debt. 
The Eleventh Circuit further rejected the debtor’s argument that general 
principles of claim preclusion barred the agencies from attempting to 
collect the child-support debt.146 The debtor argued that the agencies were 
attempting to re-litigate the amount of the child-support debt; the 
bankruptcy court’s order granting the claim objection and reducing the 
allowed claim had already adjudicated the total amount of the child-support 
debt.147 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the debtor’s argument: 
“The agencies are not attempting to relitigate this issue, as it was never 
litigated . . . . [T]he only issue before the bankruptcy court . . . was the 
amount of the child-support debt that would be paid by the bankruptcy 
estate through [the debtor’s] Chapter 13 plan, not the total amount.”148 The 
Eleventh Circuit found further support for its conclusion by referring to pre-
Espinosa cases holding that claim preclusion does not “prevent a creditor 
who holds a nondischargeable tax debt from arguing that the amount of the 
debt exceeds the payment that the creditor received during bankruptcy.”149 
Thus, concluded the court, the debtor’s remaining child-support debt was 
never discharged, and the agencies did not violate the discharge injunction 
by attempting to collect it.150  
                                                                                                                 
 143. Id. at 1089-90 (quoting United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 
274 n.10 (2010)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), (8), (15) (2012). 
 144. In re Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1090 (quoting Cruz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re 
Cruz), 277 B.R. 793, 795 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2000)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1090-92. The court also concluded that issue preclusion did not bar the 
agencies from attempting to collect the debt either. See id. 
 147. See id. at 1091. 
 148. Id. (citing Bell v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bell), 236 B.R. 426, 429 (N.D. 
Ala. 1999)). 
 149. Id. at 1091-92. 
 150. Id. at 1092. 
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The court cautioned, however, that while the agencies could collect the 
interest that had been disallowed in the debtor’s bankruptcy, the agencies 
were not permitted to double-collect the allowed principal that the debtor 
had already paid through his bankruptcy plan.151 The court further 
cautioned that its decision did not finally adjudicate the total amount of 
remaining child support the debtor owed; that was a decision left for a state 
court with proper jurisdiction.152 
Although the In re Diaz court could have rested its decision on the idea 
that disallowance of a debt is not tantamount to a discharge (a direct split 
from the First Circuit’s reasoning in In re Hann),153 the tone of the opinion 
is much more sweeping. The thrust of the opinion—as well as that of a 
subsequent Eleventh Circuit decision, Florida Department of Revenue v. 
Davis (In re Davis)—is that child-support obligations are never 
dischargeable, even if a confirmed plan included a provision explicitly 
discharging, rather than merely disallowing, the debt.154 
If this interpretation is correct, then Diaz and Davis sharply limit the 
applicability of Espinosa. Espinosa explicitly reserved the question of 
whether debts that are categorically nondischargeable—such as child-
support debts, certain types of tax debts, and debts arising from incidents of 
driving while intoxicated—can nonetheless be discharged if a confirmed 
plan so provides.155 The Eleventh Circuit approach resolves this question in 
the negative: the plan-finality sections of the Code only trump the 
nondischargeability provisions when the Code provides an exception to the 
general rule of nondischargeability, like the undue hardship discharge for 
student loans.156 Because child support obligations—and, by extension, 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Id. at 1093. 
 152. Id. (citing Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 907 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 153. See Hann v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hann), 476 B.R. 344, 357 (B.A.P. 1st 
Cir. 2012). 
 154. See State of Fla. Dep’t of Rev., Child Support Enforcement v. Davis (In re Davis), 
481 F. App’x 492, 495 (11th Cir. 2012); In re Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1089-92; see also De Boer 
v. Talsma (In re Talsma), 496 B.R. 828, 835 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2013) (“[U]nlike the student 
loan debt in Espinosa, the domestic support obligation is not dischargeable under any 
circumstances.”). 
 155. United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 273-74 n.10 (2010) (“Sections 
1328(a) and 523(a)(8) [of the Code] provide that student loan debt is dischargeable in a 
Chapter 13 proceeding if a court makes a finding of undue hardship. In contrast, other 
provisions in Chapter 13 provide that certain other debts are not dischargeable under any 
circumstances. We express no view on the conditions under which an order confirming the 
discharge of one of these types of debt could be set aside as void.”) (citations omitted). 
 156. In re Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1089-90 (analyzing Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 273 n.10). 
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almost all of the categories of nondischargeable debts enumerated in Code 
section 523(a)—do not contemplate exceptions to the general rule of 
nondischargeability, a provision in a confirmed plan purporting to discharge 
them has no preclusive effect.157 
Some courts in other jurisdictions have generally agreed with the 
Eleventh Circuit’s approach. One bankruptcy court in the Northern District 
of Texas held squarely that domestic support obligations “are not 
dischargeable under any circumstances.”158 
Purely as a matter of policy, In re Diaz seems sound. The result in In re 
Diaz protects federalism: “If bankruptcy courts could fix a debtor’s 
personal liability for child—support through rulings [and orders], this 
would often result in de facto modification of state child-support orders. 
Federal bankruptcy courts have no business becoming embroiled in state 
domestic relations to such a degree.”159 
In re Diaz fares less well as a matter of logic. The thrust of Espinosa is 
that even illegal provisions of a confirmed plan bind creditors and that 
otherwise nondischargeable debts may be discharged in bankruptcy if the 
court confirms a plan that provides for their discharge.160 Yet, there is no 
particular reason why this rule would apply to student loans but not to other 
types of obligations, including child-support debts. 
In re Diaz picks up on Espinosa’s footnote 10 and uses it to distinguish 
student loans from child-support debts. Whereas the Code makes student 
loans nondischargeable unless the court finds that repayment would 
constitute undue hardship, the Code specifies that a child-support debt is 
never dischargeable.161 That analysis is not entirely accurate, however. 
Code section 1322(a)(2) permits courts to confirm a plan that does not 
provide for full payment of child-support obligations where the holder of 
the child-support claim agrees.162 Just as a plan could contain a provision 
that a student loan poses an undue hardship even where no hardship 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. at 1091-92.  
 158. In re Talsma, 496 B.R. at 838. 
 159. In re Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1092 n.16 (citing Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1579 
(11th Cir. 1992); Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 907 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 160. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 275-78. 
 161. Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1089-90 (citing Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273 n.10). 
 162. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 1322(a)(2) (2012) (“The plan . . . shall provide for the full 
payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority under section 507 of 
this title, unless the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such 
claim.”) Domestic support obligations are included in the category of claims entitled to 
priority. See id. § 507(a)(1); see also Burnett v. Burnett (In re Burnett), 646 F.3d 575, 580-
82 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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determination has occurred,163 so too could a plan contain a provision 
stating that a domestic-support creditor agrees to reduced (or zero) 
payments.164 If the creditor fails to object, and if the court fails to catch the 
objectionable plan provision in its independent review, then the logic of 
Espinosa would give that plan preclusive effect as well, but for the 
Espinosa court’s dicta that child-support obligations are never 
dischargeable.165 
Indeed, one court has examined the tension inherent between Espinosa 
and Diaz regarding the distinction between debts that are “not dischargeable 
under any circumstances”166 and debts like student loans, which the 
Supreme Court considered to be dischargeable under some circumstances, 
specifically upon a finding of undue hardship.167 Intriguingly, the In re 
Moore court found the distinction between the types of debts to be illusory 
at best, pointing out that “[c]hild support obligations, . . . tax debts, . . . , 
and student loan obligations that do not impose an undue hardship are all 
always nondischargeable.”168 Ultimately, the Moore court followed the 
Eleventh Circuit decision in In re Diaz, concluding that the precedent’s 
logic was most applicable to the tax debts at stake in Moore and finding that 
the Eleventh Circuit’s intention was for claims-allowance processes to have 
no preclusive effect on non-dischargeable debts outside of bankruptcy.169 
The Moore court made a salient point. Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy 
Code is not well-equipped to shed light on which types of debts are really 
nondischargeable, like those the Supreme Court enumerated in its tenth 
footnote to Espinosa.170 Ideally, section 523 of the Code would list detailed 
descriptions of nondischargeable debts in parallel construction and without 
sub-exceptions or conditional language. For student loans, the proposed 
language of section 523(a)(8) would be something like: 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 276. 
 164. Unlike In re Diaz, both In re Davis and In re Talsma were Chapter 11 cases. Title 
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) does not contemplate full payment of domestic support claims as § 
1322(a)(2) does and therefore does not contemplate agreements between parties. Still, all 
three courts denied debtors' efforts to reduce their domestic support obligations. 
 165. See In re Burnett, 646 F.3d at 580-82; see also Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273 n.10. 
 166. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273 n.10.  
 167. In re Moore, No. 08-40118-JTL, 2013 WL 4017936, at *7 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 
2013). 
 168. Id. at *9 (emphasis added). 
 169. Id. at *9-10. 
 170. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012); Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273 n.10.  
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 (a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from 
any debt— 
 (8) that does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor and 
the debtor’s dependents and that is  
 (A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, 
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under 
any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit 
or nonprofit institution; or 
 (ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational 
benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or 
 (B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education 
loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual. 
By removing the conditional language, the confusion among courts evident 
in the Moore decision171 would, if not disappear, at least diminish. Without 
conditional language or exceptions, section 523(a) would be a simple list of 
absolute circumstances in which a debtor would be unable to discharge a 
debt, and footnote 10 of Espinosa would create fewer questions than in its 
current form. 
The absurdity of the categorical framework developed in Espinosa and 
criticized in In re Moore has opened the door for the In re Diaz court and 
others to pick and choose which types of debt are protected from discharge 
by declaration and which ones are not, based principally on whether the 
applicable subsection of section 523 contains conditional language or 
exceptions. As a basis for resolving a split between circuit courts, hair-
splitting a statute based upon the presence or absence of a protasis is an 
especially weak approach. In its next revisions to the Code, Congress 
should reword section 523 in the general style suggested above to avoid this 
confusion. 
As a result of the absurd approach the Supreme Court adopted, not all 
courts follow the In re Diaz approach. For example, in In re Burnett, the 
Eighth Circuit considered a confirmed plan that, contrary to Code section 
523(a)(5), did not provide for the full payment of accrued interest on 
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spousal support incurred pre-petition.172 Although the Eighth Circuit 
emphasized that the bankruptcy court should have independently refused to 
confirm the plan, even though no creditor objected to the offending 
provision, the Eighth Circuit, citing Espinosa, other applicable Supreme 
Court precedent, and Code section 1322(a)(2), held that the plan-finality 
provisions gave the illegal plan binding and claim-preclusive effect.173 
Contrast the In re Burnett decision with Hart v. Luckman (In re Luckman), 
in which a court, in part, refused to give a plan preclusive effect against 
further collections because it did not explicitly purport to discharge the 
domestic support obligation at issue.174 
The Burnett approach is superior because it does not subscribe to the 
kind of arbitrary ordering of nondischargeable debts that In re Diaz and In 
re Luckman do, but instead faithfully applies the Espinosa precedent in a 
logical way—equally to all debts that are not dischargeable under the Code. 
Assuming that amending the Code is not high on the list of congressional 
priorities, it will be up to the courts to fashion a consensus surrounding the 
reasonable approach developed in In re Burnett that treats all 
nondischargeable debts the same. 
(3) Taxes 
As one might imagine, debtors have continued to try to use Espinosa to 
their advantage, and those efforts have not been confined to the realm of 
student loans and domestic-support obligations. Other “nondischargeable” 
debts such as taxes and secured loans have proven to be fertile grounds for 
litigation in the wake of the Espinosa decision. “Nondischargeable” is in 
irony-denoting quotation marks because, as discussed above, the Supreme 
Court sowed the seeds of confusion by implying in a footnote an arbitrary 
preference for nondischargeable debt categories that are written into the 
Code without conditional language or exceptions.175 Unfortunately for 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Burnett v. Burnett (In re Burnett), 646 F.3d 575, 577, 581 (8th Cir. 2011). However, 
the In re Burnett court held that the creditor could nonetheless recover on post-petition child 
and spousal support, as well as interest incurred post-petition, because a bankruptcy plan can 
only dispose of claims that existed as of the petition date. Id. at 582-83 (citations omitted). 
But see Hart v. Luckman (In re Luckman), No. 12-60036-13, 2012 WL 6708586, at *9 
(Bankr. D. Mont. Dec. 26, 2012) (finding that confirmation order language specifically 
discharging a pre-petition domestic support obligation was necessary to achieve such a 
discharge). 
 173. In re Burnett, 646 F.3d at 580-81 (citing United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 
U.S. 260, 269-70 (2010); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 152 (2009)). 
 174. In re Luckman, 2012 WL 6708586, at *9. 
 175. See Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273 n.10. 
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debtors with tax debts, the Code provisions that describe the 
dischargeability of tax debts are riddled with such exceptions and 
conditional language,176 so the stage is set for similarly contradictory results 
as described above in the section on domestic-support obligations.177 
 For instance, in United States v. Monahan (In re Monahan), a debtor 
filed, and the court confirmed, a plan to pay in full the allowed claim of the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).178 The IRS was unsatisfied with the plan’s 
payment of its allowed claim in full and sent numerous notices of intent to 
levy upon the debtor for interest accrued on its claim post-petition.179 The 
debtor argued that, because she paid the claim in full and the claim did not 
include any provision for interest accruing post-petition, the IRS was 
precluded from continuing to try to collect said interest.180  
The In re Monahan court was thus faced with deciding whether the 
plan’s treatment of the claim was a final settlement of the IRS’s claim, 
including all interest pre- and post-petition. “The overwhelming majority of 
[C]hapter 13 plans do not provide for post-petition interest on unsecured 
claims . . . [because] a Chapter 13 plan can only provide for allowed 
claims . . . [and section] 502(b)(2) prohibits a claim from including 
unmatured interest.”181 Yet, section 1322(b)(10) provides an exception to 
the rule and allows for the payment of post-petition interest on unsecured 
claims that are nondischargeable, but only if the plan otherwise makes full 
payment on all allowed claims.182 The type of tax debt at issue in In re 
Monahan was of the type described in Code section 507(a)(8)(C), which is 
not dischargeable even if paid in full.183 Regarding such debts, “the debtor 
remains liable for any unpaid portion of the claim, including any interest 
                                                                                                                 
 176. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (2012) (allowing an exception from discharge 
debts “for a tax or a customs duty of the kind . . . specified in section 507(a)(3) or 507(a)(8) 
of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed”); id. § 507(a)(8)(C) 
(describing a category for debts that are “tax[es] required to be collected or withheld and for 
which the debtor is liable in whatever capacity”). The exception appears not in these 
provisions, but in section 1328(a)(2), which says that such debts may not be discharged at all 
in Chapter 13. Id. The Code’s labyrinthine construction here provides fertile ground for 
courts to apply Espinosa’s tenth footnote in contradictory ways. 
 177. See supra Part II.B.1.b.2. 
 178. 497 B.R. 642, 644 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2013). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 648. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 648-49 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8)(C), 1328(a)(2) (2012)).  
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that accrues on the claim post-petition.”184 Taxing authorities regularly 
collect such post-petition interest after a Chapter 13 debtor completes plan 
payments despite the automatic stay under the authority of Bruning v. 
United States.185 The only new issue to examine, then, was whether 
Espinosa overturned a half-century of widely settled law.186 
As expected, the IRS prevailed because the court held that the plan 
simply satisfied the pre-petition debt but did not discharge it.187 The critical 
difference between the plan in In re Monahan and the plan in Espinosa was 
that Monahan did not expressly state that her plan would discharge the IRS 
debt.188 As explained above, such a provision would have been illegal 
because the tax debt at issue in In re Monahan was not dischargeable even 
if paid in full under the plan.189 Without an express declaration of 
discharge, the IRS was not on notice of any discharge, illegal or otherwise, 
and thus retained its right to collect post-petition interest.190 
In In re Brown, another post-Espinosa bankruptcy court dealt with 
Espinosa's footnote ten as it applies to tax debts.191 The In re Brown court 
held that dischargeability of tax debts is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) 
and that, in accordance with Espinosa's tenth footnote, tax debts are never 
dischargeable.192 The court so held despite various IRS actions in the 
debtors' favor, including that the IRS voluntarily bifurcated its claim into 
priority and general unsecured categories, did not object to the debtors' plan 
that left much of the general unsecured claims pool unpaid, encouraged the 
                                                                                                                 
 184. In re Monahan, 497 B.R. at 648-49 (citing In re Sprolito, 359 B.R. 423, 428 (Bankr. 
D.P.R. 2006); Tashjian v. IRS, 325 B.R. 56, 59 (D. Mass. 2005)). 
 185. 376 U.S. 358, 362 (1964). 
 186. See In re Monahan, 497 B.R. at 650-51 (listing a large sample of cases across many 
circuits indicating the extension of the Bruning principle into the Code era and into all areas 
of nondischargeable debts). 
 187. Id. at 652. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (2012). 
 190. In re Monahan, 497 B.R. at 652. The In re Monahan decision cited three popularly 
cited cases with significant discussions on the issue of notice to creditors as it relates to 
Espinosa-style discharges: In re Brodeur, 434 B.R. 348, 351 n.2 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2010); In re 
Deavila, 431 B.R. 178, 179 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010); In re McLemore, 426 B.R. 728, 744 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010); see also In re Carlin, Case no. 11-11784 (ALG), 2014 WL 
5023653 at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2014) (slip op.) (requiring plan to expressly state 
discharge of tax debt to achieve discharge). But see In re Ryan, 504 B.R. 686, 704 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2013) (distinguishing In re Monahan). 
 191. No. 8:09-bk-27844-CED, 2015 WL 2437913 at *3-4 & n.24 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 
20, 2015) (citing United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 273 n.10 (2010)). 
 192. Id. 
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debtors to seek a hardship discharge, and never indicated that it intended to 
seek to collect the unsecured portion of its claim after the hardship 
discharge.193 Put another way, even in such a heavily-pro-debtor set of 
facts, IRS conduct heavily implying consent to discharge cannot override 
the Bankruptcy Code.194  
Overall, the IRS has been very successful in the post-Espinosa world at 
avoiding impermissible discharges in consumer debtor plans. 
(4) Secured Debts 
Contrast the In re Monahan court’s conclusion with that of the 
bankruptcy court in In re Franklin.195 There, a secured residential mortgage 
creditor claimed, after the claims bar date and plan confirmation, that the 
debtor owed it roughly $1,700.00 more in arrearages than provided for in 
the plan.196 The secured creditor argued that since § 1322(b) specifically 
prohibits Chapter 13 debtors from modifying the rights of residential home 
mortgage holders, and since secured lienholders are generally not bound by 
plan provisions that modify their rights without initiating a contested 
matter, the debtor’s confirmed plan should not be permitted to reduce the 
debtor’s liability to the secured creditor.197 The Court, notwithstanding pre-
Espinosa Fifth Circuit case law that supported the creditor’s position, ruled 
that Espinosa compelled a ruling in the debtor’s favor that the arrearages 
were not collectable.198 Since the creditor in In re Franklin had received 
notice and been afforded an opportunity to object to the debtor’s plan, the 
creditor was now bound, notwithstanding that the debtor unilaterally 
modified his liability on a secured home mortgage debt.199 
The distinction in this case can be found in the specific exceptions to 
discharge contained in Code section 1328(a). Section 1328(a)(1) excepts 
from discharge a secured debt which is not paid in full under the plan.200 In 
this case, however, the secured debt was to be paid in full and thus be 
discharged.201 
                                                                                                                 
 193. Id. at *2.  
 194. Id. at *4.  
 195. In re Franklin, 448 B.R. 744 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2011). 
 196. Id. at 746. 
 197. Id. at 747. 
 198. Id. at 748.  
 199. Id. 
 200. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1) (2012) (referencing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5)). 
 201. In re Franklin, 448 B.R. at 747-48.  
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In light of cases such as Diaz that applied Espinosa narrowly and 
decided in favor of creditors, the result in In re Franklin may seem 
somewhat counterintuitive. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has indicated that 
debtors can do only so much with seemingly innocuous language in their 
plans.202 In a recent Chapter 11 case, Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White 
Transportation, Inc. (In re S. White Transportation, Inc.), a secured creditor 
who had participated throughout the bankruptcy and litigated its secured 
claim pre-petition remained silent as the debtor submitted a plan for 
confirmation that provided no recovery for the secured creditor.203 When 
the secured creditor objected post-confirmation, belatedly realizing that 
section 1141(c) might very well void its asserted lien, the debtor argued in 
part that Espinosa altered Fifth Circuit precedent on this issue.204 The Fifth 
Circuit, however, construed Espinosa very narrowly as simply a case that 
dealt with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) concerning void 
judgments and held that secured creditors may still sit idly on the sidelines 
of a bankruptcy without participating, and continue to look to their lien for 
satisfaction.205 
One commentator has suggested that the Fifth Circuit’s decision here 
permits creditors to “spring awake and strip debtors of finality” post-
confirmation.206 There is certainly tension between the rights of creditors to 
ignore bankruptcy and the ability of debtors to modify secured creditors' 
rights with a simple statement in a plan.207 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel addressed this tension by shutting the door on secured 
creditors, construing silence as acceptance of even an arguably illegal 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Trans., Inc. (In re S. White Trans., Inc.), 725 F.3d 
494 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 203. Id. at 495-96. 
 204. Id. at 497-98 n.1. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Liana-Marie Lien, Note, “Asleep at the Switch”? The Need to Hold Sophisticated 
Creditors to Higher Standards in Chapter 11, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 557, 580 
(2014). 
 207. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2012). A debtor must presumably provide notice to the 
creditor of its intention to discharge the secured debt and strip the lien; otherwise Espinosa’s 
due process requirements would not be met. See United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 
U.S. 260, 272 (2010); see also In re St. Louis, No. 10-11933-TMD, 2013 WL 4498986 at 
*5-6 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2013) (holding service of an objection that putatively 
sought to challenge a lien but that did not initiate an adversary proceeding was not sufficient 
notice to afford a secured creditor due process). 
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plan.208 Other courts have found that even when a secured creditor had 
already completed a foreclosure pre-petition, because the secured creditor 
failed to object to confirmation of the debtor's plan to cure arrearage and 
resume mortgage payments, the creditor was stuck with the plan and the 
debtor's retention of the property.209 Yet another court held that a secured 
creditor was stuck with plan treatment impermissible under section 1325's 
“hanging paragraph” because the secured creditor failed to object.210 
Despite the differences among varying debt categories, courts are 
applying Espinosa so as to settle tensions its footnote 10 created, even in 
the context of secured debts, as the previously cited cases demonstrate.211 
The same Bankruptcy Rule, 7001, that requires a debtor to use an adversary 
hearing to prove undue hardship also requires an adversary hearing to 
determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien.212 To deal with secured 
loans, courts should simply impose the same notice requirements discussed 
in Espinosa213 to secured claimants.214 In the absence of the hearing 
required to contest a lien, a plan in which the debtor stripped a lien under 
section 1141(c) or 1322(b)(2) is procedurally defective, in no relevant way 
distinct from a student loan discharge-by-declaration.215 As such, secured 
creditors need to pay attention and object to confirmation of plans, even 
when they believe their rights are being improperly or illegally affected. 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Bronitsky v. Bea (In re Bea), Nos. NC-14-1376-DKiTa & 14-41272-MEH13, 2015 
WL 3441169 at *8 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 29, 2015). The Panel went on to find, however, that 
the code did not plainly state that the proposed plan treatment was illegal. See id. 
 209. In re Best, No. 14-30692, 2014 WL 3700698, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 24, 
2014); In re Ulrey, 511 B.R. 401, 407-08 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2014).  
 210. In re Ross, No. 11-04792-HB, 2015 WL 3781074, at *4 (Bankr. D.S.C. June 16, 
2015) (slip op.).  
 211. See, e.g., In re Best, 2014 WL 3700698, at *5; In re Ulrey, 511 B.R. at 408. 
 212. FED R. BANKR. P. 7001(2),(6).  
 213. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (quoting 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (requiring notice 
“to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections”)). 
 214. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2), (6). 
 215. Potentially, 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) may be of additional interest to secured creditors in 
this position, but it only applies if a secured creditor filed a claim which was not allowed. 
See Ralph Brubaker, Lien Voiding or Lien Pass-Through Upon Confirmation of Chapter 11 
Plan? (Part II): The (Ir)Relevance of Secured Creditor Participation 34 No. 1 BANKRUPTCY 
LAW LETTER NL1 (Westlaw), at nn.59, 60 (2014) (providing more analysis on the 
application of Espinosa to secured debts). 
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Tension arises (or should arise) when courts attempt to square their pre-
Espinosa precedents with that decision’s new notice requirements.216 Many 
Circuit Courts, including the Fifth, had previously developed the concept of 
“creditor participation,”217 which generally requires the creditor to do more 
than passively make an appearance and receive bankruptcy court notices 
and documents to “participate.”218 Creditor participation is generally a 
required element for a debtor to avail itself of the lien modification 
provisions of section 1141(c), though courts differ on what constitutes 
participation.219 At least one court has defined participation to be no more 
than receiving notice of the plan and an opportunity to object.220 That is 
consistent with minimal Espinosa notice, in which actual, even informal, 
notice of a debtor’s plan to illegally discharge a debt was held to be 
sufficient to foreclose a creditor’s subsequent effort to object.221 
The Fifth Circuit in In re S. White Transportation held, however, that 
secured creditors must do more than simply receive the plan and an 
opportunity to object.222 As a result, yet more nuances have been introduced 
into the world of preclusion in the wake of Espinosa, as secured creditors in 
the Fifth Circuit must now do more than receive notice to have their rights 
impacted by a debtor’s illegal plan provision. A student loan lender, 
domestic support creditor, or a taxing authority does not receive that same 
level of protection—if they simply receive a copy of the debtor’s proposed 
plan and don’t object, Espinosa’s notice requirement is satisfied. It is 
appropriate for secured lenders to receive this additional protection in light 
of the long tradition protecting their right to remain aloof of bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                 
 216. The Fifth Circuit in In re S. White Transportation appears not to have experienced 
any Espinosa-related reservations when holding that it changed nothing with regard to 
secured creditor participation precedents. 725 F.3d 494, 497-98 (5th Cir. 2013). 
For an excellent discussion of the participation requirement in a post-Espinosa world, see 
James N. Duca, Now Where Did That Mortgage Not Go? A Two-Act Play Under U.C.C. § 3-
301 and 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c), 16 HAW. B.J. 71, 82-92 (2013). 
 217. See, e.g., In re S. White Transp., 725 F.3d at 498; Universal Suppliers v. Reg’l Bldg. 
Sys., Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 254 F.3d 528, 530 (4th Cir. 2001); FDIC v. Union 
Entities (In re Be-Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1996); In re Penrod, 50 
F.3d 459, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 218. See, e.g., Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 
F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Penrod, 50 F.3d at 462. 
 219. In re S. White Transp., 725 F.3d at 497. 
 220. In re Reg'l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 251 B.R. 274, 287 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000). 
 221. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 277 (2010). 
 222. In re S. White Transp., 725 F.3d at 498. 
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proceedings. The Fifth Circuit should simply have made its position clearer 
vis-à-vis Espinosa. 
(5) Espinosa Analysis 
As the preceding cases show, Espinosa can be an exceedingly powerful 
decision in favor of debtors who manage to put their creditors on notice of 
their illegal plans without attracting an objection; they can often preclude 
their creditors from challenging their discharge of otherwise 
nondischargeable debts. The threat of sanctions against debtors’ attorneys 
that attempt this gambit clearly dampens the practice. Still, enough 
divisions remain between jurisdictions on these preclusion issues to afford 
debtors’ attorneys some cover if they decide to risk submitting a plan with a 
so-called “discharge by declaration.” Until the precedents solidify and the 
Supreme Court resolves the circuit split regarding Espinosa’s footnote ten, 
plenty of ambiguity will remain. Such a situation, in which debtors and 
creditors do not know what to expect, will undoubtedly lead to more 
“shooting for the moon” from debtors. This practice, even when 
unsuccessful, ultimately works out to the detriment of creditors, who are 
charged under Espinosa with remaining extra vigilant, always anticipating 
how an order may be interpreted in the future, especially by other judges. 
Only a much more strenuous effort by courts to achieve some level of 
uniformity in decision-making or to distribute sanctions to debtors that 
propose such discharges in bad faith will effectively discourage debtors’ 
efforts to circumvent Congress’s priority debt structure. 
C. Peeking Behind the Curtain: Brown, Archer, and Exceptions to Claim 
Preclusion in Bankruptcy 
As the foregoing demonstrates, claim preclusion is generally applicable 
in consumer bankruptcy. As will be described below, however, the 
Supreme Court, in Brown v. Felsen223 and Archer v. Warner,224 established 
categorical exceptions to the applicability of claim preclusion in the context 
of dischargeability proceedings. 
Nevertheless, the lure of claim preclusion remains strong, and 
practitioners have continually requested lower courts to find exceptions to 
the exceptions: instances in which claim preclusion applies notwithstanding 
Supreme Court precedent. As will also be described below, lower courts 
have largely rejected these requests in recent years and held that the 
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Supreme Court meant what it said in Brown and Archer: claim preclusion 
generally does not apply in dischargeability proceedings. However, a few 
important recent cases suggest that claim preclusion may apply in certain 
limited circumstances.  
1. Dischargeability Proceedings in Bankruptcy 
Before discussing the holdings of Brown and Archer, a word about 
dischargeability in bankruptcy is necessary to orient the uninitiated. The 
following analysis applies equally in consumer and nonconsumer 
bankruptcies under various chapters of the Code, but given this article’s 
focus on consumer bankruptcy cases, for the sake of brevity and clarity the 
article will analyze the issue from the perspective of a consumer 
reorganization under Chapter 13 of the Code. 
A Chapter 13 debtor that completes her bankruptcy plan225 is afforded a 
discharge of many of her debts.226 However, this discharge is not absolute. 
Congress opted to deem certain categories of debts nondischargeable in 
bankruptcy.227 These include, inter alia, debts for domestic support 
obligations,228 debts for willful and malicious injury to persons or 
property,229 debts incurred through fraud or defalcation,230 certain tax 
debts,231 and so forth. A creditor may obtain a determination that a certain 
debt is nondischargeable by initiating an adversary proceeding in the 
debtor’s bankruptcy case pursuant to Rule 4007.232 
Commonly, the debt that a creditor seeks to declare dischargeable is 
based on a judgment obtained in state or federal court. The question in such 
circumstances is this: to what extent is that prior judgment given claim 
preclusive effect in the subsequent dischargeability proceeding? 
a) Brown v. Felsen 
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Felsen, a case brought 
under the prior Bankruptcy Act (the Act).233 The facts of that case were as 
                                                                                                                 
 225. A bankruptcy court may also grant a discharge to a debtor who has not completed 
her plan, but only under very limited circumstances. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2012). 
 226. Id. § 1328(a). 
 227. See, e.g., id. § 1328(a), 1328(c). 
 228. Id. § 523(a)(5); see also id. § 523(a)(15). 
 229. Id. § 523(a)(6). 
 230. Id. § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4). 
 231. Id. § 523(a)(1), (a)(7), (a)(14), (a)(14A). 
 232. See FED R. BANKR. P. 4007. 
 233. 442 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1979) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 17a, 32 (1975)). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
772 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:733 
 
 
follows: Mark Paul Felsen (Felsen) owned a car dealership.234 Felsen 
obtained a bank loan to finance his dealership235 and induced G. Garvin 
Brown III (Brown) to guarantee the bank loan.236 Brown later sued Felsen 
in Colorado state court, alleging that Felsen obtained the guarantee from 
Brown “‘by misrepresentations and non-disclosures of material facts.’”237 
Brown and Felsen then settled the state court case by a stipulation 
providing that the bank would recover jointly and severally against Brown, 
Felsen, and the dealership, and that Brown would, in turn, have judgment 
against Felsen and the dealership.238 Neither the judgment nor the 
stipulation specified the cause of action upon which Felsen’s liability to 
Brown was based.239 Notably, because Brown and Felsen settled the case, 
the state court never admitted a sworn deposition by Felsen into the 
record.240 
Felsen then filed bankruptcy and sought discharge of his debt to 
Brown.241 Brown argued that the bankruptcy court should declare the state 
court judgment a nondischargeable debt because Felsen obtained it by 
fraud, deceit, and malicious conversion.242 Felsen responded that because 
the state court proceeding did not result in a finding of fraud, claim 
preclusion barred the bankruptcy court from redetermining the nature of the 
debt.243 He advanced this argument even though the dischargeability 
provisions of the Act had not been at issue in the state court proceeding 
because he had not yet declared bankruptcy.244 
The bankruptcy court, following Tenth Circuit precedent requiring the 
court to apply claim preclusion in dischargeability proceedings,245 
“somewhat reluctantly confined its consideration to the judgment, 
                                                                                                                 
 234. Id. at 128. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. Specifically, Brown alleged that Felsen “had prepared false title certificates, sold 
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Id. at 129. 
 238. Id. at 128. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
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 242. Id. at 129. 
 243. Id.  
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pleadings, exhibits, and stipulation which were in the state-court record.”246 
It declined to hear other evidence, including Felsen’s deposition, which the 
state court had never admitted into the record.247 The bankruptcy court 
concluded that, because neither the judgment nor the state court record 
showed that the judgment followed from Felsen’s fraud, Brown failed to 
establish that the debt was nondischargeable under the Act.248 
The district court and the court of appeals, both applying claim 
preclusion, affirmed, holding that “the prior consent decree was conclusive 
as to the nature of [Felsen]’s liability.”249 The courts concluded that because 
neither the stipulation nor the judgment mentioned fraud, the debt was 
dischargeable.250 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the 
Tenth Circuit, which applied claim preclusion in dischargeability 
proceedings, and “every other Court of Appeals that ha[d] considered the 
question,” which “rejected [claim preclusion] and held that extrinsic 
evidence may be admitted in order to determine accurately the 
dischargeability . . . of a debt previously reduced to judgment in state 
court.”251 The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that claim preclusion 
was inapplicable because “neither the interests served by [claim 
preclusion], the process of orderly adjudication in state courts, nor the 
policies of the [Act] would be well served by foreclosing [Brown] from 
submitting additional evidence to prove his case.”252 Unlike most situations 
in which a party raises claim preclusion, Brown was not attempting to 
“assert a new ground for recovery” or “attack the validity of the prior 
judgment” in the dischargeability proceeding.253 Instead, Brown was 
attempting to meet the “new defense of bankruptcy” that Felsen had 
“interposed between [Brown] and the sum determined to be due him.”254 By 
declaring bankruptcy and attempting to discharge the debt owed to Brown, 
Felsen had “upset the repose that would justify treating the prior state-court 
                                                                                                                 
 246. Brown, 442 U.S. at 130. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 130-31. 
 251. Id. at 131 (citing Houtman v. Mann (In re Houtman), 568 F.2d 651, 653-54 (9th Cir. 
1978); In re McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 293 n.6 (3d Cir. 1978); Bailey v. Wright (In re 
Wright), 584 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir. 1978); Hovermale v. Pigge (In re Pigge), 539 F.2d 369, 
371-72 (4th Cir. 1976); Raley v. Nicholas (In re Nicholas), 510 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1975)). 
 252. Brown, 442 U.S. at 132. 
 253. Id. at 133. 
 254. Id. 
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proceeding as final, and it would hardly promote confidence in judgments 
to prevent [Brown] from meeting [Felsen]’s new initiative.”255 
The Supreme Court further reasoned that Congress, in enacting the 
dischargeability provisions of the Act, intended for bankruptcy courts, not 
state courts, to make dischargeability provisions in the first instance.256 The 
legislative history of the Act suggested that the bankruptcy court’s review 
of the dischargeability of debts should be exclusive and plenary.257 
Additionally, state law elements of fraud and the like are not necessarily 
identical to the federal prerequisites for nondischargeability.258 
Furthermore, Congress, “in the interest of justice and honest dealing and 
honest conduct,” intended for all debts incurred through “offenses against 
good morals” to be excepted from discharge, even those reduced to a 
stipulated judgment.259  
Most importantly, when a plaintiff seeks a state court judgment against a 
defendant, the defendant has oftentimes not yet declared bankruptcy; “the 
debtor’s bankruptcy is still hypothetical.”260 Dischargeability 
determinations are thus “not directly in issue” at the state court level, and as 
a result “neither party has a full incentive to litigate them.”261 If state court 
judgments were entitled to claim preclusive effect in a subsequent 
bankruptcy proceeding, it “would force an otherwise unwilling party to try 
[dischargeability] questions to the hilt in order to protect h[er]self against 
the mere possibility that a debtor might take bankruptcy in the future.”262 If 
the defendant does not subsequently declare bankruptcy, then the state court 
and the litigants would have unnecessarily wasted time and resources 
arguing the dischargeability issue.263 In sum, “[i]t makes little sense . . . to 
resolve a federal dischargeability question according to whether or not the 
                                                                                                                 
 255. Id. at 133-34. 
 256. Id. at 134-39. Note, however, that there may be categories of debts over which 
“[b]ankruptcy courts and state courts share concurrent jurisdiction.” Monsour v. Monsour 
(In re Monsour), 372 B.R. 272, 278 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007). Monsour is discussed in 
greater detail below. 
 257. Brown, 442 U.S. at 134-39. 
 258. Id. at 135 (citing Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934)). 
 259. Id. at 138 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1698, at 3, 6 (1902); 36 CONG. REC. 1375 (1903)). 
 260. Id. at 135. 
 261. Id. at 134-35. 
 262. Id. at 135. 
 263. Id. 
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parties in state court waived their right to engage in hypothetical litigation 
in an inappropriate forum.”264 
Thus, the Supreme Court rejected Felsen’s claim preclusion argument.265 
“[T]he mere fact that a conscientious creditor has previously reduced h[er] 
claim to judgment should not bar further inquiry into the true nature of the 
debt.”266 The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Tenth Circuit 
and held that “the bankruptcy court is not confined to a review of the 
judgment and record in the prior state-court proceedings when considering 
the dischargeability of” a debtor’s debt.267 Instead, the bankruptcy court 
was permitted to “weigh all the evidence,”268 including additional evidence 
not admitted into the record during the state court proceeding.269 As a result 
of Brown, bankruptcy courts, when tasked with the responsibility of 
determining whether a prior judgment falls within a statutory exception to 
dischargeability, independently determine whether the type of action 
predicating the judgment is the sort of action that Congress intended to be 
exempt from discharge in bankruptcy.270 
However, the Supreme Court stressed in a footnote that even though 
claim preclusion was inapplicable in the dischargeability proceeding, the 
Court would not reach the question of whether or not the state court’s 
factual determinations would be accorded issue preclusive effect.271 
However, the Court strongly suggested that if a state court determines 
factual issues using standards identical to those of the Act’s dischargeability 
provisions in the course of adjudicating a state law question, then issue 
preclusion would bar relitigation of those issues in the bankruptcy court in 
                                                                                                                 
 264. Id. at 137. After all, one of the purposes of claim preclusion is judicial economy. 
Incentivizing parties to litigate potentially irrelevant issues in inappropriate fora would 
stymie rather than further that purpose. 
 265. Id. at 138. 
 266. Id. (citing Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co. v. Hudson, 111 F. 361, 362-63 
(E.D. Mo. 1901), aff’d, 122 F. 232, 235-36 (8th Cir. 1903)). 
 267. Id. at 138-39. 
 268. Id. at 138. 
 269. Id. at 132. The Supreme Court did note, however, that the bankruptcy court was 
permitted to “take into account whether or not [Brown’s] failure to press these allegations at 
an earlier time betrays a weakness in his case on the merits.” Id. at 138. This statement is 
somewhat at odds with its argument that Brown lacked a full incentive to litigate these issues 
at the prior stage of the litigation. 
 270. See, e.g., Bennett v. Smith (In re Smith), No. 05-10041, 2006 WL 3333801, at *2, 
*8-13 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Nov. 16, 2006) (assessing whether a judgment based on North 
Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act satisfies the Code’s statutory 
prerequisites for fraud). 
 271. Brown, 442 U.S. at 139 n.10. 
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the absence of some countervailing statutory policy.272 As explained below, 
this is because issue preclusion, unlike claim preclusion, affords preclusive 
effect only to questions actually and necessarily decided in a prior 
proceeding. The Supreme Court subsequently recognized in Grogan v. 
Garner that issue preclusion is indeed applicable in nondischargeability 
proceedings.273 
b) Archer v. Warner 
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided Archer v. Warner,274 which built 
upon Brown v. Felsen. The Court summarized the facts of Archer as 
follows: 
1) A sues B seeking money that (A says) B obtained through fraud; 
2) the parties settle the lawsuit and release related claims; 
3) the settlement agreement does not resolve the issue of fraud, but 
provides that B will pay A a fixed sum; 
4) B does not pay the fixed sum; 
5) B enters bankruptcy; and 
6) A claims that B’s obligation to pay the fixed settlement sum is 
nondischargeable because, like the original debt, it is for [money 
obtained by fraud.]275 
Therefore, the question at issue was the dischargeability of the settlement 
debt.276 
The bankruptcy court, district court, and court of appeals all concluded 
that the debt was dischargeable.277 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the 
settlement “had worked a kind of ‘novation’”278 that eliminated the original 
potential debt for money obtained by fraud and replaced it with a new 
debt.279 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, because this new debt was not for 
                                                                                                                 
 272. Id. 
 273. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 285 n.11 (1991) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., 
Leventhal v. Schenberg, 484 B.R. 731, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Kyte v. Clifton (In re Clifton), 
No. 10-43681-drd-7, 2011 WL 2224631, at *3-4 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. June 7, 2011). 
 274. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003). 
 275. Id. at 316-17 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000)). 
 276. Id. at 316.  
 277. Id. at 318. 
 278. A novation is “[t]he act of substituting for an old obligation a new one that either 
replaces an existing obligation with a new obligation or replaces an original party with a new 
party.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (9th ed. 2009). 
 279. Id. (citing 283 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
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money obtained by fraud, but rather obtained as part of a settlement, it was 
dischargeable in bankruptcy.280 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on this 
issue.281 In a 7-2 decision,282 the Court reversed and remanded.283 The 
Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the settlement agreement 
amounted to a novation that fully addressed all underlying state law claims 
and created a new debt.284 The Court nonetheless concluded that the new 
settlement debt amounted to a debt for money obtained by fraud that could 
be adjudged nondischargeable.285 
The Court reasoned that this result flowed inexorably from Brown.286 
Both the stipulated judgment in Brown and the settlement agreement in 
Archer effected a novation, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, of a 
previous potential debt.287 If the bankruptcy court in Brown was 
permitted—and indeed required—to look behind the face of the stipulated 
judgment to determine the true nature of the underlying debt, there was no 
reason the bankruptcy court could not and should not do the same in 
Archer; “[a] debt embodied in the settlement of a fraud case ‘arises’ no less 
‘out of’ the underlying fraud than a debt embodied in a stipulation and 
consent decree.”288 In other words, “if reducing a fraud claim to settlement 
definitively changed the nature of the debt for dischargeability purposes,” 
then “the nature of the debt in Brown would have changed similarly, 
thereby rendering the debt dischargeable.”289 
The Court further noted that “[p]olicies that favor the settlement of 
disputes, like those that favor ‘repose,’” were “neither any more nor any 
less at issue” in Archer than in Brown.290 
In Brown, the doctrine of [claim preclusion] itself ensured ‘a 
blanket release’ of the underlying claim of fraud, just as the 
contractual releases did here . . . what has not been established 
                                                                                                                 
 280. Id. (citing 283 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 281. Id. (citing United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re West, 
22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
 282. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent joined by Justice Stevens. Id. at 323-28 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 283. Id. at 323. 
 284. Id. at 318-19. 
 285. Id. at 319. 
 286. Id. at 319-22 (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979)). 
 287. Id. at 320. 
 288. Id. at 320-21. 
 289. Id. at 320. 
 290. Id. at 321. 
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here, as in Brown, is that the parties meant to resolve the issue of 
fraud or, more narrowly, to resolve that issue for purposes of a 
later claim of nondischargeability in bankruptcy.291 
Indeed, as in Brown, the issue of dischargeability was not—and could not—
have been raised in the state court fraud litigation, because dischargeability 
determinations are for the bankruptcy court to resolve in the first 
instance.292 
Thus, the Court ruled that claim preclusion did not bar the creditors from 
arguing that the settlement debt was nondischargeable.293 As in Brown, the 
Archer Court did not reach questions of issue preclusion; those were left for 
the Fourth Circuit on remand.294 
By solely relying on Brown (a case decided under the Act) to resolve 
Archer (a case decided under the Code), the Archer Court reaffirmed that 
Brown’s holding survived the enactment of the Code.295 However, Archer 
went further than merely reaffirming the applicability of Brown; it also 
widened the exception to claim preclusion in dischargeability proceedings. 
The Archer Court took seriously Brown’s admonition that “the mere fact 
that a conscientious creditor has previously reduced h[er] claim to 
judgment,” settlement agreement, or, presumably, to any other form, 
“should not bar further inquiry into the true nature of the debt” in a 
nondischargeability proceeding.296 “‘Congress intended the fullest possible 
inquiry’ to ensure that ‘all debts arising out of’ fraud are ‘excepted from 
discharge,’ no matter what their form,”297 and courts should not apply claim 
preclusion in a manner that would flout this congressional will. This is true 
even where, as in Archer, “[t]he parties . . . executed a blanket release, 
rather than entered into a consent judgment.”298 
                                                                                                                 
 291. Id. at 321-22. 
 292. Id. at 321. 
 293. Id. at 323. 
 294. Id. at 322-23. Interestingly, the Court also left for the Fourth Circuit the ability to 
decide other questions involving claim preclusion. See id. at 322. However, given the overall 
thrust of Brown and Archer — that claim preclusion generally does not apply in 
dischargeability proceedings — it is unlikely that the Court left much for the Fourth Circuit 
to do in this area. 
 295. Indeed, the Archer Court’s reference to the “Code” when discussing Brown suggests 
the Court may not have been aware that Brown was decided under a different statutory 
regime at all. See id. at 321. 
 296. Id. at 320-21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 
127, 138 (1979)). 
 297. Id. at 321. 
 298. Id. at 324 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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In sum, when faced with opportunities to apply claim preclusion in the 
dischargeability context, the Supreme Court has exhorted lower courts to 
elevate function over form: if a later debt has its genesis in a previous debt 
that would otherwise be nondischargeable in bankruptcy, the court may, 
notwithstanding claim preclusion, look below the surface of the document 
creating the later debt and determine whether the later debt is also 
nondischargeable. 
Thus, in practice, creditors need not litigate allegations of fraud to the 
hilt in state court out of concern that the debtor may declare bankruptcy in 
the future: 
[O]ftentimes . . . the creditor can easily establish the debtor’s 
liability based on a promissory note or other loan document 
simply by proving the debtor executed the document and failed 
to pay the debt, not bothering to present the more extensive 
evidence necessary to prove the debtor also committed fraud or 
other misconduct in connection with the debt. Brown v. Felsen 
means such a creditor is free to take the easy route to a state 
court judgment on the debt, and wait until the debtor actually 
files for bankruptcy before trying to prove the same debt also 
involved misconduct that makes it nondischargeable.299 
c) Recent Developments: Brown and Archer in the Trenches 
Since 2005, lower courts have issued countless opinions interpreting 
Brown and Archer. The majority of these cases are simply straightforward 
applications of the two cases.300 In an unsettling number of cases, the 
practitioner simply did not know that Brown and Archer existed, or, at the 
very least, did not fully appreciate or understand the consequences of their 
                                                                                                                 
 299. Frontier Farm Credit, PCA v. Norris (In re Norris), No. 05-43551-7, 2007 WL 
1946547, at *2 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 29, 2007). 
 300. See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank v. Carlson (In re Carlson), 464 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th 
Cir. 2012); JHK Venture Capital Ltd. P’ship v. Wellens (In re Wellens), No. 11-35835 ABC, 
2012 WL 2871666, at *1 (Bankr. D. Colo. July 12, 2012); Voss v. Pujdak (In re Pujdak), 
462 B.R. 560, 569-70 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011); Era Franchise Sys. L.L.C. v. Kroeber (In re 
Kroeber), No. 09-32125 (LMW), 2010 WL 4064026, at *10 (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 15, 
2010); Allen v. Loughery (In re Loughery), No. 09-69033-PWB, 2010 WL 4642131, at *2-3 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 12, 2010); V2R, LLC v. Schneider (In re Schneider), No. 05-2382-
JNF, 2006 WL 1431603, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 23, 2006); Rainey v. Davenport (In re 
Davenport), 353 B.R. 150, 193-95 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2006). 
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holdings.301 This demonstrates this article’s importance to educate 
practitioners of the applicable law. 
In the more interesting cases, the practitioner was aware of Brown and 
Archer and tried to distinguish them. As will be described below, most of 
these attempts have failed, even though many of them exhibited deep 
engagement with the cases and clever reasoning. In other words, the lower 
courts have largely reaffirmed that Brown and Archer mean what they say. 
The upshot for practitioners is that attempts to sidestep these cases, even 
well reasoned ones, are likely to fail. In the most interesting cases, however, 
the attempt worked. Thus, there are times, albeit very few of them, where, 
notwithstanding Archer and Brown, claim preclusion is applicable in 
dischargeability proceedings. Finally, a few courts have extended the 
holdings of Brown and Archer beyond the nondischargeability context. 
(1) Brown and Archer Mean What They Say 
It is worth briefly mentioning the various ways in which courts have 
reaffirmed the essential holdings of Brown and Archer. 
Although Brown and Archer only dealt with debts arising out of fraud, 
Code section 523(a) exempts from discharge debts from other categories, 
some of which are listed above. Following Archer, “numerous courts have 
applied the Supreme Court’s holding to other categories of 
nondischargeability actions under section 523(a).”302 Courts have also 
extended the Brown/Archer rule beyond the nondischargeability provisions 
                                                                                                                 
 301. See, e.g., West Coast Rentals, Inc. v. Perez (In re Perez), 415 B.R. 546, 552 (Bankr. 
D.N.M. 2009); Frontier Farm Credit, PCA v. Norris (In re Norris), No. 05-43551-7, 2007 
WL 1946547, at *1-2 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 29, 2007). 
Some of this ignorance might stem more from the unfortunate tendency of some 
practitioners to lump claim preclusion (which, under Brown and Archer, generally does not 
apply in dischargeability proceedings) together with issue preclusion (which may apply in 
dischargeability proceedings) under the single umbrella term “res judicata.” See, e.g., Ngo v. 
Webb (In re Webb), No. 08-bk-743, 2009 WL 1139548, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 
2009). 
Additionally, some of these cases involved pro se litigants, who understandably might not 
be familiar with Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Wendt v. Hanson (In re Hanson), No. 
10-19165-MM7, 2011 WL 6148429, at *2-3 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011); Tomlin v. 
Crownover (In re Crownover), 417 B.R. 45, 50-51 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009). 
 302. Bauer v. Colokathis (In re Colokathis), 417 B.R. 150, 158 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) 
(citing Giaimo v. DeTrano (In re DeTrano), 326 F.3d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying 
Archer to “willful and malicious injury” prong)). 
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of section 523(a) to the nondischargeability provisions of Chapter 13 of the 
Code.303 
Additionally, Brown and Archer permit the bankruptcy court to look 
behind the terms of a settlement agreement even where that agreement 
explicitly releases the debtor-defendant from the plaintiff-creditor’s fraud 
claims,304 or where the settlement agreement contains a provision that 
purports to preclude the creditor from pursuing a nondischargeability 
determination in the debtor’s bankruptcy case.305 “Regardless of any release 
which may have been executed by the creditor, or any potential novation, if 
the particular debt arose out of fraud, then [the bankruptcy court] may find 
the debt to be nondischargeable, no matter its current form.”306 
Likewise, the bankruptcy court may look behind the terms of a 
settlement agreement or judgment to determine whether the debt truly arises 
out of fraud, even where the settlement agreement explicitly states that the 
debt is indeed predicated on fraud and is therefore nondischargeable.307 “If 
it is permissible for a bankruptcy court to look behind a state court 
judgment to find a debt is not dischargeable, the reverse is also true, and the 
court may look behind the judgment and conclude a debt is 
dischargeable.”308 
Courts have held that claim preclusion does not apply in a 
dischargeability proceeding, even where the plaintiff attempts to give 
preclusive effect to a default judgment that contains explicit findings that 
the debtor perpetrated a fraud.309 Thus, claim preclusion generally does not 
apply in a nondischargeability proceeding, even where the parties agree that 
                                                                                                                 
 303. See League v. Lowther (In re Lowther), No. 10-04155-8-JRL, 2011 WL 61603, at 
*1-2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 4, 2011). 
 304. See Weilert v. Parker (In re Weilert), No. CC-07-1448-MkMOD, 2008 WL 
8462953, at *1-5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2008); OSB Mfg., Inc. v. Hathaway (In re 
Hathaway), 364 B.R. 220, 242-43 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). 
 305. See In re Weilert, 2008 WL 8462953, at *5. 
 306. In re Hathaway, 364 B.R. at 242. 
 307. See Simmons Capital Advisors, Ltd. v. Bachinski (In re Bachinski), 393 B.R. 522, 
529-34, 540-42 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008). 
 308. Hackney v. Hackney (In re Hackney), No. 07-40952-JJR-11, 2008 WL 4830040, at 
*10 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Oct. 10, 2008) (emphasis added). 
 309. See Bublitz Mach. Co. v. Brewer (In re Brewer), No. 05-51960, 2006 WL 1109409, 
at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 2006). 
The Bublitz Court further held that issue preclusion did not apply because a default 
judgment is not a judgment on the merits. Id. at *1-2. This is not true in all jurisdictions, 
however; in some courts, “[i]t is well-established that default judgments may be entitled to a 
preclusive effect under the theory of res judicata.” See Voss v. Pujdak (In re Pujdak), 462 
B.R. 560, 568-69 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (citations omitted). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
782 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:733 
 
 
the debtor committed fraud; the bankruptcy court must look behind the 
record to determine the true nature of the debt. 
Following Brown’s admonition that dischargeability determinations are 
the exclusive province of the bankruptcy court,310 some state appellate 
courts have reversed state trial court rulings that purport to declare a debt 
nondischargeable in a defendant’s bankruptcy.311 
Some courts, interpreting Archer, have held that when a debt subject to a 
dischargeability proceeding has previously been reduced to a settlement, the 
court “need only look to the underlying civil action”—that is, to “the 
underlying complaint and the allegations contained in it”—”to determine 
whether [the] claim is nondischargeable.”312 
(2) Failed Attempts to Sidestep Brown and Archer 
Many practitioners have tried and failed to distinguish Brown and 
Archer.313 In Simmons Capital Advisors, Ltd. v. Bachinski (In re Bachinski), 
for example, a judgment creditor “attempt[ed] to turn the tables and make 
offensive use of the novation doctrine” discussed in Archer.314 Specifically, 
the creditor argued that because “the contractual doctrine of novation does 
not operate so as to alter the nature of a debt for dischargeability purposes,” 
it follows that “a debt allegedly arising from fraudulent conduct, which is 
made the subject of a settlement agreement, is ipso facto nondischargeable 
                                                                                                                 
 310. Note, however, that there may be categories of debts over which “[b]ankruptcy 
courts and state courts share concurrent jurisdiction.” Monsour v. Monsour (In re Monsour), 
372 B.R. 272, 278 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007). Monsour is discussed in greater detail below. 
Moreover, some courts hold “that, when a debtor fails to schedule a debt, the debtor loses 
the benefit of the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction,” such that “the bankruptcy court 
may share jurisdiction” with a state court “for dischargeability issues, but only to the extent 
that the bankruptcy court in its discretion remands or abstains from hearing the matter.” 
Cotter v. Skylands Cmty. Bank (In re Cotter), No. 08-12504 (NLW), 2011 WL 5900811, at 
*4 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2011) (citing In re Strano, 248 B.R. 493, 502-03 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
2000)). Thus, there are instances where a state court may decide dischargeability issues. See 
id. at *4-5. 
 311. See, e.g., Birry v. Birry, No. 256627, 2006 WL 2457488, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 
24, 2006). 
 312. Bauer v. Colokathis (In re Colokathis), 417 B.R. 150, 158 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) 
(citing Giaimo v. DeTrano (In re DeTrano), 326 F.3d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 313. See, e.g., V2R, L.L.C. v. Schneider (In re Schneider), No. 05-2382-JNF, 2006 WL 
1431603, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 23, 2006). 
For instance, Brown and Archer apply even when the debtor argues that following them 
would produce an unfair result in a given case. See Rainey v. Davenport (In re Davenport), 
353 B.R. 150, 195 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2006). 
 314. 393 B.R. 522, 541 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008). 
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under [Code section] 523(a)(2)(A).”315 The bankruptcy court agreed with 
the creditor’s premise regarding the inapplicability of novation in a 
nondischargeability proceeding, but disagreed with the creditor’s 
conclusion that the debt in question was necessarily nondischargeable.316 
The bankruptcy court explained: “Archer permits a creditor to demonstrate 
that the debt underlying a settlement arises out of fraud, false pretenses or 
false representation, but it does not relieve a creditor of meeting its burden 
under [Code section] 523(a)(2)(A)” to show that the debt is 
nondischargeable.317 
In Sukola v. Nader, the debtor argued that the bankruptcy court could not 
look beyond a settlement agreement to determine whether a debt was 
nondischargeable under Code section 523(a)(2)(A),318 because, unlike in 
Brown and Archer, the settlement agreement was made between the 
plaintiffs and “the [d]ebtor’s wholly owned company, rather than directly 
between the [p]laintiffs and the [d]ebtor.”319 The bankruptcy court 
concluded that this “difference is not determinative as a matter of law” and 
therefore rejected the debtor’s argument.320 The court reasoned that “[t]o 
find Brown and Archer inapplicable would undermine the purpose of 
[Code] section 523 and the Supreme Court’s reasoning.”321 Therefore, the 
court concluded that further inquiry into the true nature of the debt was 
proper.322 
Claim preclusion does not apply in a dischargeability proceeding even if 
“the underlying fraud is twice removed from [the] disputed debt,” unlike the 
once removed settlement agreement as in Brown and Archer.323 For 
instance, in Star High Yield Investment Management Corp. v. Schwartz (In 
                                                                                                                 
 315. Id. at 541-42. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 542 (citing Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 323 (2003); Burrell-Richardson v. 
Mass. Bd. of Higher Educ. (In re Burrell-Richardson), 356 B.R. 797, 802 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 
2006)). 
 318. Sukola v. Nader (In re Nader), No. 11-13042 (DHS), 2012 WL 1614856 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. May 9, 2012). Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Code renders nondischargeable any debt 
“for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the 
extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a 
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition.” 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 319. In re Nader, 2012 WL 1614856, at *4. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Star High Yield Inv. Mgmt. Corp. v. Schwartz (In re Schwartz), No. 07-30508, 
2007 WL 3051865, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007) (emphasis added). 
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re Schwartz), the creditor held a debt that arose “from a state court 
judgment, which arose from breach of a promissory note, which arose from 
a settlement of alleged fraudulent conduct.”324 The creditor commenced an 
adversary proceeding to declare the debt nondischargeable.325 The debtor 
argued he was “entitled to summary judgment because” the creditor’s claim 
arose “from a promissory note, not fraudulent conduct.”326 The court ruled 
that “[l]iable parties can not [sic] erase the history of a debt’s origin through 
a settlement and subsequent breaches of the settlement.”327 Because Archer 
and Brown require bankruptcy courts to inquire into “the conduct from 
which the debt originally arose,” the number of steps between the original 
fraud and the debt the creditor seeks to enforce is irrelevant.328 At least one 
other case accords with this result.329 
The form of the debt that the creditor seeks to declare nondischargeable 
is also generally irrelevant. For instance, Brown and Archer apply “the 
same whether the stipulation arises out of a consent judgment or simply an 
agreement between the parties.”330 Likewise, Brown and Archer apply even 
where the award that the creditor seeks to declare nondischargeable is the 
product of an arbitration rather than a judicial proceeding.331 
A clever litigant may not sidestep Brown and Archer “by narrowly 
defining the claim subject to preclusion as fraud” or another basis for 
dischargeability.332 “The claim is the debtor’s right to discharge, not the 
creditor’s objection, based on fraud, to discharge.”333 
(3) Exceptions to the Exceptions 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, courts have recognized several 
exceptions to Brown and Archer. First, courts have emphasized that Brown 
and Archer stand only for the proposition that claim preclusion does not 
                                                                                                                 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at *1-2. 
 326. Id. at *2. 
 327. Id. at *3. 
 328. Id. 
 329. See Hodges v. Buzzeo (In re Buzzeo), 365 B.R. 578, 580-83 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2007). 
 330. Infinity Grp. LLC v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 477 B.R. 236, 246 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 
2012) (citing Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003)). 
 331. See Data Mountain Solutions, Inc. v. Giordano (In re Giordano), 472 B.R. 313, 323-
24, 335 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012). 
 332. Crowe v. Moran (In re Moran), 413 B.R. 168, 179 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (citing 
Graham v. IRS (In re Graham), 973 F.2d 1089, 1096 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 333. Id. at 180. 
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apply in dischargeability proceedings; they do not stand for the proposition 
that claim preclusion does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings 
generally.334 For instance, “several circuits have recognized that Brown 
applies to the federal dischargeability issue, but not to issues of definition 
of property in the estate, in which Congress has given the states a key 
role.”335   
Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. Jensen (In re Jensen) exemplifies another 
exception to Brown and Archer.336 In that case, the State of Colorado and 
its Attorney General obtained a default judgment against the debtor in state 
court.337 The State then commenced an adversary proceeding against the 
debtor-defendant seeking to declare this debt nondischargeable.338 The 
debtor-defendant attempted to challenge the validity of the underlying 
judgment by arguing that she had not in fact violated the law that gave rise 
to the default judgment.339 The bankruptcy court, notwithstanding Brown 
and Archer, held that claim preclusion barred the debtor-defendant from 
contesting the validity and amount of the debt in the nondischargeability 
proceeding.340 The court reasoned that, although “a bankruptcy court is not 
bound by the state court judgment or record when considering the 
dischargeability of the debt under federal bankruptcy principles,” claim 
preclusion “may prevent the bankruptcy court from reexamining matters 
other than the dischargeability aspect, such as the validity and the amount 
of the debt.”341 The court therefore ruled that the debtor-defendant was 
“precluded” from asking the court “to redetermine the validity and amount 
of the debt” by “alleging that she did not violate the law, and signed an 
admission of violation only under duress.”342 Other decisions recognize this 
exception.343 
                                                                                                                 
 334. See McGarry v. Chew (In re Chew), 496 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 335. Id. (citing Comer v. Comer (In re Comer), 723 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1984); Goss 
v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1983); Collateral Control Corp. v. Deal (In re 
Covington Grain Co.), 638 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 336. 395 B.R. 472 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008). 
 337. Id. at 479. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 491. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. (citing Griego v. Padilla (In re Griego), 64 F.3d 580, 584 (10th Cir. 1995); 
Dennis v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 25 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1994); Comer v. Comer (In re 
Comer), 723 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 342. Id. 
 343. See Davidson v. Investors Title Ins. Co., No. 3:08-cv-00243-FDW, 2008 WL 
4426142, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2008). 
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This exception is sound. Allowing a debtor-defendant to contest the 
underlying debt by raising a new defense in a nondischargeability 
proceeding would upset principles of finality. Unlike dischargeability, the 
parties have the opportunity and incentive to debate the defense to the 
underlying cause of action in the state court. The state court also has the 
authorization and the expertise to determine the merits of the defense, 
which it does not necessarily have in the dischargeability context. 
Another exception applies when the creditor lost in the prior action. The 
creditors in Archer and Brown had each obtained a victory of sorts in the 
prior state court action—a settlement in the former, and a consent judgment 
in the latter. Where, however, the creditor loses completely and entirely in 
the prior state court action, claim preclusion may apply in a dischargeability 
proceeding notwithstanding Archer and Brown. In Gleason v. Gleason (In 
re Gleason), the plaintiff had previously sued the defendant in state court 
for fraud, embezzlement, and theft.344 The state court ruled that the plaintiff 
failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his claims, and therefore 
granted summary judgment to the defendant.345 The plaintiff then brought a 
dischargeability complaint in the defendant’s bankruptcy case on the same 
fraud, embezzlement, and theft claims.346 The bankruptcy court applied 
claim preclusion and dismissed the adversary proceeding.347 Unlike in 
Brown and Archer, the putative creditor in Gleason did not ask the court to 
determine whether an existing debt was nondischargeable. The state court 
had “fully and finally determined that [the p]laintiff ha[d] no claim against 
[the d]efendant.”348 Because no debt existed, there was “no purpose . . . in 
proceeding with a dischargeability complaint to determine whether that 
non-existent debt would theoretically be dischargeable.”349 
Thus, claim preclusion applied even though the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant procured the state court judgment by fraudulent evidence.350 The 
bankruptcy court explained that, if the defendant had done so, the plaintiff 
should have moved the state court to reconsider the judgment and/or 
appealed the judgment to the state appellate courts.351 The plaintiff did 
                                                                                                                 
 344. No. 08-41471, 2009 WL 982154, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 27, 2009). 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. at *1-3. 
 348. Id. at *2. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. 
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neither, and therefore could not use the bankruptcy court as an avenue for 
appellate review of a state court judgment.352 
Gleason is also an obviously correct exception to Brown and Archer. 
When a creditor has already lost in state court, all of the interests normally 
served by finality are present (namely, economy of resources and repose for 
the defendant), while all of the countervailing interests set forth in Brown 
and Archer are absent. Applying claim preclusion to bar a state court loser 
from relitigating her claim in a dischargeability proceeding will not cause 
state courts to make (and state court litigants to defend) premature and 
wasteful dischargeability determinations outside their authority and 
expertise. Nor will applying claim preclusion prevent the searching inquiry 
into the nature of debts envisioned by Congress when enacting the 
dischargeability provisions; that searching inquiry has already been made in 
the state court when the claim was litigated to a conclusion. Nor will 
applying claim preclusion allow debtors to get away with offenses against 
good morals; the state court has already conclusively determined that no 
such offense occurred. Thus, the exception to claim preclusion should only 
apply when a court has determined that debt actually exists. 
Likewise, claim preclusion may apply in a nondischargeability 
proceeding when a bankruptcy court, in an adversary proceeding in a 
previous bankruptcy case involving the same debtor, has entered a 
judgment deeming the debt in question nondischargeable.353 If a bankruptcy 
court deemed a debt nondischargeable in a debtor’s first bankruptcy, the 
debtor cannot challenge the prior court’s determination in his or her second 
bankruptcy.354 Similar results obtain where the parties settle the issue of 
dischargeability in a prior nondischargeability proceeding, and the 
bankruptcy court dismisses the nondischargeability proceeding on the basis 
of that settlement.355 “In other words, once nondischargeable, always 
nondischargeable,”356 and vice versa.357 
                                                                                                                 
 352. Id. The bankruptcy court added in a footnote that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
prohibits such tactics by state court losers. Id. at *2 n.9 (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 
U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994); Abboud v. Abboud (In re Abboud), 237 B.R. 777, 780 (B.A.P. 
10th Cir. 1999)); see also Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
 353. See Sanders v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (In re Sanders), No. AZ-06-1382-PaBMo, 
2007 WL 7540961, at *1-3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2007). 
 354. See id. 
 355. See Hackney v. Hackney (In re Hackney), No. 07-40952-JJR-11, 2008 WL 
4830040, at **1-2, 3-5, 10-12 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Oct. 10, 2008). 
 356. In re Sanders, 2007 WL 7540961, at *3 (citing Paine v. Griffin (In re Paine), 283 
B.R. 33, 37 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)). 
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This exception too seems obviously correct. The importance of finality 
counsels against allowing a debtor to repeatedly relitigate a 
nondischargeability determination by filing successive bankruptcies. 
Moreover, unlike a state or federal court that initially issues the judgment 
giving rise to the debt in question, the bankruptcy court is uniquely 
authorized and qualified to determine the dischargeability of that debt. 
When a bankruptcy court has previously determined that a particular debt is 
nondischargeable, it has done so in an adversary proceeding where the issue 
was squarely presented to the bankruptcy court, and where the parties had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate it. Indeed, because of Brown and Archer, 
the original bankruptcy court has likely already looked behind the facts 
leading to the judgment to determine whether the debt is nondischargeable. 
Thus, claim preclusion does—and should—apply to a bankruptcy court’s 
prior determination that a debt is nondischargeable, even in a subsequent 
nondischargeability proceeding. 
Not all exceptions to Brown and Archer are as obvious as those 
discussed above. Calaway v. Cozart (In re Cozart), for example, is an odd 
case in which the bankruptcy court found Brown and Archer 
inapplicable.358 The creditors sued the debtor, along with the debtor’s 
related corporate entities, for fraud and other causes of action in state 
court.359 Specifically, the creditors alleged that the defendants had induced 
them to purchase a poorly constructed residence through fraud and other 
wrongdoing.360 Because the creditors never served the individual debtor, 
however, the state court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the debtor.361 
The state court accordingly entered judgment against the corporate entities 
but not the debtor.362 While the case was on appeal, the defendants, 
including the individual debtor, entered into a settlement agreement, 
notwithstanding the state court’s prior ruling that the creditors had never 
properly served the individual debtor.363 The debtor then declared 
bankruptcy.364 The creditors then commenced an adversary proceeding, 
seeking a declaration that the state court debt was nondischargeable.365 
                                                                                                                 
 357. See In re Hackney, 2008 WL 4830040, at **1-2, 3-5, 10-12. 
 358. Bankruptcy No. 5:08-bk-73392, 2009 WL 1955294, at *4-5 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. July 
6, 2009). 
 359. Id. at *1. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at *2. 
 365. Id. at *1. 
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The bankruptcy court, notwithstanding Brown and Archer, ruled that it 
could not look behind the settlement agreement.366 It noted that, unlike in 
Archer and Brown, there existed no underlying debt that initially resulted 
from a lawsuit resolved by a settlement or stipulation.367 Although a 
settlement agreement existed in the case, it did not arise from an underlying 
debt; the creditors obtained a judgment from the debtor’s related corporate 
entities, but did not obtain a judgment against the individual debtor.368 
Because the court had dismissed the individual debtor from the underlying 
lawsuit, the debt against the debtor first arose in the settlement agreement 
itself.369  
The bankruptcy court therefore reasoned that, “[w]ithout an underlying 
debt,” it could not “look beyond the settlement agreement; there was no 
debt owed by [the debtor] prior to his entering into the settlement 
agreement.”370 As a result, rather than looking at whether the debtor 
induced the creditors to purchase a shoddy house through fraud, the court 
considered whether the debtor induced the creditors to enter the settlement 
agreement through fraud, false pretenses, or false representations.371  
However, not all courts follow the reasoning of Cozart. For instance, in 
Hodges v. Buzzeo (In re Buzzeo), the codebtor, like the debtor in Cozart, 
was “not a party” to the prior litigation and “was not named as a 
defendant,” but nonetheless “join[ed] as a party to the [s]ettlement 
[a]greement” that was the subject of a nondischargeability proceeding.372 
The bankruptcy court, rather than inquiring whether the codebtor 
committed fraud in entering the settlement agreement, instead inquired 
whether the underlying debt had its genesis in fraud, and denied summary 
judgment because the factual record was insufficient to reach that 
conclusion.373 
Monsour v. Monsour (In re Monsour) is another case with unusual facts 
in which a bankruptcy court concluded that claim preclusion was applicable 
in a dischargeability proceeding notwithstanding Brown and Archer.374 The 
plaintiff-debtor and the defendant-creditor were spouses who filed for 
                                                                                                                 
 366. Id. at *4-5.  
 367. Id. at *5. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at *5-6. 
 372. 365 B.R. 578, 583 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007). 
 373. Id. at 583-85. 
 374. 372 B.R. 272, 277-79 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007). 
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divorce in state court.375 The plaintiff-debtor declared bankruptcy and 
received a discharge before the state court entered a spousal support award, 
but after the state court had entered a final decree of divorce.376 
After the plaintiff-debtor received his discharge, a state court 
commissioner in chancery recommended that the plaintiff-debtor pay a 
lump sum alimony payment to defendant-creditor in order to pay the 
parties’ joint debts.377 The plaintiff-debtor filed exceptions to the 
commissioner’s report in which he “asserted that he received a discharge of 
the lump sum obligation” in the bankruptcy case because “the lump sum 
obligation constituted a property settlement,” which may be dischargeable 
in bankruptcy, “and not spousal support,” which is generally 
nondischargeable.378 The state court overruled the plaintiff-debtor’s 
exceptions.379 The plaintiff-debtor then moved to reopen his bankruptcy 
case and commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a declaration that the 
lump sum obligation had been discharged.380 
The bankruptcy court, with minimal discussion of Brown and Archer, 
ruled that claim preclusion prevented the plaintiff-debtor from relitigating 
whether the lump sum was dischargeable.381 The bankruptcy court noted 
that although “bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction to decide 
exceptions to discharge that arise under” some subsections of Code section 
523(a), “[b]ankruptcy courts and state courts maintain concurrent 
jurisdiction to decide all other exceptions to discharge arising under Section 
523(a), including Section 523(a)(5), which excepts from discharge any debt 
to a spouse for alimony, support or maintenance made in connection with a 
divorce decree.”382 The court stated that the plaintiff-debtor “had an 
opportunity to fully litigate dischargeability and any exceptions arising 
under Section 523(a)(5) in state court proceedings because he filed 
bankruptcy and received his discharge before the [state court] entered its 
[d]ecree.”383 Indeed, as noted above, the plaintiff-debtor “did, in fact, raise 
the issue of dischargeability in the state court proceeding” in his challenge 
                                                                                                                 
 375. Id. at 275. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. at 276. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. 
 381. See id. at 277-79. 
 382. Id. at 278 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 523(a)(5) (1996); In re Crawford, 183 B.R. 
103, 107 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a)). 
 383. Id. (citing Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
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to the commissioner’s report.384 Therefore, the court held that claim 
preclusion barred the plaintiff-debtor from relitigating whether the lump 
sum was dischargeable in the adversary proceeding.385 
Thus, Monsour suggests that claim preclusion may apply in a 
dischargeability proceeding, notwithstanding Brown and Archer, where the 
exception to discharge at issue is one over which state courts share 
concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts, and where the debtor 
receives a discharge before the state court entered its judgment giving rise 
to the debt in question.386 However, even though the Monsour court ruled it 
“need not determine the dischargeability of the lump sum obligation on [its] 
merits,”387 the court nevertheless proceeded to analyze the merits of 
whether the debt was dischargeable in the plaintiff-debtor’s bankruptcy,388 
which suggests that the court’s claim preclusion ruling may be dicta. 
Moreover, the Court did not explicitly analyze how its decision was 
consistent with the Brown and Archer’s holdings that claim preclusion is 
generally inapplicable in dischargeability proceedings.389 Therefore, time 
will tell whether Monsour represents a robust exception to Brown and 
Archer. 
(4) Extensions of Brown and Archer 
Brown and Archer hold that claim preclusion is generally inapplicable in 
nondischargeability proceedings, but a nondischargeability proceeding is 
only one of many types of adversary proceedings a litigant may commence 
in a bankruptcy case. Interestingly, a few courts have extended Brown and 
Archer beyond the nondischargeability context by ruling that claim 
preclusion may be inapplicable in other types of adversary proceedings. 
In Vineyard v. Vineyard (In re Vineyard), the plaintiff filed an adversary 
proceeding in the defendant-debtor’s bankruptcy case “seeking a 
declaration that [the plaintiff was] the owner of certain property in the 
possession of [the d]efendant or, in the alternative, imposition of a 
constructive trust on assets of the [d]efendant.”390 The plaintiff and the 
defendant had previously engaged in state court litigation over certain life 
insurance proceeds, and had entered into two settlement agreements 
                                                                                                                 
 384. Id. at 282. 
 385. Id. at 278. 
 386. Id. at 277-79. 
 387. Id. at 278. 
 388. Id. at 279-82. 
 389. Id. at 277-78. 
 390. No. 10-63518-fra13, 2011 WL 306068, at *1 (Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 27, 2011). 
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throughout the course of the litigation.391 The bankruptcy court noted that 
the plaintiff was “seeking a determination of the ‘nature and extent of 
property of the estate’” in the adversary proceeding, and observed that such 
determinations are “a fundamental core bankruptcy function.”392 The 
bankruptcy court, “analog[izing] to the holding in Archer v. Warner,” ruled 
that it could “look ‘beyond the state-court record and the documents 
terminating the state-court proceeding’ to determine [the p]laintiff’s interest 
in property alleged by [the d]efendant to be property of the estate.”393 By 
ruling that the bankruptcy court could look behind the terms of the 
settlement agreements, the Vineyard court extended Brown and Archer 
beyond the nondischargeability context into other adversary proceedings 
that implicate a “fundamental core bankruptcy function.”394 Time will tell 
whether other courts follow the reasoning of Vineyard and expand Brown 
and Archer beyond its original domain. 
D. Intervening Change in the Law 
As we have previously noted, claim preclusion bars not only claims that 
were brought in a subsequent proceeding, but also claims that could have 
and should have been brought in that prior proceeding. What happens when 
a judicial decision comes down in between the two proceedings that 
arguably provides the litigant with a new legal argument that was not 
available or viable during the prior proceeding? Should claim preclusion 
bar the litigant from raising that new argument? 
In Dover v. United States (Dover II),395 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said claim preclusion should indeed apply in 
such a situation. Dover pled guilty to defrauding Sunbelt Federal Savings 
(Sunbelt), a savings and loan institution.396 He was sentenced to two years 
probation and ordered to pay $19.6 million in criminal restitution to the 
FDIC.397 Dover then filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 
                                                                                                                 
 391. Id. at **1, 3. 
 392. Id. at *4. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. 
 395. 367 F. App'x 651 (6th Cir. 2010). Hereinafter this decision will be cited as Dover II, 
for clarity. “Dover,” unitalicized, shall refer to the plaintiff-appellant in Dover II. We note 
that as an unpublished decision, the precedential value of Dover II is limited. However, the 
issues that it raises are of great interest, and its reasoning is sufficiently persuasive that other 
courts may adopt the decision's logic. 
 396. Id. at 651. 
 397. Id. at 651-52. This is admittedly an oversimplification for the sake of clarity. 
Initially, “[r]estitution was to be paid to the District Court Clerk for disbursement to” an 
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of the Code.398 “Instead of listing a governmental entity as the judgment 
creditor on the schedules filed with the bankruptcy petition, Dover listed 
[Sunbelt] in the amount of $19.6 million.”399 The bankruptcy court entered 
a discharge and closed the case.400 
When Dover made no payments toward the criminal restitution, the 
FDIC brought suit to collect the judgment401 (Dover I402). Dover sought to 
avoid the FDIC’s collection efforts by arguing that the expiration of his 
probation period relieved him of his duty to pay restitution, and that the 
FDIC could not collect the criminal restitution levied against him because 
he and the FDIC settled the civil judgment against him based on the same 
acts.403 The Sixth Circuit “rejected both arguments and granted the FDIC 
summary judgment in the enforcement action, thereby holding that the 
FDIC was entitled to execute on its nineteen million dollar restitution order 
against Dover.”404 
Following Dover I, “Dover again sought to stop the attempts to collect 
the restitution by filing a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against the 
FDIC and the United States. Dover claimed this time that the criminal 
restitution was discharged in his bankruptcy proceedings—a question that 
was not specifically adjudicated in” Dover I.405 The Sixth Circuit in Dover 
II concluded that Dover could have raised the discharge issue in Dover I but 
did not; therefore, Dover was barred by claim preclusion from raising it in 
Dover II.406 
Dover argued, inter alia, that he could not have brought the discharge 
argument in Dover I because an “argument regarding discharge was not a 
viable argument until the Sixth Circuit rendered its decision in Hughes v. 
Sanders several months after Dover I.”407 In Hughes, the Sixth Circuit 
                                                                                                                 
entity known as “the Resolution Trust Corporation as a receiver for Sunbelt,” but “[l]ater, by 
statute, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ('FDIC') succeeded to the Resolution 
Trust Corporation's interest in restitution.” Id. at 652 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(m)(1) 
(2006)). 
 398. Id. at 652. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. Again, we have simplified the procedural posture somewhat for clarity. See id. 
 402. FDIC v. Dover (Dover I), 453 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 403. Dover II, 367 F. App’x at 652.  
 404. Id. (citing Dover I, 453 F.3d at 710). 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. at 651-54. 
 407. Brief of Appellant at 10-11, Dover v. United States, 367 F. App'x 651 (6th Cir. 
2010) (No. 08-6196), 2009 WL 1683546 [hereinafter Dover II Brief]. 
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interpreted Code section 523(a)(7), which renders any “fine, penalty, or 
forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit” that is “not 
compensation for actual pecuniary loss,” other than certain tax penalties, 
nondischargeable in Chapter 7 liquidations.408 The Hughes court held that a 
default judgment entered against a Chapter 7 debtor in a legal malpractice 
action did not fall within section 523(a)(7)'s exception to dischargeability 
because it constituted compensation for actual damages and was payable to 
the plaintiff rather than to a governmental entity.409 Dover argued that his 
criminal restitution order was no different than the judgment deemed 
dischargeable in Hughes, and therefore was discharged in his Chapter 7 
case.410 Dover further argued that Hughes marked a change or clarification 
in the law that could not have been anticipated.411 Therefore, concluded 
                                                                                                                 
 408. 469 F.3d 475, 477 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 409. Id. at 476-79. 
 410. Dover II Brief, supra note 407, at 7-8. 
The Hughes Court held that [Code] § 523(a)(7) only provides an exception to 
discharge for restitution orders that are payable both to and for the benefit of a 
governmental unit. The Hughes Court further determined that when a judgment 
amount is explicitly calculated to compensate the complainant for its damages, 
such a judgment does not fall within the exception to discharge because it is 
compensation for actual pecuniary loss. 
 In [Dover's] criminal case, the restitution was ordered payable to and for the 
benefit of the defrauded victim . . . which was not a governmental unit. Also, 
the restitution was compensation for actual pecuniary loss because it is the 
precise amount of damages alleged by the victim. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 411. Id. at 12, 14, 18, 20. 
In order to understand why Mr. Dover's claim that the restitution obligation was 
discharged in bankruptcy is a valid claim and is a claim that was not available 
in the prior litigation, it is important to first analyze the case that provides the 
basis for that claim. The Hughes case is an interpretation and application of the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Kelly v. Robinson . . . . 
 . . . . 
 Courts have taken the Kelly decision in many different directions. With 
respect to the requirement that the restitution be “payable to and for the benefit 
of a governmental unit,” some courts have adopted Kelly's very broad 
interpretation and have concluded that all restitution is, to some degree, for the 
benefit of the state and, therefore, meets this criteria. Other courts have rejected 
the Kelly approach, opting instead for a literal reading of the statute's 
requirements. Some courts have determined that Kelly only applies to state 
restitution orders. . . . 
 . . . . 
 In summary, the decision in Hughes marked the first time the Sixth Circuit 
had decided to narrowly interpret Kelly and [Code section] 523(a)(7) in such a 
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Dover, he could not have raised this dischargeability argument in Dover I, 
“because the Hughes decision had not been rendered and, accordingly, the 
defense was not available, or 'ripe' for presentation.”412 
The Dover II court rejected Dover's argument. Although the Sixth 
Circuit acknowledged that a change in the factual basis underlying a 
litigant's claim can deprive a prior judgment of claim preclusive effect,413 
the Sixth Circuit, citing an influential treatise, concluded “that a 
clarification in the law” is not “the same as a change in facts . . . . [A] 
change in the law is not a sufficient justification to avoid the res judicata 
effect of the earlier judgment.”414 Because the facts had not changed, Dover 
I and Dover II involved identical causes of action, so the dischargeability 
issue could have and should have been litigated in Dover I.415 
Alternatively, the Dover II court argued that Hughes did not actually 
effect a change in the law at all: 
[T]he law has not changed. At most, Hughes fills a small gap in 
the law regarding federal restitution orders left by the Supreme 
Court decision in Kelly v. Robinson, which held that state 
criminal restitution orders are not dischargeable in federal 
bankruptcy. Dover himself acknowledges that Hughes is “an 
interpretation and application” of the Kelly decision. . . . 
 Additionally, the Kelly decision was handed down years 
before Dover defended against the FDIC enforcement action, as 
were the other Courts of Appeals cases cited by Dover on this 
point. Consequently, Dover had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate his discharge defense at that time. The Hughes decision 
                                                                                                                 
way as to support the argument that a federal restitution order can be 
discharged in bankruptcy. For the first time, the Sixth Circuit endorsed an 
interpretation of 523(a)(7) that comported with its plain language and that, 
arguably, embraced the dissent in Kelly. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . . Prior to Hughes, Mr. Dover did not have such a defense available to 
him because that was not the state of the law in the Sixth Circuit. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 412. Id. at 10. 
 413. Dover II, 367 F. App'x at 653 (citing Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 
521, 529-30 (6th Cir. 2006); Kane v. Magna Mixer Co., 71 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 1995); 
Katt v. Dykhouse, 983 F.2d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 1992)). 
 414. Id. at 653-54 (emphasis added) (citing 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER 
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4415 (2d ed. 2009)). 
 415. Id. 
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does not excuse Dover's failure to make this argument in Dover 
I.416 
The Dover II court therefore concluded that Dover's declaratory judgment 
action was barred by claim preclusion.417 
II. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel) 
A. Definition 
Many practitioners are familiar with the terms “collateral estoppel” and 
“issue preclusion” because the two labels have historically been used 
interchangeably.418 As the latter is the more accurate term, this article will 
exclusively utilize the term “issue preclusion” in lieu of the more antiquated 
“collateral estoppel.” The Restatement (Second) of Judgments defines the 
doctrine as follows: 
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined 
by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential 
to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent 
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different 
claim.419 
The doctrine is intended to conserve judicial resources and to protect the 
adversaries of a party—and sometimes a non-party—from the expense and 
vexation of facing multiple lawsuits.420 In other words, issue preclusion 
prevents issues of ultimate fact from being re-litigated in a future lawsuit if 
those issues have already been determined by a valid and final judgment.421 
This treatment effectively denies litigants a second bite at the apple, 
conserving judicial resources and promoting consistency in judicial 
decisions.422 The “actually litigated” requirement of issue preclusion differs 
from the claim preclusion doctrine, which prevents the litigation of an issue 
                                                                                                                 
 416. Id. at 654. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 n.4 (2009) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980)). 
 419. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980). It should be noted that while 
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides the general rule for issue preclusion, the 
application of these elements vary depending from which underlying court the prior 
judgment came as discussed below. Therefore, this rule, while certainly persuasive, is not 
authoritative in all jurisdictions.  
 420. Berry v. Vollbracht (In re Vollbracht), 276 F. App’x 360, 365 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 421. Vines v. Univ. of La. at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 422. Melnor, Inc. v. Corey (In re Corey), 583 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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or cause of action that has never been litigated.423 In other words, whereas 
claim preclusion bars the relitigation of any claim that was or could have 
been litigated in a prior proceeding, issue preclusion bars any claim based 
on facts that were actually litigated.424 
In Grogan v. Garner, the Supreme Court, while holding that a 
preponderance of the evidence was the correct burden of proof under 11 
U.S.C. § 523, clarified that the issue preclusion doctrine applies in 
bankruptcy proceedings.425 While this was the Court’s first formal 
acknowledgment regarding the doctrine’s applicability to bankruptcy 
proceedings, the Court noted that it was not inconsistent with prior holdings 
under the Code and the former Bankruptcy Act.426 This holding is also 
consistent with the Full Faith and Credit Act,427 which requires all federal 
courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those 
judgments would receive in the courts of the state from which such 
judgments emerged.428 Likewise, federal courts must give deference to 
judgments from an underlying federal court.  
For judgments in diversity cases, “federal law incorporates the rules of 
preclusion applied by the State in which the rendering court sits.”429 Federal 
common law governs the preclusive effect of a judgment issued by a federal 
court sitting in diversity.430 While bankruptcy courts are required to give 
preclusive effect to final judgments entered by a state court, the bankruptcy 
court retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a debt is 
dischargeable.431 In the consumer bankruptcy context, the issue preclusion 
                                                                                                                 
 423. Id. 
 424. Carlson, supra note 1, at 353. 
 425. 498 U.S. 279, 285 n.11 (“We now clarify that collateral estoppel principles do 
indeed apply in discharge exception proceedings pursuant to § 523(a).”). 
 426. Id. (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 48 n.8 (1986); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 
127, 139 n.10 (1979); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 736 (1946)). 
 427. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 428. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 284 n.11; Marciano v. Chapnick (In re Marciano), 708 F.3d 
1123, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013); Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(citing Raju v. Rhodes, 7 F.3d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 429. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 n.4 (2008) (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001)). 
 430. Semtek Int’l Inc., 531 U.S. at 508. 
 431. 11 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 283–85, 291; Gupta v. E. Idaho 
Tumor Inst., Inc. (In re Gupta), 394 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a bankruptcy 
court may apply issue preclusion to prevent re-litigation of findings relevant to 
dischargeability, but the ultimate determination of whether a debt is dischargeable is a 
federal question); Caton v. Trudeau (In re Caton), 157 F.3d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1998) 
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doctrine arises most frequently in situations involving a debtor’s 
discharge.432 
B. Recent Developments 
This section will discuss the current state of the issue preclusion doctrine 
with particular focus on current developments as it applies to consumer 
bankruptcy cases. When initiating an issue preclusion analysis, it is 
necessary to first determine in which court the underlying judgment 
originated to establish the specific elements needed to satisfy the rule. 
While federal common law—as well as the majority of states—generally 
rely on the Restatement (Second)’s interpretation of issue preclusion, a 
body of common law has since developed based on unique jurisdictional 
interpretations of the general rule.433 
1. The Underlying Judgment: What Elements Apply?434 
The first step in an issue preclusion analysis is to determine from which 
jurisdiction the underlying judgment stems. This step is important to 
establish the required elements in an issue preclusion argument. For 
example, the preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by 
                                                                                                                 
(“[Issue preclusion] applies in bankruptcy dischargeability proceedings, but the bankruptcy 
court retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a debt is dischargeable.”). 
 432. In particular, adversary proceedings objecting to a debtor’s discharge pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6). 
 433. In addition to common law interpretations, some states have codified their rendition 
of the issue preclusion doctrine. It is imperative to adhere strictly to the preclusion rule 
adopted by the state that issued the underlying judgment when conducting an issue 
preclusion analysis. The occasional misstatement of an applicable preclusion rule creates 
conflicting case law and misleads the court. 
To illustrate, at least two Louisiana appellate courts declined to recognize the doctrine of 
issue preclusion at all. Regions Bank v. Weber, 2010-1169, pp. 8-9 n.4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 
12/15/10); 53 So. 3d 1284, 1290 n.4 (“We distinguish equitable estoppel and [issue 
preclusion], and emphasize that Louisiana law does not recognize the doctrine of [issue 
preclusion].”); Alonzo v. Louisiana, 2002-0257, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/04); 884 So. 2d 
634, 639 (“With regards to [issue preclusion], it is imperative that we restate that Louisiana 
law does not recognize this doctrine.”). But “Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4231 embraces 
the broad usage of the phrase ‘res judicata’ to include both claim preclusion (res judicata) 
and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).” Williams v. Williams, 2006-1471, p. 3 (La. App. 
1 Cir. 2/9/07); 2007 WL 437767, at *3; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231(3) (2012); 
Foley v. Entergy La., Inc., 06-0983, p. 15 n.4 (La. 11/29/06); 946 So. 2d 144, 156 n.4 
(“While it is true that LSA-R.S. 13:4231(3) adopts issue preclusion in Louisiana, its 
application is strictly limited to narrowly defined circumstances.”). 
 434. In this section, we will attempt to bring clarity to the complexity of the doctrine and 
the confusion associated with its application. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/2
2015]        RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTOPPEL (VOL. II) 799 
 
 
federal principles of issue preclusion,435 whereas particular state-court 
requirements may differ by jurisdiction. Indeed, federal common law 
governs the preclusive effect of a prior decision rendered by a federal court 
sitting in diversity.436 As discussed above, federal common law on issue 
preclusion generally conforms to the rule outlined in the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments.437 Thus, a bankruptcy court’s final order should 
warrant the same preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings whether it be 
a bankruptcy proceeding or otherwise.438 
The finality of a particular bankruptcy order depends on the proceeding 
or controversy that it was designed to resolve, rather than its effect on the 
entire bankruptcy proceeding. The “flexible finality” of a bankruptcy order 
is not a concept that is easily grasped.439 In fact, the flexible finality rule 
may ultimately become a rigid reality for a party that elects to delay the 
appellate process.440 
It is well-settled that federal courts must give state court judgments the 
same preclusive effect they would have in the courts of the rendering 
                                                                                                                 
 435. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (citing Semtek Int’l Inc., 531 U.S. at 
507-08); Foster v. City of El Paso, 308 F. App’x 811, 812 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. McKinney, 936 S.W. 2d 279, 281 (Tex. 1996)); Ball v. A.O. 
Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 436. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376 n.6 (2011) (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. with 
approval); Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. v. Terra XXI, Ltd., 583 F.3d 348, 353 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1325 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 437. A judgment is preclusive in federal court if: (1) the prior or federal decision resulted 
in a judgment on the merits; (2) the same fact issue was litigated in that court; and (3) the 
issue’s disposition was necessary to the prior action’s outcome. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891; 
Ball, 451 F.3d at 69 (citing Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003)); Fin. 
Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Am. Home 
Assur. Co. v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 400 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 2005)). 
 438. While this statement seems axiomatic as to the preclusive effect of bankruptcy court 
orders, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Stern v. Marshall, Executive Benefits 
Insurance Agency v. Arkison, and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif present a 
potential problem. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); Exec. 
Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 
(2011); see also infra Part IV.D. Hence, as will be discussed, perhaps “may warrant” is a 
more appropriate statement. 
 439. A problem Part IV.C.1 infra seeks to remedy. 
 440. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. NA, v. Pac. Lumber Co. (In re SCOPAC), 624 F.3d 274, 
281 (5th Cir. 2010), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 649 F.3d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing whether it is prudent to upset a chapter 11 plan of reorganization thereby 
affecting third-party rights when a period of time has passed after its implementation) 
(citations omitted). 
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state.441 The preclusive effect of prior state court proceedings on federal 
proceedings is determined by the treatment the state court judgment would 
receive in the courts of the state in which those prior proceedings were 
held.442 So while it may be true that most circuit courts (and federal courts 
for that matter) follow the Restatement (Second) of Judgment’s approach to 
determine the preclusive nature of a prior judgment, it is important to 
remember that state courts within a circuit may base their decision to 
preclude an issue using a slightly different approach to the general rule, 
which, as mentioned above, will govern even the highest of federal 
courts.443 
Therefore, a prudent practitioner should be careful not to instinctively 
cite a case from an otherwise mandatory authority when making an issue 
preclusion argument without first determining to which forum’s law the 
court is adhering. This initial determination is not only important to 
establish the correct rule of law but also to shed light on the relative weight 
an underlying jurisdiction may lend to a particular element in an issue 
preclusion analysis. It is for these reasons that each element of issue 
preclusion and their current interpretations are discussed in detail below. 
2. Valid and Final Judgment 
The determination of whether an issue must be precluded from litigation 
in a subsequent action is dependent on the existence of a “valid and final” 
judgment, regarding the same subject matter, issued by a previous court.444 
A judgment is “valid” if a court of competent jurisdiction445 renders a 
decision affecting an entity that has either submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the court or has been given adequate notice and the court has territorial 
                                                                                                                 
 441. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.11 (1991); 
Intervest Nat’l Bank v. Welch, 491 F. App’x 322, 325 (3d Cir. 2012); Vasquez v. YII 
Shipping Co., 692 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 2012); White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 
918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012); Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(applying Mississippi law to determine the preclusive effect of a prior Mississippi state court 
conviction on subsequent bankruptcy proceedings); Plunk v. Yaquinto (In re Plunk), 481 
F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Texas law to determine the preclusive effect of a 
Texas state court judgment on subsequent bankruptcy proceedings); Raspanti v. Keaty (In re 
Keaty), 397 F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that because the underlying judgment 
was from a Louisiana state court, Louisiana issue preclusion rules must apply). 
 442. B.B. v. Bradley (In re Bradley), 466 B.R. 582, 586 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012); 
Honkanen v. Hopper (In re Honkanen), 446 B.R. 373, 382 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); Norris v. 
Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 460-61 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 443. See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 284 n.11. 
 444. Vines v. Univ. of La. at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 2005).  
 445. See infra Part II.D for another issue involving the competency of bankruptcy courts. 
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jurisdiction over the action.446 A judgment is “final” if the prior 
adjudication of an issue is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded 
conclusive effect.447 A judgment is “sufficiently firm” if: 
[T]he court should determine that the decision to be carried over 
was adequately deliberated and firm, even if not final in the 
sense of forming a basis for a judgment already entered. Thus 
preclusion should be refused if the decision was avowedly 
tentative. On the other hand, that the parties were fully heard, 
that the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, that 
the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on 
appeal, are factors supporting the conclusion that the decision is 
final for the purpose of preclusion. The test of finality, however, 
is whether the conclusion in question is procedurally definite and 
not whether the court might have had doubts in reaching the 
decision.448 
The standards for determining the finality of bankruptcy court orders differ 
from those applicable to orders stemming from litigation outside the 
bankruptcy context.449 Indeed, “[f]inality is a fairly strict concept in most 
federal litigation,”450 such that a federal-court action is treated “as a ‘single 
judicial unit’ from which only one appeal can be made.”451 Generally, 
parties “must wait for the entire case to be disposed of before taking an 
appeal.”452 However, bankruptcy courts are not so constrained.453 
                                                                                                                 
 446. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 (1982). 
 447. Id. § 13 (emphasis added). 
 448. Haber v. Biomet, Inc., 578 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982) with approval); Greenway Ctr., Inc. v. Essex Ins. Co., 
475 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 2007) (same). 
 449. Ades-Berg Investors v. Breeden (In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.), 439 F.3d 155, 
160 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sonnax Indus., Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp. (In re 
Sonnax Indus., Inc.), 907 F.2d 1280, 1283 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 450. In re McKinney, 610 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 451. Pinpoint IT Servs., LLC v. Rivera (In re Atlas IT Exp. Corp.), 761 F.3d 177, 181 
(1st Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir. 1983)). 
 452. In re McKinney, 610 F.3d at 401-02 (citing Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 
U.S. 100 (2009)). 
 453. In re Atlas IT Exp. Corp., 761 F.3d at 182 (“[I]n the world of bankruptcy, ‘final’ 
does not just describe the last order entered at the case’s end—you know, the one ‘that 
ultimately disposes of all the debtor’s assets on the basis (perhaps) of the results of many 
individual proceedings and controversies taking place over many years within the context of 
the overall bankruptcy case.’”) (quoting Tringali v. Hathaway Mach. Co., 796 F.2d 553, 558 
(1st Cir. 1986)). 
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The need for different standards arises because a bankruptcy case is an 
umbrella under which several contested matters and adversary proceedings 
may be litigated simultaneously. Proceedings between two third parties may 
come within the bankruptcy court’s subject-matter authority based upon 
only a tangential relationship to the debtor.454 Even so, the outcome in such 
cases may affect the overarching bankruptcy case sufficiently to delay an 
appeal of a final order.455 Conversely, even if the debtor litigates such a 
proceeding as a named party, a decision may be unreviewable if appellate 
jurisdiction exists only at the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding.456 
These two situations comport with the general “finality” requirement in 
federal law, but because bankruptcy cases, quote, often live on for many 
years, courts “take a flexible approach to finality . . . giving that 
requirement a ‘practical’ rather than a ‘technical’ construction.”457 
An area of finality peculiar to bankruptcy is plan confirmation. The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank resolved a 
split among circuit courts by holding that an order denying plan 
confirmation is not “final” for purposes of appeal.458 In doing so, the 
Supreme Court noted that while an ordinary civil litigation case in federal 
                                                                                                                 
 454. In re Bennett Funding Grp, Inc., 439 F.3d at 160 (quoting In re Sonnax Indus., Inc., 
907 F.2d at 1283). Such third parties may be caught in the “large net case by ‘related to’ 
jurisdiction,” which exists if “the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any 
effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Frisia Hartley, L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A. (In re Talsma), 509 B.R. 535, 542 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014) (quoting Celotex 
Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307 n.6 (1995)). 
 455. Or, as is often the case, the appeal of the district court’s final order after de novo 
review of the bankruptcy court’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See 28 
U.S.C. § 157(c) (2012); Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 
(2014). Such a stay may be available under the bankruptcy court’s broad authority under 11 
U.S.C. § 105(a). Cf. Celotex, 514 U.S. at passim. 
 456. See In re Bennett Funding Grp., 439 F.3d at 160. 
 457. In re Atlas IT Exp. Corp., 761 F.3d at 182 (quoting In re Parque Forestal, Inc., 949 
F.3d 504, 508 (1st Cir. 1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Hartford Underwriters 
Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000); Gillespi v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 
U.S. 148, 152 (1964), overruled in part on other grounds by Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. 
v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000)) (internal punctuation omitted). 
As examples of the longevity of bankruptcy cases, the bankruptcy case of chemical maker 
W.R. Grace & Co. was filed on April 2, 2001, and remained open for more than twelve 
years. Peg Brickley, 5 Takeaways From the W.R. Grace Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. BLOG 
(Feb. 3, 2014, 6:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/02/03/5-takeaways-from-the-w-r-
grace-bankruptcy/. Likewise, the chapter 11 bankruptcy case for Mirant Corp., filed in July 
2003, remains open as of the date of publication. In re Mirant Corp., No. 03-46590-dml11 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex filed July 14, 2003). 
 458. 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015).   
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district court typically culminates in a final decision, at which point a 
district court disassociates itself from such case, a bankruptcy case involves 
“an aggregation of individual controversies” that stand independent of the 
larger case itself.459 One such “individual controversy” is an order denying 
confirmation. The Court held that the denial of confirmation with leave to 
amend “changes little” in terms of a debtor’s bankruptcy case. “The 
automatic stay persists. The parties’ rights and obligations remain unsettled. 
The trustee continues to collect funds from the debtor in anticipation of a 
different plan’s eventual confirmation. The possibility of discharge lives on. 
‘Final’ does not describe this state of affairs.”460  
The Supreme Court noted that 11 U.S.C. § 158(a) authorizes appeals “as 
of right not only from final judgments in cases but from ‘final judgments, 
orders, and decrees . . . in cases and proceedings,’” which demonstrates the 
difficulty in applying a rigid formula of finality in the bankruptcy 
context.461 It is for this reason that the “valid and final” judgment 
requirement is slightly more flexible for purposes of bankruptcy court 
orders.462 Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure afford 
bankruptcy courts discretion to grant an appeal taken by leave of court.463 
Given this “flexible” standard, a final judgment does not have to dispose of 
all matters involved in a bankruptcy proceeding in order to have a 
preclusive effect.464 This flexibility is especially important because it 
provides finality to bankruptcy court orders for purposes of appeal or 
preclusion prior to the disposition of the entire case, which may take 
years.465 Although the concept of finality “still suffers from a lack of 
clarity”466 in the bankruptcy context, the Seventh Circuit has noted that: 
While perhaps a contradiction in terms, the concept of flexible 
finality is based both on the traditional approach to bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                 
 459. Id. at 1691-92. 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. at 1692 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2012)). 
 462. The “valid and final” judgment requirement is also more flexible in an issue 
preclusion analysis than it is under a claim preclusion analysis. See Klein, supra note 1, at 
853; cf. supra Part I. 
 463. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012). 
 464. Pye v. Dep’t of Transp. of Ga., 513 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1975); Guion v. Sims (In 
re Sims), 479 B.R. 415, 421 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 465. Additionally, a bankruptcy court order may be considered a “valid and final” 
judgment even if such order is pending on appeal. See In re Sims, 479 B.R. at 421 (citing 
Pye, 513 F.2d at 292); cf. S.P. Auto Sales, Inc. v. Benites (In re Benites), No. 11-35444-
SGJ-7, 2012 WL 4793469, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2012). 
 466. In re Comdisco, Inc., 538 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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proceedings and the commonsense understanding that the 
breadth of bankruptcy cases necessitates an approach that allows 
for the efficient resolution of certain discrete disputes that may 
arise in a given bankruptcy.467 
The importance of this initial element of an issue preclusion argument 
should not be overlooked. Indeed, failing to properly establish whether a 
“valid and final” judgment exists could be detrimental to a practitioner’s 
argument. Therefore, when developing an issue preclusion argument, 
practitioners should be mindful of the flexible nature of bankruptcy court 
orders and tailor their arguments accordingly. Moreover, as is often argued, 
practitioners should be mindful of the overlay of powers available under 
§ 105(a) of the Code for a court to fashion equitable relief.468 
3. The Litigation Requirement 
Inherent to the doctrine of issue preclusion is the requirement that an 
individual be afforded the opportunity to be heard prior to the rendering of 
a judgment to which he or she may later be bound. Thus, as a matter of 
practice, certain judgments will not support the application of issue 
preclusion in subsequent litigation because the issues were never “actually 
litigated” in the first place.469 
While an issue need not be thoroughly litigated to satisfy this 
requirement, a showing must be made that “the parties disputed the issue 
and the trier of fact resolved it.”470 This determination may seem like a 
formality at first blush, but this term of art has been interpreted and applied 
differently depending on the jurisdiction. Indeed, the litigation requirement 
has become particularly relevant in circumstances when an issue of fact or 
law has been previously waived or when addressing judgments previously 
entered by confession, consent, or default. 
a) Waiver 
Waiver is a developing topic within the “actually litigated” requirement. 
In Clark v. Zwanziger (In re Zwanziger), the Tenth Circuit considered the 
“novel question” of whether a bankruptcy court must give preclusive effect 
to a district court’s final determination that a party waived an issue.471 In 
                                                                                                                 
 467. In re McKinney, 610 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 468. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).  
 469. Klein, supra note 1, at 854. 
 470. Gambino v. Koonce, 757 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Harmon v. Gordon, 
712 F.3d 1044, 1055 n.4 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
 471. 741 F.3d 74, 75 (10th Cir. 2014). 
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that case, plaintiffs sued their former employer for fraud and violations of 
certain state wage laws and requested additional damages for emotional 
distress.472 The plaintiffs’ included their request for damages based on 
emotional distress in their complaint but failed to list such damages in the 
final pretrial order.473 Notwithstanding the omission, the jury ruled in favor 
of plaintiffs and ultimately awarded them a combined sum of $573,000.474 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict on liability, but 
held that the plaintiffs waived their right to damages for emotional distress 
by failing to include them in the pretrial order.475 In so holding, the court 
noted that it could not determine what portion of the award was attributable 
to damages for emotional distress and remanded the case back to the district 
court to re-calculate damages.476 Before the district court could recalculate 
damages, the defendant filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy.477 Shortly thereafter, 
the plaintiffs filed an adversary in the defendant-debtor’s bankruptcy case 
to determine how much of the liability was nondischargeable.478 
The bankruptcy court determined that it was not bound by the remand 
instructions and awarded plaintiffs $181,300 in nondischargeable damages 
of which $50,000 was attributable to damages for emotional distress.479 The 
defendant-debtor appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) 
arguing that claim preclusion prevented the bankruptcy court from 
including damages for emotional distress.480 The BAP determined that the 
issue of whether plaintiffs waived emotional distress damages was fully and 
finally litigated in the circuit court and therefore binding on any subsequent 
court.481 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the BAP decision and held 
that “[a] finding that an issue of fact or law is waived is not a decision on 
the merits” and therefore not afforded preclusive effect in a subsequent 
case.482 
                                                                                                                 
 472. Id. at 76. 
 473. Id. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. (citing Hamilton v. Water Whole Int'l Corp., 302 F. App’x 789, 797 (10th Cir. 
2008) (“[D]amages not included in the pretrial order are waived even if they appeared in the 
complaint.”)). 
 476. Id. 
 477. Id. 
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. 
 480. Id. The BAP held that claim preclusion did not apply, but determined that issue 
preclusion did. Id. 
 481. Id. 
 482. Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
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Although the case law is scant, Zwanziger represents a logical approach 
to the preclusive nature of a prior court’s determination that a party waived 
his or her argument. That is, “[w]here there has been no hearing [on the 
merits], and therefore no findings, there can be no issue preclusion.”483 
Thus, “waiver as a general matter is a procedural determination that 
governs only the case in which it is made—not another case—except in the 
rare instance when waiver is imposed as a sanction intended to preclude 
future litigation of that substantive issue.”484 
b) Settlement Agreements and Consent Judgments 
Compared to the evolving authority on waiver, settlement agreements 
and consent judgments are typically favored by courts as a means of 
resolving costly disputes. Indeed, such agreed decisions are “useful 
device[s] to resolve disputes and are as much of an adjudication for 
purposes of applying the principle of judgment preclusion as any other final 
judgment.”485 Courts will often look to the intent of the parties to determine 
whether such agreement or judgment should be afforded preclusive 
effect.486 Thus, to attain preclusive effect, settlement agreements and 
consent judgments must also satisfy the “actually litigated” requirement. 
The majority of courts have held that an agreed judgment is afforded the 
same preclusive effect that a judgment on the merits entered at the end of a 
trial is afforded.487  
  
                                                                                                                 
 483. Id. at 78 (quoting Borges Colon v. Roman-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2006)). 
 484. Id. (citing Melnor, Inc. v. Corey (In re Corey), 583 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 
2009)). 
 485. Bowers v. Bd. of Appeals, 448 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983). 
 486. Blacksmith Invs., Inc. v. Woodford (In re Woodford), 418 B.R. 644, 652 (B.A.P. 1st 
Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen considering a consent judgment founded upon an agreement of the 
parties, the court must examine the issue of ‘intention’ when determining whether the 
‘actually litigated’ requirement of [issue preclusion] has been fulfilled.”).  
 487. Plunk v. Yaquinto, Jr. (In re Plunk), 481 F.3d 302, 308 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that 
agreed judgments in Texas have the same degree of finality and binding force as judgments 
reached at the end of adversary proceedings); Diamond Fields, L.L.C. v. Rankin Cnty., No. 
3:09-CV-00451, 2011 WL 8198518, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2011) (“[C]onsent 
judgments receive the same force as regular judgments, in binding parties under [issue 
preclusion].”); Chaisson v. Cent. Crane Serv., 2010-0112, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/29/10); 44 
So.3d 883, 886 (noting that while the doctrine of issue preclusion is ordinarily premised on a 
final judgment on the merits, it also applies where the opposing parties enter into a 
compromise or settlement of a disputed matter). 
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c) Traditional v. Post-Answer Default Judgments 
The preclusive effect of a default judgment generally hinges on the 
parties’ level of participation in the initial lawsuit that gave rise to the 
default judgment. A traditional default judgment contains no specific 
findings but simply an unopposed judgment. In most jurisdictions, such a 
naked default judgment does not satisfy the “actually litigated” 
requirement. Indeed, the majority of courts have held that a traditional 
default judgment lacks the “actually litigated” prong because it is not a 
“judgment on the merits” and therefore has no preclusive effect on 
subsequent hearings.488 
Despite this majority position, a bankruptcy court may be forced to reach 
a different result where the underlying state law dictates that a traditional 
default judgment has preclusive effect. Some state appellate courts have 
suggested that a default judgment “imports absolute verity, and is as 
effectual and binding as if pronounced upon a trial upon the merits.”489 
Courts following this approach place less emphasis on whether an issue was 
“actually litigated” and instead focus on whether a default judgment 
constitutes a final judgment on the merits.490 
Post-answer default judgments are less controversial. Courts generally 
afford preclusive effect to a post-answer default judgment. For example, in 
Harrison v. Kiwi Services, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that issue preclusion 
was proper “where the defendant’s answer places the merits of the 
plaintiff’s cause of action at issue, where judgment cannot be entered on the 
pleadings, and therefore, where a plaintiff in such a case must offer 
evidence to prove his case is more than just a garden variety default 
judgment.”491 In fact, the majority of courts agree that a post-answer default 
                                                                                                                 
 488. See, e.g., Gessin v. Taitano (In re Gessin), Nos. 12-1330-JuKiD, NV-11-51818, 
2013 WL 829095, at *5-6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2013) (noting that default judgments are 
generally not entitled to preclusive effect). But see Clarke v. Latimer (In re Latimer), No. 
14-0004, 2014 WL 2441469, at *2 (Bankr. D. Haw. May 29, 2014) (noting that Idaho law 
gives preclusive effect to unopposed default judgments); Voss v. Pujdak (In re Pujdak), 462 
B.R. 560, 568-69 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011). 
 489. TransDulles Ctr., Inc. v. Sharma, 472 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Va. 1996) (quoting Neale v. 
Utz, 75 Va. 480, 488 (1881)); see also Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 627 A.2d 374, 379 
(Conn. 1993). 
 490. Dominquez v. Elias (In re Elias), 302 B.R. 900, 912 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) 
(quoting Olson v. Kirkham, 720 P.2d 217, 220 (Idaho 1986)). 
 491. 180 F. App’x 485, 487 (citing Garner v. Lehrer (In re Garner), 56 F.3d 677, 680 
(5th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998)). 
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judgment should be afforded preclusive effect.492 When the default occurs 
post-answer, the litigant has engaged the judicial process sufficiently to 
invoke the “fully and fairly litigated” prong.493 
4. Same Facts and Legal Standard 
In addition to a “valid and final” judgment, that was “actually litigated” 
in a prior hearing, the underlying facts and legal standard used to assess 
those facts must be the same in both proceedings for an issue to be afforded 
preclusive effect.494 Thus, while the underlying factual setting in both 
matters may be the same, if the legal standard to be applied is different in 
each, the issues are not identical and issue preclusion should not apply.495 
Most courts appear to agree with the underlying rule, although some courts 
are stricter than others in its application. 
A prior court’s determination regarding a defendant’s liability (or, in a 
criminal proceeding, culpability) stemming from a cause of action or charge 
will not result in per se preclusivity, regardless of whether the underlying 
cause of action is identical in name to one that appears in the Code (e.g., 
fraud, embezzlement, or larceny).496 Indeed, bankruptcy courts within the 
Fifth Circuit have consistently applied a narrow interpretation of certain 
elements and causes of action.497 
                                                                                                                 
 492. Gamble-Ledbetter v. Andra Grp., L.P. (In re Gamble-Ledbetter), 419 B.R. 682, 694 
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that a consent or agreed judgment is effectively a written 
agreement and adjudication of an issue between parties and is as conclusive as any other 
judgment); Gilleylen v. Evans (In re Evans), 252 B.R. 366, 371 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2000) 
(“In Mississippi, the application of the doctrine of [issue preclusion] can clearly be 
predicated on a previous default judgment.”); Crain v. Limbaugh (In re Limbaugh), 155 B.R. 
952, 956 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993). 
 493. In re Limbaugh, 155 B.R. at 955–57. 
 494. Fin. Acquisition Partners L.P. v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2006); see 
also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288-91 (1991). 
 495. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 284-85 (noting that if a clear-and-convincing standard, and not 
a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, is applied in nondischargeability proceedings, 
“the prior judgment could not be given collateral estoppel effect”); S.P. Auto Sales, Inc. v. 
Benites (In re Benites), No. 11-35444-SGJ-7, 2012 WL 4793469, at *1 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. Oct. 9, 2012) (citing RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1291 (5th Cir. 
1995)). 
 496. Gupta v. E. Idaho Tumor Inst., Inc. (In re Gupta), 394 F.3d 347, 349-50 (5th Cir. 
2004) (holding that a bankruptcy court may apply preclusion to findings relevant to 
dischargeability, but the ultimate determination of whether a debt is dischargeable, is a 
federal question). 
 497. See, e.g., Guerra & Moore Ltd., L.L.P. v. Cantu (In re Cantu), 389 F. App’x 342, 
345 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Despite similarities in the language used to describe an injury under 
[s]ection 523(a)(6) and intentional torts, [s]ection 523(a)(6) creates a narrower category of 
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Issue preclusion may also not apply when a prior court fails to designate 
the legal standard used to determine the underlying judgment. At least one 
bankruptcy court has declined to apply preclusion of a state court judgment 
because the state court did not specifically list findings of fact or which 
legal standard was used to support a judgment.498 Such a conclusion is 
logical because the later court cannot discern whether the earlier court 
determined if even a minimal burden was satisfied. 
What make less sense are the decisions where the earlier court applied a 
higher legal standard. While it would seem logical for a court to give 
deference to a prior court’s decision that was determined using a higher 
burden of proof than is needed in a subsequent proceeding, the results have 
been mixed. Several courts have concluded that a prior judgment decided 
by a higher legal standard may not satisfy a strict interpretation of the 
“same legal standard” test in a subsequent proceeding.499 
Therefore, creditors’ attorneys should fully investigate both the facts and 
legal standard used to determine whether a prior judgment may preclude a 
debtor from re-litigating facts that may be helpful to attaining a 
nondischargeable debt. Debtors’ attorneys or trustees would be served by 
scrutinizing prior judgments to look for broad interpretations and differing 
standards of law. 
  
                                                                                                                 
tortious conduct.”) (quoting Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re 
Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 509 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re 
Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1998) (“While the definition of ‘fiduciary’ under 
§ 523(a)(4) is controlled by federal common law rather than Texas law, it is clear that the 
federal common law definition is even narrower than the Texas definition.”). 
 498. In re Benites, 2012 WL 4793469, at *1 (“[S]ince there were no findings or 
reasoning whatsoever set forth in the State Court Judgment . . . there was no basis to allow 
the court to conclude, as a matter of law, that the State Court Judgment was 
nondischargeable . . . .”). 
 499. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Prince (In re Prince), No. 09-43627, 2011 WL 
861114, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2011) (finding that application of the issue 
preclusion doctrine was warranted when a prior court found fraud using a “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard while bankruptcy proceedings, in contrast, only require the lower 
standard of preponderance of evidence). Cf. Knott v. Donahoe, No. 3:11-CV-00256-CWR-
FKB, 2011 WL 6399920, at *3 n.29 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2011) (“[T]here is a different 
burden of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) in the criminal proceeding from the burden of 
proof (preponderance) to be employed in these civil proceedings resulting from the instant 
Complaint. That fact alone precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”) 
(citing Lanier v. Oktibbeha Cnty. Hosp., No. CIV.A.1:95CV206-D-D, 1996 WL 671361, at 
*4 n.7 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 1996)). 
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5. The Facts Were Essential to the Prior Judgment 
In addition to being the same facts as in the earlier judgment, the facts 
must also have been essential to the outcome of the earlier judgment. A 
subsequent judgment would expand the holding of an earlier judgment if 
preclusive effect were given to dicta and other irrelevant facts. Courts have 
historically required a clear and coherent holding from the prior court for 
such judgment to be afforded preclusive effect.500 This substantive 
evaluation usually amounts to a fact-specific determination made by the 
reviewing court. 
Such determinations may become increasingly complex where both a 
civil and criminal proceeding predate the bankruptcy court’s determination 
of whether a debt is nondischargeable. The decision in Fitch v. Fitch (In re 
Fitch) provides an interesting example.501 There, the bankruptcy court had 
to determine whether to afford preclusive effect to a no-answer default 
judgment or a criminal restitution order in a nondischargeability proceeding 
brought under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and (7).502 
The facts in Fitch are relatively straightforward. The debtor-defendant 
entered into agreement to sell his late mother’s house for $150,000 to a 
company owned by his business partner.503 Around the same time, the 
business partner contracted to sell the house to a third party for $275,000.504 
Both transactions closed on January 7, 1997.505 Almost three years later, in 
August 2000, the brother of the debtor-defendant became guardian of his 
late-mother’s estate (the Guardian) and sued the debtor-defendant in 
probate court over the house transactions alleging fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duty.506 The debtor-defendant failed to respond, and the probate 
court entered a no-answer default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.507 In 
doing so, the probate court awarded damages for breach of fiduciary duties, 
                                                                                                                 
 500. Tex. Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l, Inc., 951 F.2d 684, 691 (5th Cir. 
1992) (declining to give preclusive effect to a prior decision that “wallows in a pig sty of 
confusion”); see also Olstowski v. Petroleum Analyzer Co., L.P. (In re ATOM Instrument 
Corp.), 478 B.R. 252, 261 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding that where there are alternative 
plausible bases for a prior decision, issue preclusion will not bar the relitigation of the same). 
 501. 349 B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 502. Id. at 135-36. 
 503. Id. at 136. Prior to her death, the mother of the debtor-defendant had executed a 
power of attorney appointing the debtor-defendant as her agency with respect to the 
mother’s property, including her house. Id. 
 504. Id. 
 505. Id. 
 506. Id. 
 507. Id. 
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constructive fraud, and statutory fraud (the Default Judgment).508 Shortly 
thereafter, the State of Texas brought a criminal complaint against the 
debtor-defendant relating to the house transactions.509 As part of a plea 
bargain, the debtor-defendant pled guilty to second-degree theft and was 
ordered to pay $150,000 in restitution (the Restitution Order).510 
Two years after the Restitution Order, the debtor-defendant filed for 
chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing the Default Judgment as being contingent and 
of an unknown amount.511 The Guardian-brother filed an adversary 
proceeding on behalf of his mother’s estate to declare the Default Judgment 
to be non-dischargeable.512 The Guardian filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that the debtor-defendant’s guilty plea to second degree 
theft “involved the same conduct which formed the basis” for the damages 
awarded in the Default Judgment.513 Thus, the Guardian argued, the finding 
of second-degree theft was equivalent to common law larceny in federal 
courts, which is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).514 
Effectively, the Guardian attempted to bolster the Default Judgment with 
the Restitution Order to bootstrap his § 523(a)(4) claim.515 But the 
bankruptcy court segregated the two earlier judgments and analyzed them 
separately.516 While controversy existed as to whether the Restitution Order 
was “actually litigated,” the bankruptcy court declined to afford the Default 
Judgment preclusive effect.517 Breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, 
and statutory fraud all require different elements than the criminal charge to 
which the debtor-defendant pled guilty.518 As a result, the Guardian could 
not demonstrate that the elements of larceny under § 523(a)(4) were 
essential to the probate court’s findings of fraud and breach of fiduciary 
duty.519 Accordingly, the Default Judgment—aside from being a no-answer 
                                                                                                                 
 508. Id. 
 509. Id. at 136-37. 
 510. Id. at 137. 
 511. Id. 
 512. Id. at 137-38. 
 513. Id. at 137-39. 
 514. Id. at 138. 
 515. Id. at 136. 
 516. Id. at 136-38. 
 517. Id. at 141-42. 
 518. Id. at 143. 
 519. Id. 
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default judgment—had no preclusive effect with respect to fraud for the 
purpose of dischargeability.520 
Fitch demonstrates several critical steps in the preclusion analysis. First, 
the decision shows that a prior judgment cannot be used to establish the 
preclusive effect of a subsequent judgment without a showing that the facts 
are essential to the court’s determination of the second judgment. Second, 
the analysis shows the difficulty of aligning fraud elements under state law 
and federal law concerning dischargeability. And, finally, although not 
directly on-point, the decision also demonstrates a situation where a 
criminal judgment (the Restitution Order) may provide grounds for a 
subsequent nondischargeability action, assuming the elements align and the 
court will afford preclusive effect to the higher burden of proof. 
As to this second lesson from Fitch—the difficulty of aligning elements 
under state and federal law—a line of cases under § 523(a)(6) provides 
another example. Section 523(a)(6) of the Code excepts from discharge any 
debt for “willful and malicious injury by [a] debtor to another entity or to 
the property of another entity.”521 The Supreme Court has defined a 
“willful” injury as “a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a 
deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.”522 The authority has split 
as to what level of culpability Geiger requires under § 523(a)(6).523 
The split of authority turns on from whose perspective “willful and 
malicious” is adjudged. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have interpreted 
Geiger to require a subjective standard—that is, the debtor “must have 
wished to cause injury or at least believed it was substantially certain to 
                                                                                                                 
 520. Id. Ultimately, the parties agreed that the Restitution Order was non-dischargeable. 
Id. at 138. The bankruptcy court held that the mother’s estate was entitled to recover the 
$150,000 under the Restitution Order. Id. at 143. 
 521. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012). 
 522. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998). 
 523. Compare Via Christi Reg'l. Med. Ctr. v. Englehart (In re Englehart), No. 99–3339, 
2000 WL 1275614, at *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 8, 2000) (adopting a subjective standard); 
Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 465 n.10 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); 
Johnson v. Davis (In re Davis), 262 B.R. 663, 670-71 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001) (same); and 
KMK Factoring, L.L.C. v. McKnew (In re McKnew), 270 B.R. 593, 634–41 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 2001) (same); with Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999) (adopting an objective standard); Baldwin v. 
Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 245 B.R. 131, 136 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) (same); and J. Bowers 
Constr. Co. v. Williams (In re Williams), 233 B.R. 398, 405 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) 
(same); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (adopting a subjective 
standard). 
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occur.”524 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a lesser standard, 
requiring only that the injury have been made with “either an objective 
substantial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm.”525 
Thus, “[t]he key difference between the Miller and Markowitz holdings is 
that Markowitz followed the Restatement's requirement that the debtor 
believe that his actions will with substantial certainty cause injury, while in 
Miller the subjective belief of the debtor as to the certainty of the harm was 
not controlling.”526 
The difficulty with aligning the elements required by fraud under state 
law and under § 523(a)(6) comes from this circuit split. For example, 
consider the common interaction between a state court judgment of fraud 
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)527 and 
§ 523(a)(6).528 The DTPA includes a so-called “laundry list” of fraudulent 
actions that include “[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in 
the conduct of any trade or commerce . . . .”529 Moreover, the DTPA 
defines “intentionally” as “actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or 
unfairness of the act or practice . . . coupled with the specific intent that the 
consumer act in detrimental reliance on the falsity or deception or in 
detrimental ignorance of the unfairness.”530 And intentionality may be 
inferred by objective circumstances.531 
Despite the specificity of these state statutes, it is still possible even in 
the Fifth Circuit that the objective-intent paradigm for interpreting Geiger 
from Miller represents an independent element. That result is likely even 
more secure under a state following the Markowitz or subjective-intent 
standard of Geiger. As a result, even a valid and final state court judgment 
in which the DTPA was actually litigated, and which turned on the same 
facts and legal standard, may not itself establish fraud under § 523(a)(6). 
6. Mutuality of Parties 
Generally, if all the other elements of issue preclusion are met, mutuality 
is not required. In such situations, the parties need not have been 
                                                                                                                 
 524. In re Englehart, 2000 WL 1275614, at *3 (citing In re Markowitz, 190 F.3d at 465 
n.10). 
 525. In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 606. 
 526. Su v. Carrillo (In re Su), 259 B.R. 909, 913 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001). 
 527. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (West 2013). 
 528. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012). 
 529. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a). 
 530. Id. § 17.45(13). 
 531. Id. 
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adversaries in a previous cause of action for an issue to be precluded from 
re-litigation in a subsequent cause of action. Indeed, under the approach of 
the Restatement (Second) of Judgment approach, the application of issue 
preclusion does not require strict mutuality of parties.532 Not all courts 
agree with the relaxed standard proposed by the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments. 
In Taylor v. Sturgell, the Supreme Court held that federal common law 
does not extend the preclusive effect of a judgment to a non-party in a 
subsequent case.533 In so holding, the Court determined that “one is not 
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not 
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of 
process.”534 The Court noted that the application of issue preclusion to non-
parties “runs up against the ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone 
should have his own day in court.’”535 Nonetheless, the rule against 
nonparty preclusion is subject to recognized exceptions that can be grouped 
into six categories. 
First, “[a] person who agrees to be bound by the determination 
of issues in an action between others is bound in accordance with 
the terms of his agreement.”536 
Second, nonparty preclusion may be justified based on a variety 
of pre-existing “substantive legal relationship[s]” between the 
person to be bound and a party to the judgment.537 
Third, we have confirmed that, “in certain limited 
circumstances,” a nonparty may be bound by a judgment 
because she was “adequately represented by someone with the 
same interests who [wa]s a party” to the suit.538 
                                                                                                                 
 532. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
 533. 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008). 
 534. Id. (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)). 
 535. Id. at 892-93 (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)). 
 536. Id. at 893 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 40). A common example of binding parties by agreement is where two different plaintiffs 
sue a common defendant, and the parties all agree that the defendant’s liability, if any, will 
be determined by one of the cases. Id. 
 537. Id. at 894 (alteration in original) (quoting DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 75–92 (2001)). 
 538. Id. at 894 (alteration in original) (quoting Richards, 517 U.S. at 798). This exception 
binds parties in privity with one another, such as binding the ward or beneficiary of the trust 
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Fourth, a nonparty is bound by a judgment if she “assume[d] 
control” over the litigation in which that judgment was 
rendered.539 
Fifth, a party bound by a judgment may not avoid its preclusive 
force by relitigating through a proxy.540 
Sixth, in certain circumstances a special statutory scheme may 
“expressly foreclos[e] successive litigation by nonlitigants . . . if 
the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process.”541 
When determining the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, 
bankruptcy courts must look to the underlying state law regarding 
mutuality. In this regard, most states have held that, unlike claim 
preclusion, issue preclusion does not require strict mutuality of parties.542 
Although strict mutuality may not be required, the party asserting issue 
preclusion must have been in privity with the adverse party in the prior 
action for the doctrine to apply.543 Privity may be established between two 
parties where the subsequent party (1) controlled the first action if she was 
not a party to it, (2) had her interest represented by a the earlier party’s 
actions, or (3) was a successor-in-interest to the earlier party.544 
Practitioners should be aware that while the Fifth Circuit will apply the 
relaxed rule outlined in the Restatement (Second) when determining 
mutuality of parties arising from a federal judgment, state courts might be 
less permissive. 
                                                                                                                 
when the guardian or trustee litigates an issue in his official capacity. Richards, 517 U.S. at 
798. 
 539. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 895 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 
(1979)). 
 540. Id. Related to third exception, this fifth exception binds the principal where the 
agent litigated as the principal’s proxy. Id.  
 541. Id. (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989), superseded by statute as 
stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)). 
 542. See, e.g., Livingston v. Transnation Title Ins. Co. (In re Livingston), 372 F. App’x 
613, 617 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Michigan courts have instructed that an issue ‘must be identical to 
that determined in the prior action’ to have been actually litigated.”); Vines v. Univ. of La. at 
Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Terrell v. DeConna, 877 F.2d 1267, 1270 
(5th Cir. 1989)). 
 543. Vines, 398 F.3d at 705; Limon v. Berryco Barge Lines, L.L.C., 779 F. Supp. 2d 577, 
583 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 544. Fitch v. Fitch (In re Fitch), 349 B.R. 133, 141 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (citing 
McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 379 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
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C. A “New” Problem Potentially Plaguing the Preclusive Effect of 
Bankruptcy Court Orders  
A corollary issue to the “valid and final judgment” element of issue 
preclusion may be brewing following the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Stern v. Marshall545 and Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison.546 
We note pejoratively that this problem is “new.” Stern and Executive 
Benefits are the latest in a line of cases from the Supreme Court spanning 
over three decades, beginning in 1982 with Northern Pipeline Construction 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,547 that limit the constitutional authority of 
bankruptcy courts following congressional overreach. In Stern, the Court 
identified one type of proceeding—and implicated others—over which 
bankruptcy courts have statutory subject-matter jurisdiction but lack 
constitutional final-order authority.548 The relevant statute authorized the 
bankruptcy court to enter a final order whereas the Constitution reserved 
such final-order authority for a judge clothed in Article III powers.549 
A slew of decisions following the decision coined such situations “Stern 
claims.” The Court adopted the moniker in Executive Benefits and provided 
a temporary field dressing to bandage the constitutional infirmity.550 But the 
potential problem arises when a court must decide whether a bankruptcy 
court’s final order in a Stern claim merits preclusive effect in a subsequent 
case. After all, as the district court in Kirschner v. Agoglia observed,  
If there is no appeal, the [bankruptcy court’s] grant of the motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a final judgment 
dismissing the claim and is given [claim preclusion] and [issue 
preclusion] effect. But this cannot be proper unless the 
bankruptcy court had the power to render final judgment in the 
first place.551 
This section explores that dilemma and the potential cure posed most 
recently by the Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International 
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif.552 
                                                                                                                 
 545. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 546. 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014). 
 547. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 548. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 549. Id. 
 550. Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2172. 
 551. 476 B.R. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citations omitted). 
 552. 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
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1. From the 1978 Amendments to Stern 
To explore the problem, an overview is necessary of the statutory and 
constitutional issues and the direction provided in Stern, Executive Benefits, 
and Wellness International.553 Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests “the 
judicial Power of the United States” in judges with salary protection and 
life tenure.554 Federal district courts are empowered under Article III; 
bankruptcy courts are created pursuant to Congress’s powers “[t]o 
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 
United States.”555 Without guaranteed protections as to his salary and 
tenure, a bankruptcy judge’s ability to exercise “the judicial Power of the 
United States” is limited to those matters that lie “at the core of federal 
bankruptcy power.”556 
As Congress bears the responsibility for enacting bankruptcy laws, 
Congress causes an authority problem by over-allocating authority to 
bankruptcy courts. For example, in Northern Pipeline, the Court struck 
down the allocation of authority between the district and bankruptcy courts 
                                                                                                                 
 553. For a more in-depth discussion of the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts, see 
Ralph Brubaker, A “Summary” Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy Judges' 
Core Jurisdiction After Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121 (2012); Timothy S. 
Springer, Two and a Half Hurdles Between Eurozone Debts and U.S. Courts: How Recent 
Distressed Foreign Deals Could Soon Be Unwound Domestically, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1109 
(2013); Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting the Stern Decision, BANKR. LITIG. 
(ABA Bankr. & Insolvency Litig. Comm.), Winter 2012, at 2, available at http://apps. 
americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/winter2012-survey-interpreting-ster 
n.html; Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting the Stern Decision, Part II, BANKR. 
LITIG. (ABA Bankr. & Insolvency Litig. Comm.), Spring 2012, at 4; Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey 
of Cases Interpreting the Stern Decision, Part III, BANKR. LITIG. (ABA Bankr. & Insolvency 
Litig. Comm.), Summer 2012, at 2; Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting the Stern 
Decision, Part IV, BANKR. LITIG. (ABA Bankr. & Insolvency Litig. Comm.), Fall 2012, at 2, 
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/fall2012-
1212-survey-cases-interpreting-stern-decision-part-iv.html; Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey of Cases 
Interpreting the Stern Decision, Part V, BANKR. LITIG. (ABA Bankr. & Insolvency Litig. 
Comm.), Winter 2013, at 2, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bank 
ruptcy/articles/winter2013-0313-survey-cases-interpreting-stern-decision-part-v.html; Omar J. 
Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting Stern v. Marshall, Part VI, BANKR. LITIG. (ABA Bankr. 
& Insolvency Litig. Comm.), Spring 2013, at 2, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/ 
litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/spring2013-0613-survey-cases-interpreting-stern-deci 
sion-part-vi.html. 
 554. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 555. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 556. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (plurality 
op.). 
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Congress had enacted in 1978.557 The initial version of the Code dispensed 
with the former “summary/plenary” powers scheme and granted bankruptcy 
courts—directly and exclusively—broad jurisdiction over all matters 
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.558 These 
powers included final-order authority over the breach of contract claim at 
issue in Northern Pipeline, which the Court held should have been reserved 
for Article-III determination.559 The Court stayed the effect of its ruling to 
give Congress two years to fix the problem.560 
In response, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA), amending title 28 of the U.S. Code to 
include sections 157 and 1334.561 Section 1334 grants district courts 
“original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11” and original, 
but not exclusive, jurisdiction “of all civil proceedings arising under title 
11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.”562 By way of section 
157, the district court may refer “any or all” bankruptcy cases and 
proceedings to their respective district’s bankruptcy judges.563 The district 
court may exercise this broad authority itself, or, as is often the practice by 
local rule, the district court may refer this power to the bankruptcy court.564 
Even upon referral, the district court keeps a continuing, albeit passive, 
oversight role pursuant to its ability to withdraw the reference to the 
bankruptcy of any case or proceeding court at any time.565 
Unlike the broad powers permitted in 1978, a bankruptcy court’s 
authority upon referral under § 157 today depends on the type of matter or 
                                                                                                                 
 557. Id. at 86-87. 
 558. Id. at 52-53; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 46 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6008 (“The withdrawal from state and federal district courts of 
jurisdiction of the so-called plenary proceedings, when coupled with the establishment of 
uniform federal standards and rules . . . should eliminate a source of uncertainty and division 
of authority which has characterized bankruptcy law.”). 
 559. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 (“We conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1471, as added by 
§ 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of ‘the 
essential attributes of the judicial power’ from the Art. III district court, and has vested those 
attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an 
exercise of Congress' power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts.”). 
 560. Id. at 88 (“This limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the 
bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the 
interim administration of the bankruptcy laws.”). 
 561. Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 101, 104, 98 Stat. 333, 333, 340-41. 
 562. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b) (2006). 
 563. Id. § 157(a). 
 564. Id.  
 565. Id. § 157(d). 
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proceeding. Dispensing with the “summary/plenary” distinction of 
authority, Congress adopted the language used by the Supreme Court in 
Northern Pipeline and created “core” and “non-core” authority.566 The 
Court in Executive Benefits succinctly summarized the procedural 
distinction between core and non-core matters and proceedings, stating: 
Put simply: If a matter is core, the statute empowers the 
bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on the claim, subject to 
appellate review by the district court. If a matter is non-core, and 
the parties have not consented to final adjudication by the 
bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy judge must propose findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. Then, the district court must review 
the proceeding de novo and enter final judgment.567 
“Core” proceedings include “arising under” and “arising in” proceedings.568 
In comparison, “related to” jurisdiction exists if “the outcome of that 
proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being 
administered in bankruptcy.”569 
Constitutional concerns arise, as in Stern, where § 157 authorizes a 
bankruptcy court to enter a final order but the Constitution does not. “Stern 
involved a dispute over a considerable inheritance, and a widow’s attempt 
to recover in bankruptcy court for a tort claim against her late husband’s 
son.”570 The tort counterclaim arose neither under title 11 nor exclusively in 
                                                                                                                 
 566. Id. § 157(b)-(c); N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71 (“But the restructuring of debtor-
creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be 
distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private rights, such as the right to 
recover contract damages that is at issue in this case.”) (emphasis added). 
 567. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2172 (2014); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (requiring a de novo standard of review for a bankruptcy court’s 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law); FED. R. BANKR. P. 8013 (requiring a clear 
error standard of review for a bankruptcy court’s factual findings). 
 568. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2605 (2011). “‘Arising 
under’ jurisdiction involves causes of action created or determined by a statutory provision 
of title 11. ‘Arising in’ jurisdiction is ‘not based on a right expressly created by title 11, but 
is based on claims that have no existence outside of bankruptcy.’” Frisia Hartley, L.L.C. v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Talsma), 509 B.R. 535, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014). 
 569. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. 
Higgins, 743 F. 2d 984, 994 (1984)). “That state law may affect a proceeding's resolution 
cannot be the sole basis by which a proceeding is excluded from the otherwise large net cast 
by ‘related to’ jurisdiction.” In re Talsma, 509 B.R. at 542 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3)). 
 570. Springer, supra note 553, at 1139. The son filed an adversary against the widow for 
alleged defamation, along with an attendant proof of claim for the damages, and the 
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cases under title 11, thus § 157(c) should have limited the bankruptcy court 
to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.571 But “counterclaims 
by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate” is a category 
included in the non-exhaustive example list of core proceedings under 
§ 157(b)(2),572 so the bankruptcy court entered a final order.573 
As it had in Northern Pipeline, the Court held the offending authority 
statute unconstitutional, although limiting its decision to § 157(b)(2)(C).574 
While the core/non-core labels allocated statutory authority, the Court 
distilled the constitutional authority to “the question [of] whether the action 
at issue stems from the bankruptcy [case] itself or would necessarily be 
resolved in the claims allowance process.”575 
2. From Stern to Executive Benefits 
The Court provided little guidance beyond saying the decision was 
limited. As a result, “the maelstrom surrounding Stern . . . created 
considerable consternation among bankruptcy courts and practitioners 
trying to grapple with [the decision’s] implications.”576 Among the many 
questions left after the decision was the question of this section: What of 
the final orders already in place in Stern claims? Could a bankruptcy court’s 
final order in a Stern claim—that is, one in which the Constitution denies a 
bankruptcy court final-order authority—be considered valid and due 
preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings? And what about consent, 
whether express or implied by litigation conduct? Section 157(c)(2) 
authorizes a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a “related to” 
proceeding with the consent of all parties.577 Does the consent of the parties 
elucidate a navigable path around the constitutional concerns identified by 
Stern and its progeny? 
                                                                                                                 
bankruptcy estate counterclaimed for tortious interference with a gift. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 
2601. 
We underplay the trappings of the Stern facts by using generic terms of “widow” and 
“son.” Vickie Lynn Marshall, the widow, was known to the public as Anna Nicole Smith. Id. 
at 2601. The Stern decision was the second by the Supreme Court in the saga, much of 
which was publicized in the tabloids as well as the Supreme Court Reporter. See Marshall v. 
Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 300-05 (2006). 
 571. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). 
 572. Id. § 157(b)(2)(C). 
 573. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 574. Id. at 2619-20. 
 575. Id. at 2618. 
 576. Springer, supra note 553, at 1141. 
 577. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2). 
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The problem is not limited to final orders pursuant to § 157(b)(2)(C), but 
rather all claims potentially reached by the sweeping reasoning in Stern. 
Following fractured dissections of the decision by district and bankruptcy 
courts,578 the circuit courts of appeals began to divide on what qualified as a 
“Stern claim” and, more importantly, what to do with such claims. The 
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have read Stern broadly as delivering a 
debilitating blow to bankruptcy courts’ authority.579 Despite the self-
limiting language in Stern,580 these circuits have extrapolated the sweeping 
reasoning employed by the Stern Court to question sharply the limits of 
bankruptcy court power.581 Additionally, these three circuits followed the 
Court’s analysis in Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor582 
of private rights versus structural interests implicated by the separation of 
powers, concluding that Stern claims implicate structural concerns beyond 
the curing power of private litigants’ consent.583 Given the broad reasoning 
employed by the Stern Court, these circuits followed the inference that 
concern for structure protections eclipses any tongue-and-cheek declaration 
that the status quo remains unchanged.584 
In comparison, the Ninth Circuit took a more practical approach in In re 
Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.585 There, Executive Benefits Insurance 
Agency (EBIA), the target a fraudulent transfer claim brought by the 
                                                                                                                 
 578. See generally Alaniz, supra note 553. 
 579. BP RE, L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, L.L.C. (In re BP RE, L.P.), 735 F.3d 279, 
290-91 (5th Cir. 2013); Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P. (In re Frazin), 732 F.3d 313, 324-
25 (5th Cir. 2013); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 775-76 (7th Cir. 
2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 918-21 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 580. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620 (“We conclude today that Congress, in one isolated 
respect, exceeded that limitation in the Bankruptcy Act of 1984.”). 
 581. See supra note 579.  
 582. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 583. In re BP RE, L.P., 735 F.3d at 286-87 (citing Schor, 478 U.S. at 850); Wellness 
Int’l, 727 F.3d at 769-70 (same); Waldman, 698 F.3d at 917-18 (same); see also Frazin, 732 
F.3d at 320 n.3 (noting same in dicta). 
 584. See George W. Kuney, Stern v. Marshall: A Likely Return to the Bankruptcy Act's 
Summary / Plenary Distinction in Article III Terms, 21 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 Art. 
1 (2012) (Westlaw) (“Justice Breyer may not have been able to command a majority of the 
court and thus be ‘constitutionally correct,’ but he has definitely been right about one thing: 
Justice Roberts's statement that as a ‘practical matter’ the Stern v. Marshall decision ‘does 
not change all that much’ was either tongue-in-cheek or decidedly incorrect.”). Cf. Stern, 
131 S. Ct. at 2620 (“If our decision today does not change all that much, then why the 
fuss?”). 
 585. 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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chapter 7 trustee, argued that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional 
authority to determine a fraudulent transfer claim.586 The Ninth Circuit 
agreed, holding that Stern and the Court’s earlier decision in 
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg587 required an Article III court to 
determine fraudulent transfer claims.588 But the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the power to “hear and determine” includes the power to issue 
proposed findings and conclusions.589 Because “Congress enumerated the 
examples of core proceedings in § 157(b)(2) with ‘a view toward expanding 
the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to its constitutional limit,’”590 the panel 
reasoned that Congress intended for a bankruptcy court to be “vested with 
as much adjudicatory power as the Constitution will bear.”591 By this logic, 
where Article III concerns are implicated, the bankruptcy court may 
exercise discretion to issue proposed findings and conclusions under 
§ 157(b) rather than issuing a final order.592 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari following the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Executive Benefits, providing the Court its first opportunity to 
revisit Stern. The Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.593 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas assumed without deciding 
that Stern infected fraudulent transfer claims, holding that a de novo review 
of the bankruptcy court’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
cured any constitutional deficiency.594 This holding closed the so-called 
“statutory gap” debated among the circuit and lower courts.595 Moreover, 
the Court directed bankruptcy courts, upon identifying a Stern claim, to 
                                                                                                                 
 586. Id. at 561-65. 
 587. 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
 588. In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d at 565-66. 
 589. Id. 
 590. Id. at 565 (quoting Duck v. Munn (In re Mankin), 823 F.2d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir. 
1987), overruled by Exec. Benefits, 702 F.3d at 561). 
 591. Id. 
 592. Id. at 566. 
 593. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2174 (2014). 
 594. Id. at 2174-75. 
 595. Compare Waldman v. State, 698 F.3d 910, 921 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a 
bankruptcy court could not issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law when 
determining a core proceeding under § 157(b)(2) because it would violate the separation of 
powers), with In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d at 565-66 (holding that no 
statutory gap existed because the power to “hear and determine” a proceeding under 
§ 157(b)(2) encompassed the power to merely hear and submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to a district court). 
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issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to be reviewed de 
novo by the district court.596 
3. Executive Benefits to Wellness International and Beyond 
The court in Executive Benefits expressly left unanswered “whether 
Article III permits a bankruptcy court, with the consent of the parties, to 
enter final judgment on a Stern claim.”597 Instead the Court “reserve[d] that 
question for another day.”598 Soon thereafter, the Court set a date to answer 
that question, granting certiorari to the Seventh Circuit in Wellness 
International599 and certifying a question squarely addressing whether 
consent by litigation conduct can authorize a bankruptcy court to exercise 
“the judicial Power of the United States.”600 So practitioners and courts 
needed only to wait one term for the next round of the heavyweight bout 
between articles I and III of the U.S. Constitution. 
The facts of Wellness International are familiar to many practitioners 
who are “chasing” information from debtors. The eventual debtor, Sharif, 
sued its former business partner, Wellness International Network 
(Wellness), for breach of contract in the Northern District of Texas.601 
Sharif ignored numerous discovery requests, ultimately resulting in a 
default judgment for Wellness and a $650,000 sanction for attorneys’ fees 
against Sharif.602 To stave off collection efforts, Sharif filed for chapter 7 
bankruptcy in the Northern District of Illinois.603 Wellness, as a creditor 
and party in interest, requested documentation that the now-debtor Sharif 
was obligated to provide under 11 U.S.C. § 521.604 Again, Sharif balked at 
the request. 
In response, Wellness filed a five-count adversary proceeding, seeking, 
among other things, a denial of Sharif’s discharge in bankruptcy and a 
declaration that a trust Sharif set up was Sharif’s alter ego and, therefore, 
was property of the estate under § 541(a).605 In his answer, Sharif, as 
                                                                                                                 
 596. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, 134 S. Ct. at 2173. 
 597. Id. at 2070 n.4. 
 598. Id. at 2070.  
 599. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 134 S. Ct. 2901, 2901 (2014).  
 600. Brief for Respondent at 41, Wellness Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (No. 13-935). 
 601. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1940-42 (2015).  
 602. Id. at 1940. 
 603. Id. 
 604. See id. 
 605. Id. Notably, while many academics awaited the result of the bankruptcy authority 
question in Wellness International, many consumer practitioners waited an answer on the 
§ 541 question. That answer did not come, at least this time, because the Court only reached 
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required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012, admitted the 
adversary proceeding was a “core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).606 
Following additional discovery violations and sanctions, the bankruptcy 
court entered a final order denying Sharif’s discharge and, importantly, 
determining that the trust was Sharif’s alter ego and, therefore, property of 
the estate under § 541.607 Following an appeal to the district court, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the bankruptcy court lacked 
constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on the trust issue, which 
the Seventh Circuit designated a Stern claim.608 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding 
that Sharif’s consent to bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the “core 
proceeding” was knowing and voluntary.609 Speaking in categories, the 
justices in the minority in Stern carried a majority in Wellness 
International. And the new majority could not leave the flip-flop 
unannounced. Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, quelled any 
concerns that “the world will end not in fire or ice, but in a bankruptcy 
court.”610 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor downplayed formerly colorful 
rhetoric about article III judges forgoing their constitutional birthrights too 
easily.611 
Instead, the majority’s analysis emphasized the practical implications of 
the decision and the need for relying not on “formalistic and unbending 
rules,” but instead acting “with an eye to the practice effect that the practice 
will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.”612 
First, the majority distinguished Stern by reemphasizing the explicitly 
narrow scope of Stern.613 Next, the majority reasoned that Stern did not 
                                                                                                                 
the authority question on certiorari. So debtor’s attorneys must continue to wait for 
instruction of whether the alter ego theories asserts in Wellness International will affect the 
debtor’s requirements for scheduling assets under § 521.  
 606. Id. 
 607. Id. 
 608. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 773 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 609. Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1947-49. 
 610. Id. 
 611. Compare id. at 1947 (noting that reaffirming adjudication based on litigant consent 
“poses no great threat to anyone’s birthrights, constitutional or otherwise”), with Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 51, Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, No. 12-1200 (Jan. 14, 2014) 
(Roberts, C.J.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tran 
scripts/12-1200_5f57.pdf (“[T]he authority to decide cases, which is our constitutional 
birthright, we said in Stern that Congress can't take that away from us. And your position is 
that two parties who come in off the street, if they agree, and take that away from us.”).  
 612. Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1944. 
 613. Id. at 1946-47. 
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apply because that narrow focus meant consent to adjudication by a 
bankruptcy court was unsettled.614 Finally, the majority aligned its decision 
on constitutional consent in bankruptcy court with the well-settled 
constitutional consent in other article I courts, including magistrate 
courts.615 
Six justices agreed that knowing and voluntary express consent is 
sufficient for a bankruptcy court to enter a final order. Perhaps more 
importantly, particularly for the issue of appellate jurisdiction, five justices 
agreed that “[t]he implied consent standard articulated in Roell supplies the 
appropriate rule for adjudication by bankruptcy courts under § 157.”616 
Accordingly, a majority of the Court agreed that implied consent will allow 
a bankruptcy court to enter a final order so long as the consent was knowing 
and voluntary.617 The Court also noted that, a previously noted in Executive 
Benefits, obtaining express statements of consent or nonconsent remains 
“good practice.”618 
The Court’s decision in Executive Benefits settled some of the concern 
about “valid and final judgments” in Stern claims—at least going forward. 
When in doubt, practitioners can plead Stern and obtain from the district 
court either a de novo review or a stern reprimand. Either way, the result 
will validate a bankruptcy court order for preclusive effect. 
But the question remained, at least after Executive Benefits, for 
bankruptcy courts’ final orders in Stern claims where the appeals deadline 
has expired and a district court blessing is unavailable. One bankruptcy 
commentator has noted that “[i]f the Stern right can’t be waived, then 
presumably the issue can be raised months or even years later, perhaps with 
the effect that the same dispute can be litigated once again, even between 
the same parties in a different court.”619 
Now, after Wellness International, the Supreme Court has clarified that 
district-court adjudication of a Stern claim can waived.620 So the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Wellness International settles waiver concerns in theory. 
                                                                                                                 
 614. Id. 
 615. Id. at 1947 n.11. 
 616. Id. at 1948 (citing Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003)). 
 617. Id. at 1948-49. 
 618. Id. at 1948 n.13.  
 619. Bill Rochelle, Supreme Court Opening Another Constitutional Can of Worms, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 26, 2013), available at https://utcle.org/ecourses/OC4719/get-asset-
file/asset_id/31329 (emphasis added). 
 620. Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1946-49. Express consent carried six votes, while 
implied consent garnered only three. See id. at 1944-49; id. at 1949-50 (Alito, J., 
concurring); id. at 1950-60 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
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Bankruptcy courts will have to interpret Wellness International and import 
the Roell line of cases concerning implied waiver into bankruptcy 
jurisprudence.621 As to express waiver, practitioners should secure consent 
to a bankruptcy court’s final order wherever possible to avoid the 
unnecessary expense of litigating the issue. To that end, two early 
developments are worth noting. Initially, continuing a trend begun after 
Stern, districts and individual bankruptcy courts are using local rules and 
case management orders to require litigants to file statements of consent by 
set deadlines after the filing of an adversary proceeding.622  
At present, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7008 and 7012 only 
require statements of consent in non-core proceedings.623 Long term, Rules 
7008 and 7012 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure may soon 
require a statement of consent in all adversary proceedings, not merely non-
core proceedings.624 But, until proposed rules requiring consent in all 
adversary proceedings take effect, local rules and scheduling orders may 
before the norm regarding consent. 
Another area to which issues with the preclusive effect of final orders in 
Stern claims may extend is bankruptcy appeals. Appeals from a bankruptcy 
court are normally taken first to the district court or, in some circuits, to a 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP or BAPs, as appropriate).625 A BAP is 
composed of three bankruptcy judges of a different district within the 
circuit than from which the appeal was taken.626 Alternatively, for novel 
issues of law of public importance that require an immediate disposition, 
the bankruptcy court may certify, and the circuit court may authorize, a 
direct appeal to the circuit court.627 
Two problems arise. First, a BAP is composed of article I judges—that 
is, no judge whose “birthright” is to exercise “the judicial Power of the 
United States.”628 Even a de novo review would suffer from the same 
                                                                                                                 
 621. See id. at 1947-48. 
 622. E.g., Order Requiring Statement Regarding Consent, El Paso Children’s Hosp. 
Corp. v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist. (In re El Paso Children’s Hosp. Corp.), No. 15-3005-hcm 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. June 5, 2015). 
 623. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008(a), 7012(b). 
 624. Report of the Judicial Conference, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
at 6-7, 9 (Sept. 2013). 
 625. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(b) (2012). 
 626. Id. § 158(b)(1), (5). 
 627. Id. § 158(d)(2)(A). 
 628. Id. § 157(b)(1); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 611, at 51:1-51:5 
(“[T]he authority to decide cases, which is our Constitutional birthright, we said in Stern that 
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constitutional infirmities identified in Stern. So error at the bankruptcy level 
may actually be compounded at the appellate level in circuits authorizing 
BAPs. Second, even the federal courts of appeals—clearly composed of 
article III judges—may face similar problems. Following the logic of 
flawed bankruptcy court authority, the decision of an appellate court 
reviewing a direct appeal from a bankruptcy court’s final order in a Stern 
claim may likewise be plagued with issues of “valid and final judgment.”629 
In Ortiz, the Seventh Circuit recognized this second problem while 
deciding an appeal that had been pending when Stern was decided. After 
considering the parties’ additional briefing about Stern’s effect on the 
bankruptcy court’s final order, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the 
bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter the final order 
authorized for the core claims by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).630 As a result, the 
panel concluded that the bankruptcy court’s lack of constitutional authority 
stripped the circuit court of its power to authorize a direct appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).631 The panel reasoned that the bankruptcy court’s 
orders “[could not] be considered interlocutory under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(3), or final decisions, judgments, orders, or decrees within the 
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).”632 Yet the direct appeal provision in 
§ 158(d)(2)(A) requires a final order, not proposed findings of fact or 
conclusions of law, which in turn requires either a core matter or 
proceeding under § 157(b) or a consensual related-to proceeding under 
§ 157(c)(2).633 Thus, the panel had an order that had to be considered final 
or else the court lacked appellate jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit opted for 
the later determination, dismissing the appeal and remanding the 
proceeding to the bankruptcy court.634 
Of course, the question of bankruptcy appeals may likewise be solved 
under the construct in Wellness International. Although article I judges 
comprise BAPs, knowing and voluntary consent to appellate jurisdiction 
may likewise cure the constitutional deficiency without threatening 
anyone’s birthright.635 The Seventh Circuit did not address waiver in Ortiz, 
                                                                                                                 
Congress can’t take that away from us. And your position is that two parties who come in off 
the street, if they agree, they can take that away from us.”). 
 629. Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906, 908-09 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
 630. Id. at 914. 
 631. Id. at 915. 
 632. Id. 
 633. Id. at 909, 915.  
 634. Id. at 915. 
 635. See Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1947.  
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so the precedential value of that case as to bankruptcy appeals is unsettled. 
Even so, bankruptcy courts, BAPs, or circuit courts will likely have to 
address whether Wellness International reaches this area of article I judge 
authority. 
These lingering questions potentially undermine the preclusive effect of 
bankruptcy court orders in Stern claims. Practitioners can ensure preclusive 
effect by seeking the district court’s blessing of a bankruptcy court’s order, 
in accordance with the procedure Justice Thomas outlined in Executive 
Benefits. Further developments in consent requirements by court, local, or 
federal rule will also clarify the effect of article I adjudication on the issue 
preclusion doctrine. 
D. Offensive and Defensive Uses of Issue Preclusion 
Assuming an order merits preclusive effect, the doctrine may be used 
both offensively and defensively. The Restatement (Second) does not 
specifically distinguish between offensive and defensive issue preclusion,636 
but case law has established slightly different approaches in the offensive 
and defensive application. Offensive use of issue preclusion is when a 
plaintiff seeks to preclude a defendant from re-litigating an issue, which the 
defendant previously litigated and lost in a suit involving another party. 
Defensive use of issue preclusion is claimed when a plaintiff has previously 
litigated and lost an issue against another defendant. Although parties may 
come to an agreement that the issue preclusion doctrine does not apply in 
the case at hand, the application of issue preclusion is a matter of law, not 
of agreement.637 
In light of the due process implications and potential consequences that 
are associated with non-mutual or “offensive” issue preclusion, the 
Restatement (Second) has provided a secondary set of factors to assist 
courts in determining whether preclusion would lead to unjust results. 
A party precluded from re-litigating an issue with an opposing party, in 
accordance with sections 27 and 28, is also precluded from doing so with 
another person, unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording 
him an opportunity to re-litigate the issue. The circumstances to which 
                                                                                                                 
 636. The Restatement (Second) does, however, suggest additional safeguards when 
applying issue preclusion to a non-party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 
(1982); see supra Part II.F (“Exceptions to Issue Preclusion”) for a more in depth discussion 
on offensive and defensive issue preclusion. 
 637. Gamble-Ledbetter v. Andra Group, L.P. (In re Gamble-Ledbetter), 419 B.R. 682, 
694 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009). 
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considerations should be given include those enumerated in § 28 and also 
whether: 
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be 
incompatible with an applicable scheme of administering the 
remedies in the actions involved; 
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against 
whom preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the 
presentation and determination of the issue that were not 
available in the first action and could likely result in the issue 
being differently determined; 
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to 
avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the 
first action between himself and his present adversary; 
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself 
inconsistent with another determination of the same issue; 
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by 
relationships among the parties to the first action that are not 
present in the subsequent action, or apparently was based on a 
compromise verdict or finding; 
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may 
complicate determination of issues in the subsequent action or 
prejudice the interests of another party thereto; 
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively 
determined would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for 
obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it was 
based; 
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the 
party be permitted to relitigate the issue.638 
E. Exceptions to Issue Preclusion 
Notwithstanding the successful application of all elements required for 
issue preclusion, a bankruptcy court may still decline to afford a prior 
judgment preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings under the following 
circumstances: 
                                                                                                                 
 638. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29. 
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(1) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a 
matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial 
action; or 
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims 
that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is 
warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in 
the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable 
administration of the laws; or 
(3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences 
in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the 
two courts or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction 
between them; or 
(4) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a 
significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the 
issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action; the 
burden has shifted to his adversary; or the adversary has a 
significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action; or 
(5) There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination 
of the issue (a) because of the potential adverse impact of the 
determination on the public interest or the interests of persons 
not themselves parties in the initial action, (b) because it was not 
sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the 
issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or 
(c) because the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the 
conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not 
have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and 
fair adjudication in the initial action.639 
III. Practice Tips 
What practice tips can attorneys take away from the foregoing other than 
those the article has already identified? First, it is crucial to understand the 
difference between claim and issue preclusion. As demonstrated above, the 
two doctrines serve different purposes and have different elements. As a 
result, there will be cases where only one of the two doctrines will apply. 
The practitioner must therefore argue the correct branch of preclusion, lest 
she risk the possibility that the court will construe her argument to plead the 
                                                                                                                 
 639. Id. § 28. 
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incorrect form of preclusion. This is particularly important in 
dischargeability proceedings, where, as described extensively above, claim 
preclusion is generally inapplicable.640 Sometimes the court will consider 
both types of preclusion when a practitioner pleads the wrong form of 
preclusion,641 but sometimes the court will deem the correct argument 
waived if not explicitly pleaded.642 Therefore, the practitioner should not 
rely on the court to make her legal argument for her. 
IV. Other Related Doctrines for Practitioners to Consider 
Several doctrines related to the preclusion doctrines described above and 
the estoppel doctrines discussed in the prior volume of this article also 
come into play in consumer bankruptcies. These include the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine,643 law of the case,644 promissory estoppel,645 standing 
(particularly with respect to reservation of rights provisions),646 quasi-
estoppel,647 laches,648 in pari delicto,649 and others.650 While there is not 
                                                                                                                 
 640. See, e.g., Rustin v. Rustin (In re Rustin), No. 04-50890-NPO, 2011 WL 5443067, at 
*6 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Nov. 9, 2011); Rahman v. Park (In re Park), No. 09-78622-dte, 2011 
WL 1344495, at *4, *4 n.3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2011). 
 641. See, e.g., In re Park, 2011 WL 1344495, at *4; Forrest v. Bressler (In re Bressler), 
387 B.R. 446, 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); Bublitz Mach. Co. v. Brewer (In re Brewer), No. 
05-51960, 2006 WL 1109409, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 2006); cf. Davis Oil Co. v. 
Vann (In re Vann), No. 08-11824-DHW, 2009 WL 1311592, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. May 
11, 2009) (reconstruing plaintiff’s judicial estoppel argument as a claim preclusion 
argument). 
 642. See, e.g., In re Rustin, 2011 WL 5443067, at *6 (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. 
Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
 643. D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 
413 (1923). For recent cases applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the consumer 
bankruptcy context, see, for example, Newman v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 473 B.R. 447 
(Bankr. D. Utah 2012). 
 644. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Robinson Prop. Group, 661 F. Supp. 2d 622, 625-26 (N.D. 
Miss. 2009), motion to amend denied, No. 2:07CV048-P-A, 2009 WL 3003261 (N.D. Miss., 
Sept. 16, 2009), aff'd 373 F. App’x 494 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 645. See, e.g., Aceves v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507, 513-19 (Ct. App. 
2011). 
 646. See, e.g., Dynasty Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating, 
L.L.C.), 540 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 647. See, e.g., Forman v. Amboy Nat'l Bank (In re Price), 361 B.R. 68, 78-82 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 2007) (holding that although judicial and equitable estoppel were both inapplicable, 
quasi-estoppel barred chapter 11 trustee from seeking recovery of fees paid to mortgage 
lender upon closing on debtors' real property); see also Hall v. Hopkins (In re Jacobs), No. 
04–42387, 2006 WL 4451566, at *5 (Bankr. D. Idaho, Feb. 10, 2006) (distinguishing quasi-
estoppel from equitable estoppel). 
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space in this article to define these doctrines and discuss their application in 
detail, we urge practitioners to familiarize themselves with these doctrines 
and brainstorm ways to utilize them against their opponents—or at least 
prevent them from being used against their clients. 
V. Conclusion 
“[S]hame on the poor lawyer who has a case dismissed sua sponte by a 
court on . . . grounds that the lawyer has never even heard of.”651 As these 
once obscure doctrines become increasingly important in the consumer 
bankruptcy realm, it is incumbent upon practitioners to familiarize 
themselves with the nuances and tensions of estoppel and preclusion law. 
We have attempted to catalogue, as exhaustively as possible, the most 
crucial post-2005 developments in these areas. We encourage attorneys to 
also familiarize themselves with the articles written on developments that 
occurred prior to 2005. 
As the foregoing has demonstrated, with few exceptions, the doctrines of 
estoppel and preclusion are in a state of flux. There is plenty of wiggle 
room for creative practitioners to develop these doctrines in innovative 
ways that serve their clients, be they debtors or creditors, plaintiffs or 
defendants, or trustees.652 We hope that this article can assist that 
development in ways that are sensible, coherent, and consistent. 
                                                                                                                 
 648. See, e.g., In re Hawkins, 377 B.R. 761, 768-71 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding both 
(1) creditor's equitable lien claim and (2) creditor's attempt to reclassify debt as secured 
barred by laches due to creditor's lack of diligence). 
 649. See, e.g., Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 666 F.3d 955, 965-68 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 650. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Kipperman (In re Adams), Nos. SC–07–1283–
KMkDo, SC–07–1394–KMkDo, 2008 WL 8444788, at *7-9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008) 
(discussing the rule/duty of consistency, “which is in the nature of an estoppel”); Cotter v. 
Skylands Cmty. Bank (In re Cotter), No. 08-12504 (NLW), 2011 WL 5900811, at *5-6 
(Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2011) (discussing the “entire controversy doctrine,” a preclusive 
doctrine that exists under New Jersey law, in the context of a bankruptcy case); In re 
Hawkins, 377 B.R. at 771-72 (applying “general principles of equity”). 
 651. Eric A. Schreiber, Comment, The Judiciary Says, You Can't Have It Both Ways: 
Judicial Estoppel—A Doctrine Precluding Inconsistent Positions, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 
324 (1996). 
 652. That said, of course, we caution against the abusive use of preclusive doctrines. One 
should only plead them if they are supportable. See FED R. BANKR. P. 9011(b)-(c); see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)-(c). Estoppel and preclusion should not become stock, knee-jerk 
arguments that are employed every time an opposing party is haled into court against its will, 
in the way that Stern v. Marshall objections are often reflexively raised in bankruptcy courts 
nowadays. 
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